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SARAH MICHELLE POPE
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ABSTRACT
By applying learned rules, humans are able to accurately solve many problems with
minimal cognitive effort; yet, this sort of habit-based problem solving may readily foster a type
of cognitive inflexibility termed ‘cognitive set’. Cognitive set occurs when an alternative – even
more efficient – strategy is masked by a known, familiar solution. In this research, I explored
how cognitive set differs between primate species and across human cultures, using a nonverbal
computerized ‘LS-DS’ task, which measures subjects’ ability to depart from a three-step, learned
strategy (LS) in order to adopt a more efficient, one-step, direct strategy (DS or ‘the shortcut’).
First, I compared baboons’, chimpanzees’, and humans’ abilities to break cognitive set and found
that all baboon and chimpanzee subjects used the DS shortcut when it became available; yet,
humans exhibited a remarkable preference for the LS. Next, in an effort to elucidate how
cognitive set occludes alternative strategies, I tracked human participants’ eye movements to

identify whether better solutions are a) visually overlooked or b) seen but disregarded. Although
human subjects saw the shortcut, they did not use it until their conceptualization of the problem
constraints were altered. Lastly, to further distinguish between perceptual and conceptual
influences on cognitive set, I compared shortcut-use between Westerners and the semi-nomadic
Himba of northern Namibia. This study found that susceptibility to cognitive set varied across
human cultures and presented further evidence that problem conceptualization, and not
perceptual processing, influences individuals’ ability to break set and use the alternative.
Overall, this research provides a novel comparison of cognitive flexibility within the primate
lineage and across human cultures. The implications for set-promoting influences, including the
potentially mechanizing problem-solving methods typical of Western education, are discussed.
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1

INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY IN PRIMATES AND ACROSS
HUMAN CULTURES

1.1
1.1.1

Introduction to Cognitive Flexibility
Adaptive Significance of Flexible Behavior
Flexible strategy-use is the foundation of adaptive problem solving. Situations requiring

decisive action emerge almost continuously when navigating dynamic environments and an
individual’s response to such shifting social and ecological inputs can be profoundly
consequential. Fitness, and even survival, often hinge upon adaptive problem solving in which a
response is not only determined by variable stimuli but also by shifting contexts (Potts, 2012;
Reader, Morand-Ferron, & Flynn, 2016; Tebbich, Griffin, Peschl, & Sterelny, 2016).
Accordingly, cognitive flexibility is considered a nontrivial component of intelligent behavior
(Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Ionescu, 2012; Rosati, 2017; Stoet &
Snyder, 2008).
Here, I will broadly define cognitive flexibility as the ability to incorporate both known
solutions and innovated or acquired novel solutions in a contextually appropriate manner
(modified from Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; and Lehner, Burkart, & Schaik, 2011). Thus,
flexible responses must integrate external environmental cues with internal inputs, such as past
experience, and in the case that a previous strategy is no longer the most appropriate, flexible
behavior requires inhibiting that previous response and switching to a more efficient strategy.
During development, humans acquire and refine a suite of cognitive skills that eventually
enable successful, and self-sufficient, navigation of their environment. This suite of skills,
termed executive functioning, or the processes underlying the conscious control of action
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(Zelazo, 2008), are commonly identified as being comprised of three components: inhibition,
working memory, and switching (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). From early childhood to
adolescence, executive functioning develops rapidly, which has been associated with
developmental changes in the prefrontal cortex (reviewed in Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017;
Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Thompson-Schill, Ramscar, & Chrysikou, 2009). Accordingly,
children, adolescents and adults exhibit differing degrees of cognitive flexibility across a range
of tasks; yet both direct (increase in age = increase in flexibility; Cunningham, 1965; Zelazo,
2008) and inverse (increase in age = decrease in flexibility; Ardiale & Lemaire, 2012; Defeyter
& German, 2003; German & Defeyter, 2000; Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015; Lemaire &
Leclere, 2014; Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gopnik, 2014; Luchins, 1942) relationships between
cognitive flexibility and age are observed (however, see: Chelune & Baer, 1986; Diamond &
Kirkham, 2005). Furthermore, cognitive flexibility has been linked to academic achievement
(Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; Cole, Duncan, & Blaye, 2014; Titz & Karbach, 2014), social skill
(Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017), health (Besnard & Cacitti, 2005; Masley, Roetzheim, &
Gualtieri, 2009), and is found to differ between some clinical populations such as in alcoholism
(Trick, Kempton, Williams, & Duka, 2014) and Autism Spectrum Disorder (Yeung, 2015). Still,
flexible behavior is not unequivocally beneficial.
The interplay between flexible strategy updating and maintenance of extant solution
strategies presents an interesting opposition. On one hand, if an existing representation is too
concrete and impervious to contextual inputs, then newly relevant information is ignored,
resulting in a familiar but potentially inefficient response. On the other hand, if the
representation is too easily perforated, then response efficiency is impaired by distractibility
(Cools, 2008; Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Roberts, 2008). For example, if a foraging animal is
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unable to adapt flexibly to shifting environments, such as a new stream that must be crossed in
order to reach food, they may starve. Yet, if behavior is too flexible, the same animal may
attempt to cross an insurmountable obstacle, with the same fatal result. Thus, optimal behavior
requires a balance between exploiting a known solution and exploring alternatives (Brosnan &
Hopper, 2014; Chrysikou et al., 2013).

1.1.2

Abstract Problem Solving
Problems range wildly in complexity, as do possible solutions. In simple cases, an

appropriate response may be acquired through conditional associations or trial and error learning
(Petrides, 2008). This occurs when a stimulus and an action produce a reward with some
consistency, thus favoring that specific response in the presence of that specific stimulus. These
Stimulus-Response (S-R) associations often require an extended learning period but, once
developed, are characterized by faster, more consistent, responses and reduced distractibility
(Smith & Graybiel, 2016). However, such automaticity, although certainly beneficial in some
situations (red traffic light → stop), cannot be generalized to instances in which that specific
stimulus is not present (pedestrians crossing the road → stop). Thus, countless S-R associations
would be required to fully understand a problem space, placing an impractical load on one’s
cognitive processing.
Abstract response contingencies overcome this limitation by providing a response
framework that can be generalized across situations (Miller & Buschman, 2008). Derived from
the Latin word abtrahere, which translates to “to drag away,” abstractions are not fixed to a
specific stimulus (Christoff & Keramatian, 2008). Thus, whereas S-R associations reduce
cognitive load by automating behavior, abstract rules reduce cognitive load by applying a single

4

solution to multiple problems. Yet, selecting an appropriate response strategy, in and of itself,
leaves room for error. Simply put, an action is only as effective as the strategy that guides it.

“Decisions based on abstractions require a number of coordinated processes, including
the top-down biasing of inputs to the prefrontal cortex; the categorization of contextual
information, including sensory inputs, memories, and signals about internal states; the
integration of contextual information with the actions and goals appropriate to that
context; the choice among potential actions or goals, based on the predicted outcome of
each possibility; and active maintenance of those choices or goals in memory, as a
prospective code, without completely dispensing with the alternatives” (Genovesio &
Wise, 2008, p. 101)

1.2
1.2.1

Measuring Cognitive Flexibility
Cognitive Flexibility as a Multifaceted Construct
In accordance with its behavioral importance, cognitive flexibility has been measured in

humans and other animals extensively (Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008; Bonte, Kemp, & Fagot,
2014; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Davis, Vale, Schapiro, Lambeth, & Whiten, 2016; Diamond
& Kirkham, 2005; Duncker & Lees, 1945; Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Ionescu, 2012; Kolodny,
Edelman, & Lotem, 2015; Luchins, 1942; Meiran, 1996; Rumbaugh, 1971; Stoet & Snyder,
2003); yet, each of these studies employed entirely different paradigms. This is not to say that
one task is better or more telling than the others; however, it is important to distinguish between
the different types of cognitive flexibility that have (and are currently) being tested.
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“And just as the sides of a cube are not cubes themselves but squares, it is hard to
imagine that the sides of cognitive flexibility are cognitive flexibilities, too. Instead it
might be more logical to consider these sides as essential mechanisms or processes (that
can themselves be flexible) that contribute to the overall cognitive flexibility.” (Ionescu,
2017, p. 6)

1.2.2

Forced Switch Paradigms
The vast majority of cognitive flexibility metrics require subjects to switch strategies and

then measure the ensuing deficits, typically in accuracy or response times (RTs). Among these
forced switch tasks, the simplest paradigm is a reversal learning, where a previously valid
strategy is no longer correct (Rosati, 2017). When the strategies are simple S-R associations
(e.g., first the red circle is correct but later the blue circle is correct), this is referred to as a
discrimination reversal task. Inflexibility or perseveration results when the subject continues to
use their first-learned strategy after it is no longer correct and can be measured via a transfer
index, calculated as performance on reversal trials divided by performance on the initial
discrimination. Presumably the ability to extinguish the learned response determines how
readily it is replaced (Roberts, 2008). In another forced switch paradigm, the A-not-B task, one
of two targets is repeatedly baited and the subject is rewarded upon its selection. After an initial
learning phase, the other location is baited. Subjects must switch from their learned response
and instead select the newly baited location. Indeed, human infants (~9 months old) and
monkeys continue to reach for the first-learned location (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989;
Piaget, 1954; Zelazo, 2008).
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Stroop tasks, in which subjects must ignore an attribute of a stimulus that conflicts with
the correct response, are another measure of inhibitive ability and are also often reported
alongside cognitive flexibility measures (Bunge & Wallis, 2008). Although inhibition is clearly
involved in switching away from a learned solution, Friedman et al. (2008) recently proposed
that inhibition may be an emergent property of other aspects of task shifting, such as updating
(keeping a rule on-line in working memory) and switching (switching between rules), rather than
a separable entity in and of itself (see Hommel & Colzato, 2017 for review).
Another commonly used forced switch measure of cognitive flexibility is the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task (WCST), or its simpler derivative the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS)
task (Ionescu, 2012; Jordan & Morton, 2012; Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Manrique &
Call, 2015; Zelazo et al., 2003). These measures require subjects to first sort a deck of multidimensional cards based on one stimulus attribute. For example, if the first rule is to sort based
on color, cards with a red object would be placed in one pile and cards with a blue object would
be placed in another, regardless of the objects’ shapes. After this first sort, subjects are then
asked to sort the cards based on the other dimension. For example, now subjects would need to
place all the cards with a circle in one pile and all the cards with a square in the other pile,
regardless of the objects’ colors. Human children tend to perseverate with the first-learned rule;
however, inflexibility on this task seemingly decreases with age (Kirkham et al., 2003; Zelazo,
2008). By 10 years old, children can perform similarly to adults (Chelune & Baer, 1986).
Perseveration in adulthood is associated with executive impairment typical of schizophrenia and
alcoholism (Sullivan et al., 1993) but RT deficits have also been observed in a typical adult
population, suggesting that the ‘attentional inertia’ which leads to perseverative behaviors may
negatively impact new strategy adoption throughout development (Diamond & Kirkham, 2005).
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Deficits associated with switching response strategies, as opposed to repeating a strategy,
are referred to as switch costs (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2008). Measured in response
time delays or accuracy drops following a strategy change, switch costs are evident across a wide
range of tasks and are often attributed to the cognitive reconfiguration allowing the new strategy
to guide behavior (Lemaire, Luwel, & Brun, 2017; Luwel, Schillemans, Onghena, &
Verschaffel, 2009; Meiran, 1996). Both children and adults exhibit switch costs (Ionescu, 2012;
Zelazo, 2008) and they can be somewhat reduced if the subject knows that the switch is coming
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or if they have more time to prepare for the new strategy (Arrington &
Logan, 2004).

1.2.3

Optional Switch Paradigms
Problem solving strategies, or procedures for performing a task (Ardiale & Lemaire,

2012), generally fall into one of two categories. History-cued strategies are motivated by
previous experience, while means-end strategies identify a path from the current state to a
desired state; they are inspired by a goal (Sweller, Mawer, & Howe, 1982). Truly adaptive
behavior goes beyond simply inhibiting and switching between known response contingencies.
Often, one must engage in means-end problem analysis and actively select or even devise a
solution strategy. This type of cognitive flexibility can be measured via insight problem solving
tasks, wherein the solution requires approaching the problem in some novel way (Defeyter &
German, 2003; Ionescu, 2012).
In the classic functional fixedness paradigm, an object for which the normal function is
known must be used in an abnormal way to complete the task (Duncker & Lees, 1945; Knoblich,
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). For example, when attempting to build a tower which needs to reach

8

a certain height, subjects are less likely to succeed, which requires using a large box as the base
of the tower, if the other building materials are inside of the box when provided to the subject.
This mental ‘block,’ attributed to their prior knowledge regarding the box’s function, results in
an inability to re-conceptualize the problem space (Duncker & Lees, 1945; Knoblich et al.,
2001). In fact, difficulty replacing a familiar concept frequently affects humans’ performance on
optional switch tasks, resulting in a ‘cognitive set.’

1.3
1.3.1

Cognitive Set: When Sufficiency Blocks Efficienc
What is Cognitive Set?
A cognitive set occurs when prior knowledge or experience biases the interpretation of

task-relevant information, thus blocking a novel or better solution strategy. It has also been
referred to as fixedness, einstellung, conservatism, proactive interference, negative transfer,
entrenchment, satisficing, and task set (Badre, 2008; Bilalić et al., 2008; Bunge & Wallis, 2008;
Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Duncker & Lees, 1945; Hrubesch, Preuschoft,
& van Schaik, 2009; Kolodny et al., 2015; Luchins, 1942; Sweller et al., 1982). Described as
‘pernicious’ (Bilalić et al., 2008), cognitive set has been documented in thousands of subjects
across variable task designs (Bilalić et al., 2008; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Lemaire &
Leclere, 2014; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950).
In 1942, Abraham Luchins published a detailed account of cognitive set, referring to it as
the ‘Einstellung effect’ (Luchins, 1942). He used a ‘water jar’ task in which three jars were
drawn and labeled with the quantity of water they contained. Using these values, subjects were
required to add/subtract in order to ‘obtain’ a target quantity. The first five problems could all be
solved via the same four-step strategy: Jar 2 - Jar 1 - Jar 3 - Jar 3 (see Figure 1.3-1).
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Figure 1.1 Example water jar problem, solvable via the four-step, learned rule.

However, the next two problems could be solved either by this four-step strategy or a
simpler two-step strategy: Jar 1 - Jar 3 (see Figure 1.3-2).

Figure 1.2 Example water jar problem, solvable via the learned rule or the better
alternative
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Luchins tested thousands of subjects of various ages and levels of education and found
that the vast majority of subjects (70-100%, depending on the population sampled) continued to
solve the problems using the more complicated, learned method rather than adopting a more
efficient, but novel, two-step strategy. In fact, even when subjects were given actual jars of
water to manipulate (Luchins & Luchins, 1950), or the order of the jars was varied (Aftanas &
Koppenaal, 1962), they persisted in their use of the learned strategy.
Luchins described this phenomenon as a mechanization of problem-solving and suggested
that it arises in certain situations when previous experience with a problem-solving method
infringes on a subject’s ability to see the problem with an open state of mind (Luchins, 1942).
For example, Bilalić et al. (2008) found that expert chess players, after finding one possible
move, reported that they were looking for another. However, their gaze indicated that they
continued to look at the solution they had already found. In another study, subjects were given a
problematic example diagram of a bike rack and asked to redesign it such that these problems
would be minimized; however subjects seemed unable to move past the examples and included
even the problematic aspects in their designs (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005). Lemaire and
Leclere (2014) noted that, when given two strategies for solving multiplication problems,
subjects were more likely to repeat a strategy even if the other was more appropriate. Cognitive
set emerges across a wide variety of tasks. But why? Why do subjects persistently use
inefficient or problematic strategies when other, better strategies are available?

1.3.2

The Up-Side of Inefficiency
Cognitive set may not always be detrimental. Chunking, an enhanced association of

certain behaviors involved in a response (Gobet et al., 2001), is thought to decrease cognitive
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load by automating certain behavioral responses (Kolodny et al., 2015; Smith & Graybiel, 2016).
Further, while response-planning results in prolonged reaction times, especially at the beginning
of a sequence (Rushworth, Croxson, Buckley, & Walton, 2008), routine behaviors can run on
autopilot, they “require few of the processes needed for abstract response strategies” (Genovesio
& Wise, 2008). Notably, switch costs are even apparent when strategy switching is voluntary
and subjects tend to repeat a previous strategy more often than if their strategy was randomly
selected (Arrington & Logan, 2004). In fact, increased speed, increased accuracy and decreased
distractibility are some of the hallmarks of habit formation (Smith & Graybiel, 2016). Another
consideration is that humans tend to avoid ambiguity, even sometimes choosing a riskier option
rather than attempting one with an unknown outcome (Camerer & Weber, 1991).
Cognitive set affects a broad range of human problem solving conditions. Following a
learned rule offers outcome security and can support the development of task proficiency;
however, this eventually comes at the cost of task optimization. Mechanical solutions often
occlude alternative, sometimes more efficient strategies, yet are seemingly pervasive in human
problem solving.

1.4
1.4.1

The Evolution of Cognitive Flexibility
The Origins of Human Cognitive Flexibility
Currently, human culture is inseparable from technology. Over the past several

millennia, humans have constructed an advanced assemblage of tools and techniques, a feat
reliant upon the interplay between innovation and maintenance. Without invention, there is no
novel technique to adopt and without behavioral maintenance, there is nothing to upgrade upon.
Termed ‘ratcheting’ this ability to invent-adopt-upgrade has allowed humans to progress from
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basic stone tools to our current technological advancements (Davis et al., 2016; Hovers, 2012;
Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993) and yet, ‘ratcheting’ is
conspicuously less apparent in other primate species (Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, 2016; Davis et al.,
2016). Thus, a perplexing contradiction arises: humans appear better equipped for cognitive
flexibility than any other primate species; yet, when confronted with focused problem solving
tasks, humans seem crippled by inflexibility. Elucidating when and how flexible strategy-use
evolved and why similarly proficient invent-adopt-upgrade behavior appears to be lacking in
nonhuman primates seems crucial for understanding these complexities.
Comparative cognitive research, especially across primate species, provides unique
insights into the selection pressures potentially underlying the emergence of certain behaviors.
Much of our evolutionary history has been shared with monkeys and, to an even greater extent,
nonhuman apes (henceforth ‘apes’). Thus, comparing behaviors between monkeys, apes, and
humans provides insights into which traits may have been present prior to their evolutionary
divergences and which may have been uniquely derived (Rosati, 2017).

1.4.2

Cognitive Flexibility in Monkeys
Old world monkey (Cercopithecoidea) and ape (Hominoidea) lineages diverged

approximately 25 million years ago (Stevens et al., 2013). Monkeys’ evolutionary proximity to
humans and broadly similar neural organization has fueled numerous comparative studies aimed
at identifying the origins and neural underpinnings of executive functions, including cognitive
flexibility (Genovesio, Brasted, Mitz, & Wise, 2005; Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Manrique &
Call, 2015; Rosati, 2017; Stoet & Snyder, 2008). Within these comparisons, several basic
differences between monkeys and humans are apparent. First, monkeys often require extensive
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training to grasp response contingencies and even their most advanced socio-cognitive and
executive processes are basic components of human cognition (Beran, Pate, Washburn, &
Rumbaugh, 2004; Dean et al., 2012; Gallup, 1976; Manrique & Call, 2015; Stoet & Snyder,
2008; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 2002). Second, monkeys’ response times are recurrently faster
than humans,’ which may be attributable to faster neuronal conduction in smaller brains and/or
some mechanical advantage (Ringo, Doty, Demeter, & Simard, 1994; Stoet & Snyder, 2008).
Despite these differences, monkeys and humans show similarly inflexible behaviors on some
tasks.

1.4.2.1 Evidence for Inflexibility in Monkeys
In basic forced-switch tasks, such as transfer index, which rewards subjects for selecting
a certain response and then switches to rewarding a different response (Berg, 1948; Rumbaugh,
1971; Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996), monkeys and humans exhibit similar difficulties adopting
the new solution (Bonté, 2011; Bonte et al., 2014; Ionescu, 2012; Jordan & Morton, 2012;
Manrique & Call, 2015; Piaget, 1954; Rosati, 2017; Rumbaugh, 1971; Zelazo, 2008). In fact, on
the Conceptual Set Shifting Task (CSST), a WCST derivative developed for nonhuman primates,
both rhesus macaques and baboons increasingly produced perseverative behaviors with age,
which is consistent with the human developmental trajectory on similar tasks (Bonté, 2011;
Manrique & Call, 2015). Similarly, younger baboons outperformed older baboons on a transfer
index task in both pre- and post-reversal sections (Bonte et al., 2014). Thus, monkeys and
humans have shown similar inadequacies when switching behaviors; yet, when required to select
between more abstract responses, several differences emerge.
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1.4.2.2 Evidence for Flexibility in Monkeys
Like humans, monkeys are capable of learning abstract rules. In fact, rhesus macaques
(Macaca mulatta) successfully enacted a conditional repeat-stay/change-shift strategy that
requires completely ignoring S-R associations (Genovesio et al., 2005; Genovesio & Wise,
2008). In another study, a cue at the beginning of each trial signaled which of two strategies
(e.g., judge color or judge orientation) rhesus monkeys and humans should apply to a stimulus
(Stoet & Snyder, 2003). In some trials, both strategies called for the same response (e.g., choose
left) but in others, the strategies were in conflict with one another (e.g., color strategy = choose
left, orientation strategy = choose right). The monkeys successfully learned to adjust their
strategies based on the cue and accurately responded to novel stimuli, confirming their grasp of
the abstract contingencies (Stoet & Snyder, 2008). However, this study also revealed a key
difference between monkeys’ and humans’ abstract rule-use. In stark contrast to humans,
monkeys did not show slower response times when the strategy switched: in other words, they
did not exhibit switch costs (Stoet & Snyder, 2003; however, see Huguet, Barbet, Belletier,
Monteil, & Fagot, 2014 and Chapter 3 Footnote 1). As mentioned previously, humans are
plagued by switch costs, which are even apparent after 23,000 trials (Stoet & Snyder, 2007), yet
these monkeys were seemingly unaffected. Interestingly, the authors noted another difference
between humans’ and monkeys’ task-switching abilities: unlike humans, monkeys showed lower
accuracy and longer response times when facing the incongruent trials, those in which the two
strategies signaled different responses (Stoet & Snyder, 2003). Thus, monkeys but not humans
were significantly affected by irrelevant stimulus information.
“What humans are good at, compared with monkeys, is not switching between two tasks,
but rather, locking on to a single task.” (Stoet & Snyder, 2003, p. 228)
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Thus, although there is limited evidence for both flexible and inflexible forced switch
strategy switching in monkeys, their propensity to forsake a learned strategy in order to adopt a
better alternative, when it is available, is unclear.

1.4.3

Cognitive Flexibility in Apes
Within the Hominoidea superfamily, Hominidae or apes emerged ~13-18mya, with the

Pan-Homo divergence occurring ~6-7mya (Perelman et al., 2011). As our closest extant
relatives, apes provide an invaluable glimpse into the evolution of human cognitive processes.
Apes possess relatively advanced cognitive abilities compared to monkeys and non-primate
species (Biro & Matsuzawa, 1999; de Waal & Ferrari, 2010; Gallup, 1970; Haun & Call, 2008;
Moore, 2016) but are outperformed by humans in many domains, especially with regards to
language and social learning (Conway & Christiansen, 2001; Corballis, 2010; Heyes, 1993;
Huber et al., 2009). It seems plausible that, given our shared ancestry, apes and humans might
exhibit similar explorative/exploitative tendencies. However, if we consider the evolution of
human culture to be predicated upon flexible strategy updating, it is also possible that a
fundamental difference in explorative/exploitative behaviors gave rise to our vastly different
technological trajectories.
To what extent apes are able to flexibly adopt new strategies is a topic of considerable
debate and investigation (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Manrique, Völter, & Call, 2013; MarshallPescini & Whiten, 2008; Price, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2009; Van Leeuwen, Cronin,
Schutte, Call, & Haun, 2013). In some measures, apes perseverate similarly to children (Beran,
Washburn, & Rumbaugh, 2007; Rosati, 2017 for review; Rumbaugh, 1971; Vlamings, Hare, &
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Call, 2010). Additionally, inflexibility was observed in all ape species on a reversal task, in
which subjects first learned (over 100 trials) to push a lever one direction but then were required
to extinguish this learned response and switch directions (Manrique & Call, 2015). Still other
accounts state that, like humans, apes proficiently extinguish previous responses in A-not-B tasks
(Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008; MacLean et al., 2014), even performing equivalently to human
children (Barth & Call, 2006). Yet the validity of these findings has recently been challenged.
Recall that A-not-B tasks measure subjects’ ability to switch from their learned (A) response and
select the actual location of the food (B) but, typically, only three A responses are required
before this ‘strategy’ is considered learned (Amici et al., 2008; Barth & Call, 2006; MacLean et
al., 2014). Davis (2017) argued that three trials is not enough to make this claim and required
subjects to utilize the A strategy a minimum of 20 times. Under these methods, chimpanzees
responded at chance on the critical B trials, suggesting that their abilities to extinguish a learned
response were, in fact, impaired.
Evidence regarding apes’ abilities to switch between abstract rules is limited. One
account suggested that on a DCCS task, chimpanzees’ use of the second rule was impaired by
their knowledge of the first (Moriguchi, Tanaka, & Itakura, 2011). However, the reported error
rate post-switch was 52.9% and although the authors state that this was statistically different
from chance, only 6 chimpanzees were tested and those only passed the pre-switch section in an
average of 42.9% of sessions, shedding doubt on the extent to which even the first rule was
adopted. If the first strategy was not established, difficulty learning the second strategy cannot
confidently be attributed to cognitive set.
Importantly, chimpanzees are capable of abstract rule-use such as same/different
judgments (Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Nissen, Blum, & Blum, 1948; Oden, Thompson, &
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Premack, 1988; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997), even using an exclusion tactic to group
unknowns (Beran & Washburn, 2002). Further, in computerized mazes, chimpanzees are
unimpaired when the correct path requires moving away from the goal briefly (Dolins,
Schweller, & Milne, 2017; Fragaszy et al., 2009; Menzel & Menzel, 2007), suggesting that
chimpanzees are capable of reasoning between and selecting appropriate strategies. However, to
my knowledge, there have been no published investigations evincing chimpanzees’ ability to
switch between abstract solutions, prior to the current research.
Many social learning studies, investigating apes’ ability to flexibly adjust their behavior
after viewing a demonstration of an alternative method, have described both explorative and
exploitative behaviors (Hopper, Kurtycz, Ross, & Bonnie, 2015; Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka,
2013). As this clearly relates to cognitive flexibility, I will briefly review their findings;
however, with two caveats in mind. First, inflexibility in social learning contexts could also stem
from an inability to extract the relevant information from a demonstration (for whatever reason),
rather than from cognitive set (Dean et al., 2012). Second, inflexibility might also be observed if
apes cannot perform or do not grasp the physical affordances of the alternative strategy. That
being said, social learning paradigms are undoubtedly more representative of how group-specific
behavioral repertoires (cultures) evolve or persist within ape populations.

1.4.3.1 Evidence for Behavioral Inflexibility in Apes
Several studies report that chimpanzees stick to a learned strategy, even after watching a
demonstration of a more-rewarding alternative (Davis, 2017; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008).
Marshall-Pescini and Whiten (2008) reported that among 5 chimpanzees, which were trained to
use a dipping method to procure honey and then shown a more effective probing technique, all
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but one failed to switch to the new strategy. This led to speculation that chimpanzees may use a
copy-when-dissatisfied heuristic, such that, as long as they receive some reward they do not
switch to an alternative (Davis, 2017; Laland, 2004). Yet, without demonstrating that the probe
technique would have been more readily adopted if they hadn’t first learned the dip method,
inflexibility cannot be conclusively determined. A similar finding was observed in one
population of wild chimpanzees, that were unable to use a stick to access honey, even when the
stick was pre-placed inside of the honey-baited tube (Gruber, Muller, Reynolds, Wrangham, &
Zuberbuhler, 2011).
Recently, Davis (2017) presented chimpanzees with a ‘pitfalls’ box, in which a reward
could be accessed via multiple portals however, if chimpanzees used their learned method (Door
1), the best portion of the reward fell into a pit. Thus, to access the reward in its entirety,
subjects needed to use a demonstrated, novel method (Door 2). The authors found that
chimpanzees trained to use Door 1 adopted the Door 2 strategy after a median of 14 more
attempts than naïve individuals, concluding that prior behavior credibly delayed but did not
prevent use of the alternative.
In fact, some chimpanzees are conservative even when the alternative solution is easier.
For example, chimpanzees proficient in a raking technique to obtain food from a food board, did
not switch to a more efficient rattle method after their group members invented it (Hrubesch et
al., 2009). In another example, after learning how to combine two components to construct a
tool, chimpanzees continued to do so, even when the reward could easily be accessed via the
individual components (i.e. did not require tool-construction; Price et al., 2009). This finding
was mirrored in (Davis et al., 2016) who demonstrated that, while naïve chimpanzees easily
adopted the most efficient solution strategy to a puzzlebox, 9 out of 11 chimpanzees initially

19

trained to use a more complex strategy were not able to switch to the more efficient alternative
following a demonstration. It is worth noting that for some of the tasks labeling apes as
conservative, the alternative strategy is ‘locked’ during training (Davis, 2017; Manrique & Call,
2015). Subsequently, avoidance of that solution is not necessarily a function of the learned
response – it could also be that subjects’ own personal unrewarding experience with that option
delays (or prevents) their using it – compared to naïve controls that have no positive/negative
experience with either solution.
Some of these findings are, indeed, reminiscent of the cognitive set literature in humans.
If apes and humans similarly struggle to move past a known solution strategy to adopt a more
efficient or more rewarding alternative, we might consider conservatism a homologous, ancestral
trait. However, this assertion would be, as yet, unjustified.

1.4.3.2 Evidence for Behavioral Flexibility in Apes
In fact, another narrative heralds apes’ robust behavioral flexibility. This seems
particularly evident when the alternative strategy yields a higher pay-off. For instance, in token
exchange paradigms, chimpanzees flexibly switched to exchanging an unfamiliar token, when it
became more highly rewarded than the familiar token (Van Leeuwen et al., 2013). Additionally,
(Hopper et al., 2015) found that chimpanzees would flexibly travel to a more distant tokenexchange location for a better payoff; echoing the potential foraging benefits of explorative
behavior. Further, in a honey-baited tube experiment, a small subset of wild apes applied a
familiar leaf-sponging technique to the novel task, suggesting a certain degree of innovation,
marked by the ability to generalize a known strategy to a novel situation (Gruber, 2016).
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Recently, (Davis, 2017) proposed that variable findings regarding cognitive flexibility in
chimpanzees may be linked to the relative differences in strategy complexity between the learned
solution and the alternative, such that relatively simple alternatives or modifications promote
flexibility. This was supported by three lines of evidence (Davis, 2017). First, after learning
how to slide a lever to achieve a peanut, chimpanzees were able to switch to another, more
efficient strategy after it was demonstrated; however, they only switched if the other strategy
yielded an increase in the reward value. Second, the authors introduced another reward retrieval
paradigm and found that subjects would flexibly add a step to their response techniques, again, to
attain a better reward. Third, when the difficulty of the first technique was increased, subjects
readily switched to an easier alternative. These findings are in line with others demonstrating
that simple strategy modifications are well within apes’ capabilities (Lehner et al., 2011;
Yamamoto et al., 2013).
Additionally, apes are certainly able to switch strategies when their learned method no
longer works. For example, Manrique et al. (2013) showed that apes could readily master a
puzzle box requiring consecutively more advanced solutions. Once a solution technique was
learned, it subsequently became ineffective; thus, subjects were required to consecutively
innovate other strategies. Further, disabled apes are certainly able to adapt familiar behaviors to
deal with handicaps (Hobaiter & Byrne, 2010; Hockings et al., 2015), which means that, at least
when it is required, apes are capable of flexibly modifying a strategy.
Further complicating the picture, chimpanzees have even exhibited flexible behavior
above and beyond that of humans’. After being shown how to extract a reward from an opaque
box, children and chimpanzees copied all demonstrated actions to achieve the reward. However,
when the opaque box was replaced with a transparent one, children persisted in their use of all
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demonstrated actions, even the obviously unnecessary ones, such as tapping the outside of the
box (Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007). Furthermore, this
‘overimitation’ was amplified in adults, who reproduced the unnecessary actions with even
higher fidelity than children (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011). Yet, on the same task,
chimpanzees discarded the causally irrelevant portions of the demonstration and accessed the
reward with greater efficiency than either children or adults (Horner & Whiten, 2005). In fact,
like humans, functional fixedness has even been suggested to afflict apes: presented with the
floating peanut task, chimpanzees were unable to use water from their drinking source to float
the peanut to an accessible height; however, when an alternate water source was provided, a
small subset (5 out of 24) did succeed in procuring the peanut (Hanus, Mendes, Tennie, & Call,
2011).

1.4.4

Evolutionary Implications
Both flexible and inflexible behavior is observed in nonhuman primates. Seemingly,

response style (exploitative vs explorative) can be influenced by a range of factors including the
strength of the learned solution, the relative difficulty of enacting the alternative, and the reward
difference between the two (Davis, 2017; Hopper et al., 2015; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008;
Van Leeuwen et al., 2013).
Flexibility offers numerous advantages in terms of potential outcomes (Brosnan &
Hopper, 2014; Sweller & Levine, 1982). More productive alternatives might be discovered or
adopted. Novel resources might be exploited. In an ever-changing environment, it is nontrivial
to navigate a novel situation successfully and this often requires innovative or explorative
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behavior (Holmes & Cohen, 2014). Adaptation is predicated upon flexible strategy use (Crone,
Donohue, Honomichl, Wendelken, & Bunge, 2006; Lemaire & Leclere, 2014).
Yet, there are also potential disadvantages to flexibility. Explorative tendencies may
predispose an individual towards distractibility (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Stoet & Snyder,
2008). Effort spent developing a new technique or even the cognitive processes associated with
switching between techniques, might be costly (Holmes & Cohen, 2014; Stoet & Snyder, 2003).
Moreover, environmental change could be fleeting, rendering an adaptation useless (Brosnan &
Hopper, 2014) or at the very least, a waste of time. Further, an innovated strategy is untested,
whilst the pre-existing behavior sufficiently supported survival thus far (van Schaik et al., 2016).
In other words, if the current solution elicits some reward, the relative benefit of exploring
alternatives might be negligible or even detrimental. Hence the colloquialism: “If it ain’t broken,
don’t fix it.”
Yet, conservatism, especially in regards to abstract rule-use, is restricting. It impedes
innovatory behavior thereby lowering the probability of discovering adaptive solutions or niches
(Brosnan & Hopper, 2014). Moreover, without the flexibility to choose between alternatives,
optimization is unlikely.

1.5

Cross-Cultural Influences on Cognitive Flexibility

Thus far, I have compared humans’ cognitive flexibility with monkeys’ and apes,’ without
fully acknowledging that there is much evidence showing inter-individual variability in humans’
explorative/exploitative tendencies. Here, I will introduce potentially mediating factors,
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specifically focusing on cross-cultural influences, which might affect humans’ propensities to
break cognitive set.

1.5.1

Humans and Rule-Use
Human problem solving is unequivocally advanced. To a large extent, this dexterity is

facilitated by codified rules-of-thumb and equations, which enable us to accurately solve many
problems, even without necessarily understanding why a solution strategy is effective. For
example, one can successfully calculate the circumference of a circle without ever grasping the
intricacies of pi. Undoubtedly, codified solution strategies offer a tremendous advantage when
solving many, similar problems. For this reason, repetitive rule-use is a staple of Western
education, yet the real-world applications of this approach are dubious. First, how often do every
day problems require identical solution strategies? Simply determining when and where to cross
the road affords infinite solutions and reproducing the actions that allowed you to safely cross
previously could be morbidly ineffective under the current conditions. Second, might rote
learning reasonably lead to cognitive inflexibility (Star & Seifert, 2006)? In a novel problem
space, the search for a solution takes precedence but if a solution is provided and subsequently
memorized, search might never truly occur. With regards to cognitive set, perhaps alternative
solutions are not found because they are not sought. In fact, stoked by partial differences in
alternative strategy-use between publicly and privately schooled children, Luchins (1942)
repeatedly professed that typical Western educational practices might be largely accountable for
the observed conservatism.
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1.5.2

Purported Universality of Cognition
Thousands of subject have been tested on Luchins' water jar task (see Section 1.3.1)

under various manipulations and a consistent majority persist in their use of the learned rule.
This has led to a conclusion that, within human problem solving, cognitive set is universal
(Aftanas & Koppenaal, 1962; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950; McKelvie, 1984). Yet,
despite attempts to account for subjects' age, occupation, and education, only Western
(American, British, and Canadian) subjects were tested, leaving the potential for cross-cultural
differences in susceptibility to cognitive set completely unexplored. Recently, investigators have
rightfully called into question the ‘universality’ of many cognitive processes, of which our
understanding is predominantly derived from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich,
Democratic (WEIRD) subjects’ data (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010; Legare & Nielsen, 2015). One particularly concerning assessment found that in 2007,
67% of studies in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, solely collected data from
undergraduate psychology students (Arnett, 2008; Jahoda, 2016). In fact, studies that defy this
trend often find that WEIRD data are at the extremes of more globally diverse samples. Which
is not surprising, given Westerners’ highly unusual social and ecological environments compared
to those of the vast majority of humans currently, and those in which all humans belonged to
very recently in our evolutionary past (see Henrich et al., 2010 for review). The comparatively
few studies investigating cross-cultural cognition have identified differences in both perceptual
and conceptual domains.
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1.5.3

Westerners’ Global Perceptual Bias
Visual assessment of one’s surroundings is crucial to survival; yet the specific demands

are necessarily different in different environments. What may be visually important to a hunter
(e.g., judging the speed and directionality of movement) will not be the same as what is
important to an artist (e.g., attending to the minute details within a visual scene). Thus,
unsurprisingly, humans have been shown to exhibit differences in visual perceptual processing.
Westerners have been found to 1) make more accurate judgments regarding a global
figure comprised of conflicting local figures than vice versa and b) preferentially group figures
based on global rather than local features (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012; Davidoff, Fonteneau, &
Fagot, 2008; Navon, 1977). In the visual system, the lateral geniculate nucleus, which receives
visual input directly from the retina and projects to the primary visual cortex, is comprised of six
laminae: four layers of cells with small receptive fields (parvocellular) and two layers of cells
with large receptive fields (magnocelullar). Indeed, the interplay between magno- and
parvocellular inputs appears to be the source of humans’ observed global bias, evidenced by the
ability to attenuate it by suppressing a portion of the cells in the magnocellular pathway
(Michimata, Okubo, & Mugishima, 1999). Thus, one might expect global/local perceptual
biases to vary consistently between individuals.

1.5.4

Cross-Cultural Differences in Perceptual Biases
Differences in local/global perceptual biases have been reported across cultural, ethnic,

and even religious groups (see Hommel & Colzato, 2017 for review). For example, in a task
which requires subjects to judge the verticality of a line (rod) within a frame, East Asian
participants were more affected by the orientation of the frame than Americans (Ji, Peng, &
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Nisbett, 2000). In a similar task, Japanese participants more accurately reproduced a line that
was proportional to the frame, compared to Americans who were better able to ignore the frame
and reproduce the absolute size of the line; this was also true for Americans living in Japan and
Japanese living in America (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). Eye tracking
analyses showed that, when viewing a picture, American participants fixated more on the focal
object, but Chinese participants tended to look at the background (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett,
2005). Additionally, this attentional selectivity seemed to impact information processing: when
describing a scene, Japanese participants mentioned the background first, but Americans
mentioned foreground objects first (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), which influenced their ability to
recognize the scenes after changes to either the foreground or background were made (Masuda &
Nisbett, 2006). However, similar to Americans, on the hierarchical figures task (Navon, 1977),
Japanese and British participants’ exhibited equivalently global biases (Caparos, Ahmed, et al.,
2012).
Humans have also been shown to possess local perceptual biases. In direct comparisons,
the seminomadic Himba of northern Namibia exhibited a ‘dramatic’ local bias on hierarchical
figure tasks compared to Western participants (Davidoff et al., 2008), and remarkably, this bias
decreased as the number of exposures to an urban environment increased (Caparos, Ahmed, et
al., 2012). Further, compared to British participants, Himba were significantly less affected by
the Ebbinghaus illusion, in which the size of an inner object appears to change depending on the
composition of surrounding objects (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012; de Fockert, Davidoff, Fagot,
Parron, & Goldstein, 2007). Likewise, in a categorization task, the Himba grouped shapes with
local similarities even when they fell into different Western shape categories (i.e. triangles,
circles, and squares; Roberson, Davidoff, & Shapiro, 2002). Lastly, the Himba seem to possess
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greater attentional control than Westerners, as evidenced by their enhanced performance on an
Eriksen-type flanker task compared to British participants (de Fockert, Caparos, Linnell, &
Davidoff, 2011). Thus, there is clear evidence that visual perception differs between cultures.
However, if and to what extent this interacts with environmental factors to affect problem
solving is less clear.

1.5.5

Cross Cultural Differences in Problem Conceptualization
The ways in which humans conceptualize problems and their solutions, differ

substantially across human populations. Many environmental factors may contribute to humans’
performance on cognitive tasks. For one, cross-cultural differences in linguistic encoding might
lead to variation in subjects’ abilities to remember and discriminate between stimuli, especially
those which fall along a continuum such as color (Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson, 1999;
Davidoff & Fagot, 2010; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005) or quantity (Frank,
Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008). That said, Ji, Zhang, and Nisbett (2004) found that culture
but not language influenced subjects’ categorization: when provided with three words and
instructed to select the two most related, Americans preferred to group the words based on
categorizations (e.g., monkey and panda) whereas Chinese participants preferred relationshipbased categorizations (e.g., monkey and banana), regardless of testing language. Similarly,
Chinese children grouped items based on functionality while American children utilized more
categorical groupings (Chiu, 1972; Nisbett, Choi, Peng, & Norenzayan, 2001) and Asian adults
were more likely to interpret events as stemming from environmental causes, compared to
Americans who more often attributed them to internal causes (Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000).
There is even some evidence that problem-solving approach might differ across cultures.
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Chinese and Korean subjects evoked more intuitive (or holistic) reasoning styles, while
Americans (even Asian Americans) relied on more analytic problem solving approaches
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002).
However, some studies have noted similarly inflexible problem solving approaches
between cultures. For example, overimitation, wherein subjects copy even irrelevant portions of
a demonstration, has been observed across Western and remote cultures alike (Horner & Whiten,
2005; McGuigan et al., 2007; Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2014; Nielsen &
Tomaselli, 2010; however, see Berl, 2015). Yet, another set of studies revealed that
overimitation varied within individuals across cultures, depending on context: Clegg and Legare
(2016) found that both American and Vanuatuan children more closely imitated instrumental
(i.e., object-related) compared to conventional (i.e., socially determined) demonstrations (see
Legare & Nielsen, 2015 for review of cultural influences on learning). Additionally, similar to
Westerners, adolescent Shuar of Equadorian Amazonia were shown to be affected by functional
fixedness during problem solving (German & Barrett, 2005). However, in typical measures of
cognitive flexibility such as the WCST, some cross-cultural differences have been found (Avila,
2013; Shan, Chen, Lee, & Su, 2008), yet in one case, these were attributed to flaws in the task
itself rather than potential variation in cognitive processes across cultures (Coffey, Marmol,
Schock, & Adams, 2005).

1.5.6

Impact of Cultural Differences on Problem Solving
Several hypotheses have emerged, which attempt to assimilate the observed cross-

cultural differences in perceptual bias (global/local), attentional bias (context/focal), and
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response style (flexible/persistent) in both perceptual processing and problem conceptualization
across cultures.
For instance, the social structure hypothesis heralds the impact of subjects’ cultural
interdependency on cognition. Under this hypothesis, societies that revere the collective (the
common example is East Asian) rather than the individual (the common example is American)
are predicted to exhibit global rather than local perceptual biases, which in turn are predicted to
support holistic rather than analytic response styles (Nisbett et al., 2001). Although one study
found that priming subjects with more interdependent pronouns (e.g., we, our, us) elicited
enhanced performance on global responses and vice versa for independent pronouns (e.g., I, me,
mine) and local responses. (Kuhnen & Oyserman, 2002), there is substantial evidence to
discredit this hypothesis.
First, not all interdependent peoples exhibit global perceptual biases. As mentioned in
Section 1.5.4, Himba people, who live in extremely interdependent groups, exhibit profoundly
local perceptual biases (Davidoff et al., 2008; Roberson et al., 2002). Second, some of these
findings are not reproducible. A recent study (N = 363) showed that Japanese participants were
instead less globally oriented than American or Argentinian participants and this was
reconfirmed (N = 1,843) with a representative sample of Japanese and American participants
aged 20-69 (Oishi et al., 2014).
Under the visual clutter hypothesis, the characteristics of a culture’s typical visual
environment are said to contribute to local/global perceptual biases. In other words, global
perceptual bias is thought to develop from regularly encountering cluttered visual scenes;
whereas local perceptual biases might result from sparse visual scenes (Caparos, Ahmed, et al.,
2012; de Fockert et al., 2011). Both Japanese and American participants, primed with Japanese
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scenes (which were found to be more ambiguous and contain more elements than American
scenes) attended more to context than those primed with American scenes (Miyamoto, Nisbett,
& Masuda, 2006); however, this seems to suggest instead that attentional biases shift based on
recent contextual information. In fact, Linnell, Caparos, de Fockert, and Davidoff (2013)
demonstrated that attentional focus was suppressed in urban compared to traditionally-living
Himba and de Fockert et al. (2011) showed that, in stark contrast to Westerners, Himba
participants were not even distracted by a moving singleton. Thus, there is a potential link
between visual clutter and attentional selectivity. However to what extent attentional selectivity
and global/local perceptual biases are conflated is unclear (Caparos, Linnell, Bremner, de
Fockert, & Davidoff, 2012). Moreover, how visual clutter may influence problem solving
approach (Hommel & Colzato, 2017), is entirely speculative. When placing Kitayama et al.’s
(2003) rod and frame study into context with other cross-cultural perceptual findings, Hommel
and Colzato (2017, p. 5) wrote:
“With respect to control styles, this can be taken to imply that US-Americans have a
stronger bias towards persistence (the control style inducing an analytic processing
mode) than Japanese have and/or Japanese participants have a stronger bias towards
flexibility (the control style inducing a holistic processing mode) than US-Americans
have.”
Given the diversity of visual environments and doctrine to which individuals within many
of the tested communities are exposed, I would interpret such group differences as evidence that
these are not influential predictors of cognitive flexibility. Furthermore, when the same
individuals (N = 70) completed two different metrics of wholistic/analytic response style, the two
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scores did not significantly correlate, indicating that response style cannot be simplified into
binary wholistic/analytic mindsets (Peterson & Deary, 2006).
In summary, even a rudimentary understanding of the impacts of culture on cognitive
flexibility is currently lacking. The existing hypotheses are confounded with differences in
perceptual biases and interpersonal belief systems, which appear related to problem solving
approach, at best, tangentially (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett &
Miyamoto, 2005).

1.6
1.6.1

Current Research Aims and General Approach
Specific Aims
In an effort to explore how and why susceptibility to cognitive set might differ between

primate species and across human cultures the following experiments aimed to:
1)

Identify baboons’, chimpanzees’, and humans’ relative propensities toward
cognitive set during abstract problem solving and, by comparing alternative
strategy use across these species, provide a putative evolutionary trajectory
for how it may have evolved within the primate lineage.

2)

Identify the relative impacts of perceptual and conceptual influences on
humans’ propensity toward cognitive set by determining:
i. Whether or not humans a) do not see alternative strategies or b) do not
understand that they can use them.
ii. The relative impacts of a) global/local perceptual biases and b) crosscultural differences on alternative strategy-use.
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1.6.2

General Approach
For these experiments, I devised and used a nonverbal, non-arithmetic, computerized

measure of susceptibility to cognitive set: the Learned Strategy – Direct Strategy (LS-DS) task.
For each LS-DS trial, a demonstration reveals which of the four locations constitutes
Square1 (flashes red first) and which constitutes Square2 (flashes red second). Throughout
several levels of training, subjects learn to utilize a three-step sequence, in which they first copy
the demonstration by selecting Square1 and Square2, and then select a Triangle which appears in
one of the two remaining locations. This three-step sequence, (Square1→Square2→Triangle)
constitutes the learned strategy (LS; see Figure 1.6-1a). After training, once subjects
consistently utilize the LS, experimental trials are presented, in which baseline (BASE) and
probe (PROBE) trials are interspersed. For BASE trials, the Triangle is hidden (not visible) until
Square1 and Square2 have been accurately selected. For PROBE trials, importantly, the Triangle
is present from the beginning of the demonstration and remains on the screen throughout
subjects’ response. Thus, subjects can use the LS (See Figure 1.6-1b) or they can use a direct
strategy (DS or the shortcut) by skipping Square1 + Square2 and simply selecting the Triangle
immediately (See Figure 1.6-1d). Additionally, the task permits a third strategy, termed the
switch strategy (SS), wherein subjects initially select Square1 but then skip Square2 and select
the Triangle; however this was not a common approach (Figure 1.6-1c).
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Figure 1.3 An exemplar LS-DS trial depicting the Top left → Bottom right → Top right
configuration. a) On BASE trials, only the LS can be successfully employed because the Triangle
is ‘hidden’ until Square1 and Square2 are correctly selected. On PROBE trials, subjects may
utilize any of three response strategies to be correct: b) the learned strategy (LS), c) the switch
strategy, (SS), or d) the direct strategy (DS). Numbers indicate the correct Response 1,
Response 2, and Response 3, for this configuration.

34

1.6.3

Overview of Research Chapters
In Chapter 2, baboons’ and humans’ ability to forego the LS and adopt the DS is

compared. This chapter is presented as it was originally published (Pope, Meguerditchian,
Hopkins, & Fagot, 2015); however small changes were made regarding the way in which DS-use
was calculated between this and all subsequent chapters (See Chapter 3 Footnote 2). In Chapter
3, chimpanzees’ DS-use is investigated and compared with baboons’ and humans’ data from
Chapter 2; the evolutionary implications for cognitive set are then discussed. Chapter 4 presents
data regarding humans’ ability to see the alternative and how demonstrating the shortcut affects
its use. In Chapter 5, Americans’ DS-use is compared to that of the semi-nomadic Himba of
northern Namibia, to investigate the relative influences of global/local perceptual biases and
culture on cognitive set.

1.6.4

Overarching Hypotheses
I hypothesize that:
I)

Cognitive set differentially affects humans, chimpanzees, and baboons.

II)

Conceptual understanding of the alternative strategy as a viable option,
rather than the ability to perceive the alternative, determines subjects’
susceptibility to cognitive set.

Evidence supporting Hypothesis I is presented in Chapters 2 and 3, which report that,
compared to baboons and chimpanzees, humans were significantly better able to learn the LS,
were more affected by switch costs when shifting between the LS and DS, and were more
susceptible to cognitive set on the LS-DS task. I posit that the ability to verbally encode abstract
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rules results in their being more firmly represented (i.e., less easily replaced), which contributes
to humans’ elevated susceptibility to cognitive set. However, alternative interpretations are
discussed in Chapters 2, 3 & 6.
Chapters 4 and 5 provide support for Hypothesis II. In Chapter 4, subjects’ gaze
indicated that they did, in fact, see the alternative strategy but did not use it. Further, their ability
to use the shortcut was, not surprisingly, enhanced after viewing a video demonstrating the DS
(compared to controls who watched a video demonstrating the LS). In Chapter 5, Himba
subjects were shown to be less susceptible to cognitive set, compared to Americans; however,
this did not co-vary with known group differences in global/local perceptual processing. Further,
only American subjects benefitted from a prompt aimed at emboldening subjects to try new
things. I posit that cultural differences in educational background might contribute to the
observed differences in flexible strategy-use. Specifically, I suggest that the mechanized ruleuse typical of Western education might promote cognitive set, by predisposing subjects to
respond by using learned strategy.

1.6.5

Summary and Significance
Appropriately replacing sufficiency with efficiency seems crucial to adaptive behavior.

Likely, as with many cognitive processes, individuals are capable of operating within a range of
cognitive flexibility, such that the persistence of any given behavior is context dependent. The
LS-DS measures a single context: when multiple abstract solutions (LS, SS, and DS) are
present, which vary only in efficiency. Thus, although I will sometimes refer to cognitive
flexibility and shortcut-use synonymously, to be clear, I consider cognitive set as merely one
facet of cognitive flexibility.
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The results of this research discern between whether set arises from a difficulty in
recognizing alternative strategies or a difficulty in executing them. Additionally, it identifies
when human-like propensity toward cognitive set might have arisen within the primate lineage.
It is clear that mechanized rule-use can be beneficial and is often adaptive in problem solving
(Langer & Lois, 1979; Sweller & Gee, 1978). However, understanding the mechanisms and
evolution of alternative strategy use on the LS-DS task may provide a foundation for future
studies aimed at enabling participants to consciously break set, when it is beneficial.
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Abstract

Through codified rule-use humans are able to accurately solve many problems; however,
mechanized strategy-use can also be costly. Cognitive set occurs when a familiar solution
strategy blocks a better alternative. Despite half a century of research on cognitive set in
humans, there have been no attempts to investigate whether it impacts nonhuman species’
abilities to solve abstract problems. The current study utilized a non-verbal, computer task to
compare cognitive set between 104 humans and 15 baboons (Papio papio). A remarkable
difference was found between humans’ and baboons’ abilities to break cognitive set. Consistent
with previous studies, the majority of humans were highly impaired by set, yet baboons were
almost completely unaffected. Analysis of the human data revealed that children (ages 7-10)
were significantly better able to break set than adolescents (11-18) and adults (19-68). Both the
evolutionary and developmental implications of these findings are discussed.

39

2.1

Introduction
As problems increase in complexity, so too do their solutions. To mediate the difficulties

of solving these complex problems, rules may be established which give the correct answer yet
bypass problem reanalysis. Rules allow many similar problems to be solved efficiently and are
often used to teach problem-solving skills (Henderson & Pingry, 1953; Rohrer & Taylor, 2006).
However, problem solving by rule-use is not solely beneficial, as is the case when a learned
strategy is less efficient than an alternative. Cognitive set, also termed ‘einstellung’ or ‘mental
set,’ occurs when a subject successfully learns a rule to solve several problems but is unable to
switch to a more efficient method when it becomes available (Luchins, 1942; Ruscio & Amabile,
1999). Thus, an inability to break cognitive set occurs when that learned solution occludes other
problem-solving methods. In other words, once a rule is adopted, other options are not explored.
An inability to break cognitive set leads to inefficient problem solving by preventing the use of
alternative, sometimes better, problem-solving methods.
In 1942, Abraham Luchins showed that thousands of humans struggled to break cognitive
set in order to use a more efficient solution. Luchins’ (1942) task required participants to obtain
a target quantity by adding and subtracting three given values. The first five of these problems
could be solved by a single, somewhat complex, rule. However, these were followed by two
hybrid problems, solvable both by the learned rule and a more efficient, direct method. Luchins
(1942) found that 70-100% of subjects persisted in using the learned rule rather than switching to
the direct method. However, despite its pervasiveness, the underlying causes of humans’
susceptibility to cognitive set and potential methods to combat it are opaque.
Several factors influence, to varying degrees, subjects’ abilities to break a mental set
including instruction (Aftanas & Koppenaal, 1962; Luchins & Luchins, 1950), working memory
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availability (Beilock & Decaro, 2007), speed requirements (Luchins, 1942), amount of training
(Crooks & McNeil, 2009; Luchins, 1942), and similarity between problems (Sweller et al.,
1982). Further, although Luchins (1942) reported no substantial age effects on cognitive set, age
has been shown to affect other similar types of problem solving. ‘Functional fixedness’ is
described as occurring when an object’s use as a tool is dramatically hindered by a subject’s
experience with it in another functional role (Duncker & Lees, 1945). In a tool-use task,
Defeyter and German (2003) reported that five-year-old children were unaffected by their
previous experience with a tool, yet seven-year-olds and adults easily fell victim to functional
fixedness. Despite these accounts, little is known of the differences in cognitive set between
children, adolescents, and adults.
Understanding the evolutionary origins of cognitive set may aid in understanding it’s
pervasiveness in human problem solving. However, previous research on how the
mechanization of set might have evolved is nonexistent. This is likely due to the impossibility of
a comparative analysis using Luchins’ task, which used an arithmetic problem. Studies
comparing adults and nonhuman primates using computer paradigms have noted differences in
problem-solving performance that may be relevant to set-breaking behavior. First, differences in
sequential processing have been reported between nonhuman primates and adults. Ohshiba
(1997) noted that macaques’ response times to a simultaneous chaining task increased as they
progress through the sequence, indicating that they are using a ‘serial search strategy.’
Conversely, human adults’ responded slowly to the first item in the sequence but quickly to the
rest of the items, indicating that they were using a ‘collective search strategy’ and were mentally
identifying the entire sequence before reproducing it (Conway & Christiansen, 2001; however,
see Fagot & De Lillo, 2011 and Beran et al. 2004). These results may be applicable to problem-
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solving in general, with macaques operating in a more local manner (each step is independent)
and humans in a more global one (each step is part of the sequence). This is in line with findings
comparing perceptual biases between humans and baboons (Papio papio), another old world
monkey species. Baboons were found to respond more quickly to local stimuli while human
adults responded more quickly to global stimuli (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998). If we consider that
the key to avoiding cognitive set is likely rooted in an ability to see and utilize the individual
steps within a rule, humans’ collective approach may be what is driving their inability to break
set. Further, Stoet and Snyder found that macaques’ problem solving was more affected by
distractions than human adults’ (2003), suggesting that they may be less focused on the problemsolving rule and more attentive to individual variation between problems. Indeed, this may
provide old world monkeys with an increased awareness of the alternative method in a cognitive
set task.
The current research has two main goals. First, it investigated the evolutionary origins of
cognitive set by comparing humans to baboons in a computerized, nonmathematical cognitive set
task. We hypothesized that the ability to break set would be different between the two species
due to the differences in perceptual and sequential processing between old world monkeys and
humans. Indeed, extreme differences were found between the two species. Baboons were
almost entirely immune to the effects of set, while the majority of humans did not break away
from the learned rule. Second, the developmental trajectory of cognitive set in humans was
analyzed by comparing children, adolescents, and adults. Children were significantly more
likely to break cognitive set than either adolescents or adults. These findings are discussed from
both evolutionary and developmental perspectives.
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2.2
2.2.1

Methods
Subjects and Materials
Baboon data were collected from 15 subjects (ages 1.8-9.3 years), including six males

(Mean age = 5.3, SD = 2.68 ) and nine females (Mean age = 5.1, SD = 2.36), living in a larger
social group of 24 individuals located at the CNRS “Station de Primatologie”, Rousset-sur-Arc,
France. Baboons were tested via 10 automated learning devices for monkeys (ALDMs; Fagot &
Bonte, 2010; Fagot & Paleressompoulle, 2009), which were directly attached to an outside 700
m2 enclosure. Subjects had unrestricted access to the ALDMs which consisted of a 70 cm × 70
cm × 80 cm testing chamber with a view port and two hand ports. The view port allowed
subjects to see the 19-inch LCD touchscreen monitor (1939L Open-Frame Touchmonitor, Elo
Touch Solutions). As subjects reached through the hand ports, a microchip was read for subject
identification, which prompted the program to resume the trial list at the appropriate place for
that subject. For correct responses, the ALDMs automatically dispensed several grains of dry
wheat. The experiment was programmed using EPrime (Version 2.0, Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh). The local “Provence Alpes Côte d’Azur” ethic committee for experimental
animal research approved the use of the ALDM procedure.
Human data were collected from 104 subjects (ages 7-68), including 40 males (Mean age
= 26.85, SD = 17.7) and 64 females (Mean age = 25, SD = 17.7). Subjects were recruited via a
sign which read “Would you like to be a part of a scientific study?” and tested at Zoo Atlanta, in
Georgia, USA. Humans were tested behind a curtain in a ‘booth’ along a main path at Zoo
Atlanta on a 19-inch LCD touchscreen monitor (1915L Desktop Touchmonitor, Elo Touch
Solutions). The experimenter was nearby, but separated from the subject by a curtain and
remained inattentive. Additionally, family members often remained in the general vicinity but
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were asked to remain inattentive and out of sight of the participant. Participants were given
headphones (Koss On-Ear KPH Headphones, KPH7W) to hear sounds elicited by incorrect or
correct responses. Correct responses were followed by a cartoon of a present, which increased in
size with each correct response. After the fourth correct response, subjects were allowed to
choose a sticker and the present size was reset. The same instructions were given to both
children and adults explaining the correct/incorrect response screens and stated that they “would
need to touch the shapes to figure out the right answer.” Subjects could choose to stop testing at
any point and 27 (6 adults, 6 adolescents, and 15 children; 20.6% of total attempts) either
stopped of their own volition or were casually stopped (by displaying the end screen) if they had
not passed the training within 15 minutes. All human methods were approved by the Zoo
Atlanta Research Committee and the Georgia State University Institutional Review Board prior
to testing.

2.2.2

Testing
The testing phase consisted of two conditions, baseline (BASE) and probe (PROBE).

Trials began after the subject touched a fixation cross. First, two demonstration slides (150 ms
each) displayed a 300 x 300 pixels red square in one location and then again in another location
(out of four possible locations) on a light blue background (Fig 2.2-1). Subjects were then given
a response screen, consisting of four white squares in the four available locations on a dark blue
background. For correct responses, subjects were required to reproduce the demonstration by
touching the two white squares located where the red squares had been in the demonstration, in
the correct order. If subjects touched an incorrect square they were shown a 3 second ‘time-out’
screen before the next trial was cued. In the BASE condition, if subjects accurately reproduced
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the demonstration, they were presented with a blue triangle in place of one of the two remaining
white squares (Fig 2.2-1a). To answer correctly, subjects needed to touch the blue Triangle.
This sequence (touch Square1, touch Square2, touch Triangle) constituted the learned strategy
(LS). However, in the PROBE condition, the blue Triangle was shown throughout the two
demonstration squares and remained visible in the same location on the response screen (Fig 2.21b). Therefore, subjects could continue to use the LS, but were also able to touch the Triangle
directly and receive a more immediate reward. This more efficient response (touch Triangle)
constituted the direct strategy (DS). Importantly, in BASE trials, the Triangle was revealed after
the first two correct responses. However, if subjects happened to touch where the Triangle was
located during any of the response screens, they were rewarded, thereby enabling us to measure
the number of times subjects might accidentally touch the Triangle’s location regardless of it
being visible.
Baboons were given 720 testing trials (576 BASE and 144 PROBE), humans 11 years
and older were given 96 testing trials (48 BASE and 48 PROBE) and humans under 11 were
given 48 testing trials (24 BASE and 24 PROBE). The number of trials presented to humans was
reduced to minimize fatigue (as they had to complete the experiment in one sitting). It should be
recognized that for baboons, the ratio of BASE to PROBE was 4:1, while for humans it was 1:1.
The 4:1 ratio promotes the use of the LS in baboons. This is due to BASE trials not being
readily solvable with the DS method, as the Triangle is hidden. Therefore, more BASE trials
means more LS use. After collecting pilot data indicating that humans preferred the LS even with
the 1:1 ratio, we opted to collect an even number of PROBE and BASE trials for humans to
minimize the duration of the test sessions, while keeping the number of test trials large enough
for statistical analyses and cross-species comparison.
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2.2.3

Training
The three training procedures were carried out over the course of 14 days for baboons

and immediately preceding the testing phase for humans. Baboons completed an average of
12,945 training trials (SD = 4346), while humans completed an average of 35.2 trials (SD = 18).
One of the baboons did not pass Training level 2 but successfully passed the more difficult
Training level 3; thus, his data were included.
For baboons, Training 1 consisted of 96-trial blocks. Trials were randomly selected from
24 possible square/triangle configurations. Each trial began with a fixation cross, followed by
two demonstration slides (each 150 ms) showing a red square move from one location to another
(out of four possible locations). Next, a response screen was presented, consisting of two white
squares in the same locations as the demonstrated squares. The correct response was to touch the
squares in the demonstrated order. Baboons completed an average of 5545 (SD = 1947) Training
1 trials. To pass Training 1, subjects needed to achieve 80% accuracy within a training block,
two times (non-consecutively).
For humans, Training 1 consisted of 8-trial blocks and demonstration slides were
350 ms each. This is the same training procedure that was used for baboons and the 8 trials were
randomly selected from the same 24 possible square/triangle configurations. After each block,
the subject’s accuracy was assessed. If below 80%, the subject repeated the training level.
Accuracy criteria were the same for all training levels. Humans required an average of 13.06
(SD = 7.68) trials to pass Training 1.
Training 2 was conducted immediately after Training 1. Demonstration slides’
display times decreased to 250 ms for humans. Trials and block composition were identical to
Training 1 except that four white squares were given as options during the response phase
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instead of two (See Fig 2.2-1 for example of four square setup). Baboons and humans completed
an average of 6095 (SD = 2141) and 10.42 (SD = 8.35) Training 2 trials, respectively.
Training 3 is identical to the BASE condition in the testing phase. Demonstration
slides’ display times were equivalent for baboons and humans at 150 ms (Fig 2.2-1a). The
experimental phase began immediately after subjects passed Training 3. Baboons and humans
completed an average of 1,574 (SD = 1,000) and 11.70 (SD = 9.18) Training 3 trials,
respectively.

Figure 2.1 The demonstration (light blue) and response (dark blue) screens for a) BASE
and b) PROBE conditions. Black arrows indicate the LS. Yellow arrows indicate where the
subject could touch to use the DS. Arrows were not visible during testing. Upon touching the
blue Triangle, the subject is rewarded.

2.2.4

Data Analysis
Trials were analyzed to determine whether the LS or the DS was used. Trials in which

the subject sequentially touched all three response stimuli (Square1 + Square2 + Triangle) to
achieve the reward were classified as having been solved by the LS. Trials in which the subject
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touched only two (Square1 + Triangle) or one (Triangle) response stimuli to achieve the reward
were classified as having been solved by the DS. The Square1 + Triangle response was included
as a DS in an attempt to conservatively maintain the dichotomous LS vs DS paradigm. For each
subject, the number of trials in which the DS was used was divided by the number of correct
trials completed. This yielded a DS-use ratio for both BASE and PROBE trials. Next, for each
trial-type (BASE and PROBE) subjects were classified as preferring the DS (DSer) or the LS
(LSer) based on this DS-use ratio. For percent DS use, the median was 0% for both BASE and
PROBE conditions and the mean was 1.01% (SD = 2.16) for BASE and 8.01% (SD = 20.44) for
PROBE trials. Thus, subjects who used the DS in more than 5% of BASE trials were classified
as DSers in the BASE condition. Alternatively, subjects who used the DS in fewer than 5% of
BASE trials were classified as LSers in the BASE condition. The same highly conservative
criteria were used to classify subjects as DSers and LSers in the PROBE condition.
To look at the effects of age, humans were classified into three age groups: Children:
ages 7-10 (N = 27, M = 8.44, SD = 1.15), Adolescents: ages 11-18 (N = 25, M = 13.52, SD =
2.22), and Adults: ages 19-68 (N = 52, M = 40.48, SD= 13.18). Age effects were not
investigated in baboons, as there was extremely little response variation between subjects.

2.3

2.3.1

Results

Baboons
Mean percentages correct for BASE and PROBE were 80.7% (SD = 4.5) and 82.9% (SD

= 11.0), respectively. Combined, subjects used the LS in only 3 (0.02 %) of the 1,790 PROBE
trials compared to 6,898 (98.98%) of the 6,969 BASE trials. Additionally, in 20 PROBE trials
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(0.11 %), the baboons touched the correct first red square but then skipped the second and
proceeded to touch the blue Triangle (Note: this is later referred to as the ‘switch strategy’; See
Section 3.3.2). Further, all baboons immediately switched to the DS on the first PROBE trial;
the three times subjects failed to use the DS were trial numbers 22, 37, and 49. All the tested
baboons therefore showed a pronounced and immediate preference for the more efficient, DS
method in the PROBE condition and were classified as DSers (see Fig 2.3-1).
2.3.2

Humans
Mean percentages correct for BASE and PROBE were 91.2% (SD = 10.1) and 89.5% (SD

= 11.1) respectively. Among the 104 subjects, only 21 (20.2%) used the DS in greater than 5%
of PROBE trials. Of these, only 7 (6.7%) used the DS in over 50% of trials, indicating that they
were able to overcome cognitive set and use the more efficient alternative method consistently.
Interestingly, 50 humans (48%) used the DS at least once. Thus, even after discovering the more
efficient alternative, their set was unbroken.
A Yates’ continuity corrected chi-square (used due to an expected value smaller than 5)
compared the frequencies of LSers vs DSers in the two species and confirmed that the number of
DSers was greater in baboons than in humans [χ2 (1)= 35.88, p < .001; Figure 2.3-1].
Additionally, another Yates’ continuity corrected chi-square, indicated that there was no
significant association between BASE solution strategy classification and species [χ2 (1)= .105, p
= .746; Figure 2.3-1].
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Figure 2.2 The percentage of subjects classified as DSers in the BASE and PROBE
conditions across baboons and humans. ** p ≤.001.

To investigate the impact of age on DS-use, human subjects were reclassified as DSers or
LSers based on their first 48 trials (24 BASE, 24 PROBE). This was done to eliminate the
difference in trial number between children (who received 48 trials) and adolescents and adults
(who received 96 trials). A Pearson’s chi-square revealed that there was a significant association
between age group and PROBE solution strategy classification in humans [χ2 (2)= 13.32, p =
.001; Fig 2.3-2]. Further, the only category in which the standardized residual was significant
(2.8) was Children DSers, indicating that they were driving the effect. The association between
BASE trials and age group was not significant χ2 (2)= 1.60, p = .923 (Fig 2.3-2).
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Figure 2.3 The percentage of subjects classified as DSers in the BASE and PROBE
conditions across human children, adolescents, and adults. ** p ≤.001

2.4

Discussion
In this study, the first main finding was that baboons and humans responded differently

on a cognitive set task. Baboons immediately broke set and adopted the more efficient DS when
it became available, yet the majority of humans failed to deviate from the LS. Our second
finding was that humans’ ability to break cognitive set is associated with their age. Children
were 3 times more likely to be classified as DSers in the PROBE condition than adolescents and
2.4 times more likely than adults. As far as we know, this is the first study to investigate
cognitive set in a nonhuman species and it is one of very few to look at developmental
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differences in susceptibility to cognitive set in humans (Cunningham, 1965; Janzen, Maguire, &
Boersma, 1976; Luchins, 1942).
Previous findings regarding age effects and cognitive set are inconsistent. Luchins
(1942) found a trend (of unreported statistical significance) indicating that public school children
(ages 9-14) were less able to recover from cognitive set compared to adults (ages 16-52).
Cunningham (1965) tested children ages 7-12 on modified cognitive set tasks and found
(minimally reported) trends indicating that older subjects were better able to overcome set.
However, Janzen et al. (1976) tested children (ages 5-12) on visual set tasks and found no
significant age effects. We propose that the LS-DS task is better able to compare cognitive set
across ages (and species) than previous methods. While previous set tasks have involved
arithmetic (Cunningham, 1965; Luchins, 1942) and alphabetic rules (Cunningham, 1965), the
LS-DS required the use of a spatiotemporal rule: For the LS, identify the two demonstrated
squares in their demonstrated order, then select the Triangle. This metric allowed us to a)
compare set between baboons and humans and b) compare across age groups where all subjects
were naïve to the task and it’s rules prior to testing. Thus, the LS-DS task may be a better test of
cognitive set across age groups because it does not rely on math or language skills, which are
very different between children, adolescents, and adults.
Although the LS-DS task was extremely similar between humans and baboons, it was not
identical. That said, differences in methodology between species should have promoted the
opposite of our observed effects and thereby strengthen our findings. Humans received longer
display times during training, which could have conferred increased salience to the LS. Yet,
overall LS salience was heavily weighted towards baboons as they received an average of 12,915
more training trials than humans. Research suggests that increased training with a rule decreases
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the likelihood of participants’ breaking set (Crooks & McNeil, 2009). Thus, baboons should
have been less able to break set than humans based on LS experience, which was not the case.
The differential abilities of baboons and humans to break cognitive set are extreme and
yet, an underlying cause is not immediately apparent. Why did the baboons immediately
consider the DS, whereas humans ignored it? One hypothesis is that differences in visual and
sequential processing may have conferred increased perceptual awareness of the DS to baboons.
Indeed, the baboons used the DS the very first time it was available and then continued to use it
in nearly every subsequent PROBE trial. To do this, they must have (a) been aware of the
Triangle’s premature presence in PROBE trials and (b) associated it, not the sequence as a
whole, with the reward. In line with Ohshiba’s (1997) findings illustrating the serial and
collective search strategies of old world monkeys and humans respectively, baboons may have
perceived the task’s solution as a series of individual stimuli [(Square1) + (Square2) + (Triangle)
= Reward] and humans may have perceived it as a collective rule [i.e., (Square1 + Square2 +
Triangle) = Reward ]. Thus, if baboons solved the LS-DS task with a serial search strategy, it
might have allowed the DS [(Triangle) = reward] to be visually disentangled from within the LS
and thus, used more effectively. Humans, on the other hand, may have used a collective search
strategy and been less attentive to the Triangle’s premature presence in PROBE trials. Further,
Bilalić et al. (2008) found that previous experience with a solution strategy biased visual
attention towards that strategy in expert chess players. However, the possible differences in
visual and sequential processing of the LS-DS task between baboons and humans does not
explain why only 14% of humans who used the DS at least once were able to break set. Even if
it was accidental, what prevented the majority of humans from switching to the DS after
discovering it?
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Another explanation for humans’ inability to break set is that they simply did not
understand that they were allowed to. Humans’ notions of how they should respond might block
the use of alternative solutions. Since the classic Milgram shock experiments (1974), obedience
to authority has been known to affect human behavior and this has been extended to
experimenter presence and the experimental environment in general (see Rosenthal & Rosnow,
2009 for discussion). For the current study, humans’ responses may have been affected by the
presence of the experimenter and/or the knowledge that the task was a scientific study. It is
possible that they saw the LS as the way they should solve the task based on their experience
with the training and the experimental environment. Baboons, on the other hand, had free access
to the testing apparatuses, without the presence of an experimenter and are likely unaffected by
the experimental environment. This species difference in ‘obedient’ responses is supported by
findings showing that following a live demonstration of how to access food from a box, humans
but not chimpanzees imitated superfluous actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005). Although the
current study did not measure humans’ conceptual understanding of the task directly, pilot
participants were asked if they had thought about touching the Triangle directly after task
completion. Responses varied from “I didn’t see a triangle” to “I thought it was a trap” to “Yes,
and I tried it once” (See Supplementary Figure 2.2-2 in Appendix A for Pilot data). However,
even the pilot-subject who tried the DS continued to use the LS afterwards, which is consistent
with the 43% of non-pilot participants who “discovered” the DS yet continued to use the LS.
The question now becomes: If a subject is able to see the early onset of the Triangle in PROBE
trials and is willing to try touching it directly, what prevents the majority of them from adopting
it as a consistent strategy?
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We propose that working memory availability plays an important role in humans’
persistent use of the LS. In 2007, Beilock and DeCaro found that, when under stress, humans
with lower working memory availability used the direct response in Luchins’ (1942) task more
than humans with higher working memory. They posited that those with higher working
memory were better able to remember and enact the learned rule, while those with lower
working memory favored the less memory-intensive, direct response. Although the current task
did not appear to induce stress in subjects, if we consider that the same working memory
constraints might also have driven the increased DS preference in children, who show lower
working memory skills than adults (Miles, Morgan, Milne, & Morris, 1996; Thomason et al.,
2009), then our age effect becomes more coherent. The LS requires subjects to remember the
locations of Square1 and Square2, while the DS only requires the subject to touch the visible
Triangle. Simply stated, the LS requires working memory and the DS does not. Thus when we
consider their lower working memory availability, it seems logical that more children favored the
DS than adults who are presumably better equipped to handle the working memory load
necessitated by the LS. This is corroborated by the comment of a 7-year-old pilot subject after
he discovered the DS, “I like it when the triangle is already there because I don’t have to
remember the squares!” Further, baboons show overall lower working memory skills than
humans (Fagot & De Lillo, 2011) suggesting that, while a serial search strategy may allow them
to see the DS more readily than humans, their limited working memory could provide increased
incentive to use the DS. Adults’ and adolescents’ persistent use of the LS may simply be a
combination of inherent cognitive set and a lack of working-memory based incentive to deviate
from what they’ve learned. This hypothesis should be explored in future studies.

55

In summary, the current study presents findings suggesting that baboons are less
susceptible to the negative effects of cognitive set than humans. This is, as far as we know, the
first comparative cognitive set study. It should be noted that in Luchins’ original cognitive set
task, an ‘extinction problem,’ where the only possible solution was the direct one, was
sometimes used to enhance subjects’ ability to break set. The current study did not incorporate
an extinction problem but this might have an interesting effect on the observed differences.
While future studies are required to more fully understand these species and age differences in
ability to break cognitive set, the current study proposes that:
(1) Baboons’ immediate use of the DS is facilitated by an increased ability to see the
difference between the PROBE and BASE trials, which is a result of independently processing
the individual components of the task sequence. Further, continued use of the DS is promoted by
its minimal working memory requirements. Free from experimenter effects, baboon responses
were unaffected by the experimental environment and their training with the LS.
(2) After extracting the collective LS from the training, humans’ persistent use of it may
have been governed by a combination of a) difficulty visually differentiating between the
PROBE and BASE trials, b) consideration of how they should respond as dictated by the
experimental environment and their training, and c) differences in working memory availability,
with lower working memory availability promoting DS-use and higher working memory
enabling LS-use.
Although nonhuman primates may encounter complex ecological, physical, or social
problems, they are likely variable and not easily solvable by a single governing rule. Humans,
on the other hand, are regularly faced with complex similar problems, which readily lend
themselves to rule-based solutions. The adaptive benefits (or detriments) of cognitive set are not
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fully understood but it seems logical that set facilitates humans’ ritualized problem solving. It
would be interesting to address the presence of cognitive set in non-traditionally educated human
populations and/or other nonhuman primate species.
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Abstract
Within human problem solving, the propensity to persistently evoke a learned rule, rather
than switch to a more efficient alternative is pervasive. This susceptibility to ‘cognitive set’
prevents optimization by biasing response patterns toward habit-based solutions. In a recent
study, which utilized the nonverbal, spatiotemporal ‘Learned Strategy-Direct Strategy’ (LS-DS)
touch screen task, baboons exhibited a striking ability to deviate from their learned strategy to
utilize a more efficient shortcut. Humans, on the other hand, displayed the opposite response
pattern and almost exclusively employed the familiar response. In the current study, we sought
to explore the likely evolutionary trajectory of cognitive set within the primate lineage by
conducting the LS-DS task with ten chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). We found that, like
baboons, chimpanzees used the shortcut significantly more often than humans. However, unlike
either baboons or humans, we observed pronounced inter- and intra-individual variability in
chimpanzees’ shortcut-use. Additionally, we found that chimpanzees did not exhibit switch
costs when switching between the learned strategy and the shortcut. Further, a subset of
chimpanzees employed a unique solution, wherein they switched strategies mid-trial. These data
indicate that chimpanzees experience an intermediate susceptibility to cognitive set on the LSDS task. We propose that differences in abstract rule encoding may underlie differences in
susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task within the primate lineage.
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3.1

Introduction
Primates occupy highly dynamic environments. Decisive actions are demanded often,

with outcomes that can greatly impact fitness. Adaptive behavior is predicated upon flexible
strategy-use, yet such plasticity is complex. We define cognitive flexibility as the ability to
incorporate both known solutions and innovated or acquired novel solutions in a contextually
appropriate manner (Buttelmann & Karbach, 2017; Lehner et al., 2011). Flexible responses must
integrate external environmental cues with internal inputs, such as past experience, and in the
case that a past strategy is no longer the most appropriate, flexible behavior requires inhibiting
that previous response and switching to a more efficient strategy. However, humans exhibit
deficits in this regard.
Numerous studies describe failures by humans to deviate from a learned or familiar
method in order to adopt a better alternative (Adamson, 1952; Aftanas & Koppenaal, 1962;
Bilalić et al., 2008; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Crooks & McNeil, 2009; Duncker & Lees,
1945; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950; Ruscio & Amabile, 1999; Sweller et al., 1982).
Yet, this propensity toward mechanized problem solving or ‘cognitive set’, is less evident in
some nonhuman primate species. For instance, Pope et al. (2015) presented baboons and
humans with a nonverbal ‘Learned Strategy-Direct Strategy’ (LS-DS) touch screen task. The
LS-DS task begins with several sessions of training wherein subjects become proficient in using
a three-step sequence (Square1→Square2→Triangle), which constitutes the learned strategy
(LS; see Figure 1.6-1a). Once subjects consistently utilize the LS, experimental trials are
presented in which subjects can use the LS (See Figure 1.6-1b) or they can use a more direct
strategy (DS or the shortcut) by skipping Square1→Square2 and going straight for the Triangle
(See Figure 1.6-1d). Pope et al. (2015) found that all 15 baboon subjects immediately switched
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to the DS when it became available, using it in 99.9% of trials. By comparison, only four (out of
53; 7.6%) adult humans used the DS in greater than 5% of trials.
Numerous studies aimed at identifying the origins of human cognition, including
cognitive flexibility, have compared monkeys, apes, and humans (Genovesio et al., 2005;
Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Manrique & Call, 2015; Rosati, 2017; Stoet & Snyder, 2008).
Typically, when quantifying flexibility, studies utilize forced-switch paradigms, wherein subjects
are required to switch strategies (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Manrique & Call, 2015; Rosati,
2017). The most basic forced-switch tasks, discrimination reversals such as transfer index and
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task [or Dimensional Card Change Sorting (DCCS) task], reward
subjects for selecting a certain response and then switch to rewarding a different response (Berg,
1948; Rumbaugh, 1971; Zelazo et al., 1996). In these tasks, monkeys and humans exhibit
similar difficulties extinguishing a learned, rewarded response (Bonté, 2011; Bonte et al., 2014;
Ionescu, 2012; Jordan & Morton, 2012; Manrique & Call, 2015; Piaget, 1954; Rosati, 2017;
Rumbaugh, 1971; Zelazo, 2008). Yet several differences between monkeys’ and humans’ rule
following behavior are also apparent.
Like humans, monkeys are capable of learning abstract rules (Bonté, 2011; Fagot &
Bonte, 2010; Genovesio et al., 2005; Genovesio & Wise, 2008; Pope et al., 2015; Stoet &
Snyder, 2008; Stoet & Snyder, 2003). However, in stark contrast to humans, monkeys
reportedly do not exhibit overt trial-to-trial switch costs (Stoet & Snyder, 2003).1 Defined as
deficits in response time or accuracy associated with switching solution strategies in consecutive
trials as opposed to repeating a strategy (Brass et al., 2008), switch costs are attributed to the
cognitive reconfiguration allowing a new strategy to guide behavior (Lemaire et al., 2017; Luwel
et al., 2009; Meiran, 1996) and are exhibited by both human children and adults (Ionescu, 2012;
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Zelazo, 2008). Interestingly, these deficits were somewhat reduced if the subject knew the
switch was coming (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or had more time to prepare for it (Arrington &
Logan, 2004). However, humans continued to exhibit switch costs even after 23,000 trials (Stoet
& Snyder, 2007). Furthermore, although unencumbered by switch costs, monkeys did show
deficits on trials which included irrelevant stimulus information, yet humans did not (Stoet &
Snyder, 2003). This seems to indicate a trade-off between flexibility and distractibility, perhaps
driven by species differences in the strength with which rules are encoded (Ghirlanda, Lind, &
Enquist, 2017; Stoet & Snyder, 2008).
It is unclear to what extent apes are capable of flexibly adopting new strategies (Hrubesch
et al., 2009; Manrique et al., 2013; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price et al., 2009; Van
Leeuwen et al., 2013). Apes perseverate similarly to humans in some measures (Davis, 2017;
Manrique & Call, 2015; Rosati, 2017 for review); however, chimpanzees do remarkably well in
inhibiting food consumption when it can be exchanged for a better reward, even after a delay
(Beran, Rossettie, & Parrish, 2016). Furthermore, on simple stimulus-response discrimination
reversal tasks, apes outperformed monkeys in their ability to adjust to the changing contingencies
(Rumbaugh, 1971). Yet, evidence regarding their abilities to switch between more abstract rules
is limited. In fact, we are aware of a single effort to elucidate abstract response flexibility in
apes, in which chimpanzees (N = 6) completed a computerized Dimensional Change Card
Sorting task, a simpler derivative of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Ionescu, 2012; Jordan &
Morton, 2012; Kirkham et al., 2003; Manrique & Call, 2015; Zelazo et al., 2003), which requires
subjects to first categorize stimuli based on one stimulus dimension (e.g., shape) and then switch
to using another dimension (e.g. size; Moriguchi et al., 2011). The authors reported that
chimpanzees’ ability to switch strategies was affected by their previous experience with the
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familiar strategy. However, they also noted that subjects passed the pre-switch portion of the
task, on average, in only 42.9% of sessions. It is therefore unclear if even the first rule was
adequately adopted, much less to what extent subjects were affected by cognitive set.
Several studies report that chimpanzees stick to a learned strategy, even after watching a
demonstration of a more efficient alternative (Davis, 2017; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008).
In fact, some chimpanzees were shown to persist with a learned strategy even when the
alternative was easier (Hrubesch et al., 2009; Price et al., 2009). Similarly inflexible behavior
has been documented in a number of baited-box experiments, in which subjects first learn one
method for obtaining a reward but are then shown a better alternative (Davis, 2017; Davis et al.,
2016; Gruber et al., 2011; Manrique & Call, 2015). Further, like humans, functional fixedness,
wherein knowledge regarding an objects’ typical function interferes with using it in an atypical
manner (Adamson, 1952; Duncker & Lees, 1945), has been suggested to affect apes’ problem
solving tactics (Gruber, 2016; Hanus et al., 2011).
Yet, there is also compelling evidence for problem-solving flexibility in apes. In token
exchange paradigms, chimpanzees flexibly switched to exchanging an unfamiliar token when it
became more highly rewarded than a familiar token (Van Leeuwen et al., 2013) and (Davis,
2017) found that when an alternative solution required relatively simple modifications,
chimpanzees readily switched strategies, especially when the alternative reaped a better reward.
These findings are in line with others demonstrating that simple modifications to known
behaviors are well within apes’ capabilities (Lehner et al., 2011; Yamamoto et al., 2013).
Given the prevalence of both conservative and flexible behavior, some authors have
suggested that a range of factors might influence flexibility in apes, such as how strongly the
learned strategy is encoded, the relative difficulty between the familiar strategy and the
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alternative, and the reward difference between the two (Davis, 2017; Hopper et al., 2015;
Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Van Leeuwen et al., 2013). In contrast, each strategy on the
LS-DS is performed using the exact same reach/touch motion and even stimulus locations are
meaningless, as they change with each trial. Thus, the LS-DS task elucidates subjects’ proclivity
to switch strategies when presented with an alternative strategy that only differs from the learned
strategy in efficiency (# of reaches). Thus, response-style (conservative vs flexible) on the LSDS task is likely indicative of the cognitive representations underlying strategies and the relative
ease with which they are replaced or altered.
We suggest several potential influences on the propensity to adopt the shortcut on the LSDS task, which may differ across primate species. First, measured via hierarchical figures tasks,
old world monkeys have been shown to exhibit a local perceptual bias (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998;
Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002). In contrast, chimpanzees exhibit both
global and local biases, potentially mediated by the inter-element distance (Fagot & Tomonaga,
1999; Hopkins, 1997; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002). Humans, however, exhibit a consistent
global perceptual bias (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Navon, 1977).
Considering that attention to local detail might facilitate spotting the shortcut when it is
available, global/local perceptual biases could affect its use.
Second, there is some evidence that old world monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans may
process sequences differently (Beran et al., 2004; Biro & Matsuzawa, 1999; Fagot & De Lillo,
2011; Ohshiba, 1997). The LS-DS task requires subjects to remember the order and location of
the first two items (Square1 and Square2) and then select the Triangle. Processing each step of
the LS sequence as an individual component [ie. (Square1) + (Square2) + (Triangle)] or even just
processing the Triangle as separable from the Squares [(Square1 + Square2) + (Triangle)], might
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allow subjects to more readily identify the shortcut (Triangle). On the other hand, processing the
LS sequence as a collective whole [ ie. (Square1 + Square2 + Triangle)], might render the DS
more difficult to disentangle.
Third, although both monkeys and apes are capable of learning and utilizing abstract
rules, this often requires extensive training (Beran et al., 2004; Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; Pope et
al., 2015; Stoet & Snyder, 2003). Humans, by comparison, have been shown to codify rules
almost immediately (Crooks & McNeil, 2009; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950) and
readily apply them to novel problems (Sweller et al., 1982). Thus, the strength with which
abstract rules are encoded might conceivably influence how flexibly they can be used.

The current study had two aims. First, we sought to explore chimpanzees’ susceptibility
to cognitive set on the LS-DS task. Second, we sought to contextualize these findings by
comparing chimpanzees’ response patterns to those of baboons and humans, previously reported
in Pope et al. (2015). We reasoned that if chimpanzees responded similarly to humans on the
LS-DS task, then limited abstract response flexibility might be considered an homologous,
ancestral trait, perhaps even a byproduct of global perceptual biases or ‘collective’ sequential
processing. However, if chimpanzees responded similarly to baboons, we might consider
humans’ susceptibility to cognitive set to be the outcome of a derived human characteristic,
possibly a byproduct of enhanced rule encoding. Although far from a complete evolutionary
framework, the current study aimed to provide the first look at a likely evolutionary trajectory of
cognitive set within the primate lineage.
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3.2
3.2.1

Methods
Subjects
We tested 10 captive-born chimpanzee subjects [aged 16.6–36.1 years; five females (M =

26.9 years, SD = 9.0) and five males, (M = 21.3 years, SD = 3.0)] located at the Yerkes National
Primate Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia.

3.2.2

Equipment and Materials
The LS-DS was programmed using EPrime (version 2.0, Psychology Soft- ware Tools,

Pittsburgh) and administered using a 19-inch touch monitor (1939L Open-Frame Touchmonitor,
Elo Touch Solutions) affixed to a metal housing, which was temporarily attached to subjects’
home enclosure during testing. Each testing session lasted roughly 20 minutes to avoid fatigue
and subjects were rewarded with juice or small pieces of fruit or vegetables, depending on their
preferences or dietary restrictions. All testing was approved by the Emory University IACUC.

3.2.3

LS-DS Training
Chimpanzees received four LS-DS Training levels. To progress to the next training

level, subjects were required to achieve >80% accuracy twice. In Training 1 subjects were
presented with two squares, Square1 and Square2, which flashed red (250 ms each) in sequence.
To be correct, they then selected Square1 and Square2 in the demonstrated order. Accuracy was
assessed after each block of 24 trials. Next, subjects progressed to Training 1.5, in which trials
identical to those in Training 1 were randomly interspersed with trials in which four squares
were shown and one flashed (250 ms each) red; for these, subjects then selected the square that
flashed from among the four choices. Training 2 also displayed four squares, except two squares

66

flashed (250 ms each) red in sequence and subjects were required to select Square1 and Square2
in the correct order, from among the four options. Training 3 very nearly resembled Training 2,
except the demonstration squares were displayed for a shorter time (150 ms each) and after a
correct Square1 → Square2 selection, a blue triangle appeared in one of the two remaining
locations. For all Training 3 trials, subjects were rewarded upon touching the blue Triangle.
Thus, to pass Training 3, subjects needed to be proficient in using the
Square1→Sqaure2→Triangle sequence (i.e., the learned strategy or LS).
We encountered several difficulties during training that required procedural
modifications. When the Triangle first appeared in Training 3, five of the ten chimpanzee
subjects struggled to incorporate it into their response (i.e., they completely avoided it). After
several sessions wherein subjects were achieving extremely low accuracy scores, we opted to
briefly modify the program for these subjects, in an effort to prevent them from giving up
altogether. For this modification, once a correct Square1 → Square2 selection was entered, the
Triangle still appeared in one of the two remaining places but all the other squares disappeared,
such that all that was left on the screen was the Triangle. Once subjects consistently touched the
Triangle (M = 26.90; SD = 47.04), they were switched back to the regular version of Training 3.
Additionally, in some cases, subjects’ motivation appeared to dwindle substantially. When this
occurred, we altered their food reward or instated a 5 second (as opposed to the normal 3 second)
delay following incorrect responses. For Training 3, even if subjects were accounting for their
previous selections, the likelihood of being correct in any given trial simply by chance is 1/24
(Response1 = 1/4, Response2 = 1/3, and Response3 = 1/2). Therefore, evidenced by
considerably higher than chance accuracy scores (in one case a subject had achieved above 75%
accuracy nine times) many subjects grasped the LS, yet failed to reach the >80% criterion twice.
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After several months, we opted to adjust the Training 3 accuracy requirements such that a subject
needed to achieve either greater than 80% twice, greater than 75% three times, or greater than
70% five times in order to progress to the experimental trials. Potential impacts of these
alterations are discussed.

3.2.4

LS-DS Experimental Trials
Immediately after training, subjects completed 96 experimental trials, consisting of 48

PROBE and 48 BASE. In PROBE trials, the Triangle appears alongside the Square1 → Square2
demonstration and remains visible on the response screen (see Fig. 1.6-1b-d). Subjects can then
either continue to use the Square1→Square2→Triangle sequence (i.e., the LS) or they can
simply ignore the demonstration and select the Triangle (i.e., the DS or shortcut). To provide a
measure of accidental DS-use within each subject, in BASE trials (which appear identical to
Training 3) if subjects select the Triangle’s hidden location they are scored and rewarded as if
they had used the DS. Subjects randomly received each of the possible 24 configurations 4 times
(2 PROBE and 2 BASE).
3.2.5

Data Analysis
We calculated a “true” measure of DS-use by subtracting each subject’s BASE DS-use

from PROBE DS-use, thereby accounting for within-subject error (Pope, Fagot, Meguerditchian,
Washburn, & Hopkins, Submitted). For all analyses, whenever the data violated the
assumptions for parametric statistical analyses, we used non-parametric analyses and reported
the appropriate descriptive statistics. In accordance with our previous studies, subjects were
classified as DSers if they used the DS in greater than 5% of PROBE trials (Pope et al.,
Submitted; Pope et al., 2015). However, we also included progressively more stringent DSer
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qualification criteria (greater than 25%, greater than 50%, and greater than 70%) to gain a more
complete understanding of DS-use between species.
Additionally, we analyzed for switch costs associated with switching between the LS and
the DS. First, we looked for deficits in response time (RT) by isolating the time between fixation
response and first response (RT1) for BASE trials in which subjects repeated (BASE stay) or
switched (BASE switch) their strategy and for PROBE trials in which subjects repeated (PROBE
stay) or switched (PROBE switch) their strategy. All trials that were precluded by an incorrect
trial and those in which the first response was incorrect were excluded. Second, we compared
subjects’ Response 1 accuracies between trials in which the condition repeated or was different.
For example, a PROBE trial preceded by another PROBE trial was classified as PROBE same, a
PROBE trial preceded by a BASE trial was classified as PROBE different, a BASE trial
preceded by another BASE trial was classified as BASE same , and a BASE trial preceded by a
PROBE trial was classified as BASE different. Thus, strategy choice was described as
stay/switch and trial type was described as same/different.

3.3
3.3.1

Results
Training
For chimpanzees, training required an average of 295.8 days (Min = 27; Max = 465).

Subject completed a Median of 817 (SD = 863.9) Training 1 trials, 2,343 (SD = 1,637.8)
Training 1.5 trials, 8,771 (SD = 3,810.6) Training 2 trials, and 4,852.5 (SD = 6,548.0) Training 3
trials. In total, chimpanzees conducted a Median of 17,960 trials (SD = 9,989.7).
To better understand the immense number of training trials that chimpanzees needed to
learn the LS, we analyzed for error patterns during Training 2. We chose to analyze Training 2
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errors because, unlike Training 1, subjects selected between all four response options. Further,
even by Training 3, Response 1 (Mdn = 69.64%) and Response 2 (Mdn = 66.65%) accuracies
were significantly lower than Response 3 [Mdn = 94.05%; χ2(2) = 12.60, p = 0.002] indicating
that subjects’ difficulty learning the LS involved their representation of the Square1→Square2
portion of the solution, not the Triangle.
We looked at incorrect trials that were preceded by correct trials. For each Response 1,
we noted whether the erroneous selection was a repetition of the previous trial, either the
previous Response 1 or the previous Response 2. For example, if subjects had been rewarded in
the previous trial for a Bottom Left → Top Left response, then we identified whether the
erroneous response had been either a Bottom Left or Top Left selection. If driven by chance, we
would expect subject’s errors to correspond to these squares 33.33% of the time (1 out of the
three erroneous response options). However, a one sample T-Test found that, chimpanzees’
propensity to erroneously select their previous Response1 did not differ from chance (M =
31.05%, SD = 10.59). Additionally, chimpanzees erroneously re-selected their previously
correct Response 2 significantly less often than expected by chance [M = 22.49%, SD = 3.76;
t(9) = -6.94, p < .001].
Next, we identified whether subjects’ errors were, instead, due to mistakenly selecting the
Square2 location, rather than the Square1 location. For example, when the demonstration
depicted Bottom Left → Bottom Right and the erroneous response was Bottom Right. Indeed,
chimpanzees committed this ‘reversal’ error-type significantly more often than expected by
chance (M = 49.75%, SD = 10.10; t(9) = 5.14, p = .001).
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3.3.2

DS-use
All chimpanzee (N = 10/10) subjects used the DS in greater than 5% of PROBE trials. In

fact, 60% (N = 6/10) used the DS the very first time it was available and 20% (N = 2/10) used it
every single time it was available. Additionally, chimpanzees employed another, previously
unreported strategy. In addition to the LS (Square1 + Square2 + Triangle; Figure 1.6-1b) and DS
(Triangle; Figure 1.6-1d), the task permits a third strategy wherein subjects seemingly initiate the
LS by selecting the first square but then switch to the DS by skipping the second square and
instead selecting the Triangle (Square1 + Triangle; Figure 1.6-1c). Because it occurred so
infrequently, this ‘switch strategy’ (SS) was not analyzed separately from the DS in the previous
studies with baboons and humans (Pope et al., 2015). However, the current study found that
chimpanzees used the SS in an average of 12.4% (Max = 35.7%) of trials.

3.3.3

Impact of Strategy on Performance
To assess the impact of strategy on performance, we investigated average accuracies in

BASE and PROBE trials. Recall that LS, SS, and DS responses are each considered correct,
only varying on their relative efficiencies. PROBE (Mdn = 95.83, SD = 10.22) accuracy was
significantly higher than BASE (Mdn = 77.08, SD = 5.01) accuracy (Z= -2.501 , p = .012).

3.3.4

Switch Cost Analysis
A repeated measures ANOVA determined that there were no effects of either

condition (BASE/PROBE) or strategy type (stay/switch) on subjects’ RT1s. Additionally, a
related samples Friedman’s test showed no effect of trial type (same /different) on Response 1
accuracy; however, there was a significant effect of condition [χ2(3, N = 10) = 12.59, p = 0.006].
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BASE same trials were significantly less accurate than PROBE different and PROBE same,
although BASE different trials did not differ from any trial type. Thus, chimpanzees showed no
switch costs in either RT or accuracy; however, as described above, they did exhibit improved
accuracy on PROBE compared to BASE trials.

3.4

Comparative Analyses
Here we aimed to compare chimpanzees’ responses on the LS-DS task to those of

baboons and humans, which were previously collected and reported in Pope et al. (2015).

3.4.1

Subjects and General Procedure
Baboon data were collected from 15 socially housed baboons [aged 1.8–9.3 years; six

males (M = 5.3 years, SD = 2.68) and nine females (M = 5.1 years, SD = 2.36)] located at the
CNRS Station de Primatologie in Rousset-sur-Arc, France. The task was administered via ten
automated learning devices for monkeys (ALDMs; Fagot & Paleressompoulle, 2009) and was
approved by the local ‘‘Provence Alpes Cote d’Azur’’ ethics committee for experimental animal
research. In the previous report, children conducted only 48 trials (Pope et al., 2015).2
Therefore we focused on the adult human data, which were collected from 53 participants (aged
18–68 years; 23 males (M = 39.0 years, SD = 13.7) and 30 females (M = 40.8 years, SD = 13.4)
at a temporary testing booth set up at Zoo Atlanta in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. Human testing was
approved by the Zoo Atlanta Research Committee and the Georgia State University Institutional
Review Board.
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3.4.2

Analysis
For all species, analyses were performed on subjects’ first 96 trials, comprised of 48

PROBE and 48 BASE trials. For our original assessment of cognitive set between baboons and
humans (Pope et al., 2015), we calculated DS-use based on the percentage of trials in which
subjects used the DS in PROBE trials and compared it to BASE DS-use. However, for the
current analyses we used the same ‘true’ measure of DS-use described in Section 3.2.5.

3.5

3.5.1

Comparative Results

General Species Differences
Average accuracy, as shown by a Kruskal-Wallis test, significantly differed between

chimpanzees (M = 83.8, SD = 6.3) and humans [M = 90.7, SD =9.9; H(2) = 11.89, p = 0.000] but
not between baboons (M = 88.3, SD = 8.8) and humans or baboons and chimpanzees.
Additionally, Mann-Whitney tests determined that sex did not influence DS-use for any species
(baboons: U = 25.5, p = .864; chimpanzees: U = 14.0, p = .841; humans: U = 404.5, p = .213).

3.5.2

Species Differences in Training
Kruskal-Wallis tests confirmed that across all training levels, baboons and chimpanzees

completed significantly more trials than humans: Training 1 [H(2) = 53.84, p < 0.001], Training
2 [H(2) = 70.63, p < 0.001], Training 3 [H(2) = 59.80, p < 0.001], and the total number of
training trials [H(2) = 52.74, p < 0.001; Table 3.5-1]. Note that chimpanzees completed an extra
training level, Training 1.5, which is included in the total number of training trials. Combining
Training 1.5 with Training 1 did not alter the above finding (H(2) = 53.84, p < 0.001). These
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differences should be interpreted cautiously given that the pass criteria differed for each species.3
We found no significant correlations between the number of training trials (for any level) and
DS-use for any species: Training 1: chimpanzees (rs (8) = .231, p = .522), baboons (rs (13) =
.062, p = .829), humans (rs (51) = -.108, p = .439); Training 2: chimpanzees (rs (8) = .407, p =
.243), baboons (rs (13) = .313, p = .625), humans (rs (51) = .151, p = .281); Training 3:
chimpanzees (rs (8) = .164, p = .651), baboons (rs (13) = .224, p = .422), humans (rs (51) = -.051,
p = .713); Total Training chimpanzees (rs (8) = .438, p = .205), baboons (rs (13) = .095, p =
.739), humans (rs (51) = -.129, p = .357).

Table 3.1 Median number of training trials for Training 1, Training 1.5, Training 2,
Training 3 and Total Training for all species. SD in parentheses.
Training 1
Training 1.5 Training 2
Training 3
Total Training
Baboons
6,084
---------6,108
1,345
14,115
(1,947.1)
---------(2,309.1)
(999.5)
(4,345.7)

3.5.3

Chimps

817
(863.9)

2,343
(1,637.8)

8,771
(3,810.6)

4,852.5
(6,548.0)

17,960
(9,989.7)

Humans

16
(8.6)

-------------------

8
(10.5)

8
(7.7)

32
(20.2)

Error Analyses
Next, like in Section 3.3.1, we analyzed for error patterns during Training 2. Recall that

we focused on incorrect trials that were preceded by correct trials. However, only 6 humans
(none of which were DSers) committed eligible errors (M = 6.66) and thus, we did not analyze
humans’ training errors further. One sample T-Tests found that baboons erroneously reselected
their previously correct Response 1 (M = 23.55%, SD = 7.76; t(14) = -4.882) and Response 2 (M
= 14.56%, SD =3.45; t(9) = -21.06, p < .001) significantly less often than expected by chance.
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Further, similarly to chimpanzees, baboons committed the ‘reversal’ error-type significantly
more often than expected by chance (M = 49.29%, SD = 12.60; t(9) = 4.91, p < .001).

3.5.4

Cross-species Differences in Shortcut-Use
A Pearson’s chi square confirmed that the proportion of baboons (100%) and

chimpanzees (100%) that were classified as DSers differed significantly from humans (7.5%),
but not from each other [χ2(2, N = 78) = 62.17, p < .001; Table 3.5-2a]. Additionally, the
proportions of chimpanzees and baboons that used the DS in more than 25% [χ2(2, N = 78) =
58.02, p < .001] and more than 50% (χ2(2, N = 78) = 51.91, p < .001; Table 3.5-2a) of trials were
significantly higher than humans, but again did not significantly differ from each other. In the
75% DSer classification, all species significantly differed from one another [χ2(2, N = 78) =
51.09, p < .001; Table 3.5-2a].
The number of subjects who used the DS the very first time it was available differed
significantly between all three species: baboons had the highest proportion (100%), followed by
chimpanzees (60%), and then humans (5.7%) [Fisher’s Exact: χ2(2, N = 78) = 55.61, p < .001].
Further, the proportion of baboon (53.3%) and chimpanzee (20%) subjects who used the DS
every time it was available significantly differed from humans (0%), but not from each another
[Fisher’s Exact: χ2(2, N = 78) = 26.65, p < .001]
The SS was not distinguished from the DS previously (Pope et al., 2015), because
humans and baboons used it in less than 1% of trials on average (baboons: M = 0.80%; Max =
6.25%; humans: M = 0.49%; Max = 9.52%). A Pearson’s chi square confirmed that the
proportion of chimpanzees classified as SSers (50.0%) was significantly larger than the
proportion of baboons (6.7%) and humans (1.9%), which did not differ from each other [Fisher’s
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Exact: χ2(2, N = 78) = 15.68, p < .001; Table 3.5-2b). Further, the proportion of chimpanzees
(30%) who used the SS in more than 25% of trials was significantly higher than humans (0%)
but baboons (0%) did not differ significantly from either other species [Fisher’s Exact: χ2(2, N =
78) = 11.20, p = .002; Table 3.5-2b]. No chimpanzees used the SS in greater than 50% of trials.

Table 3.2 Proportion of each group which used the a) DS or the b) SS in greater than
5%, 25%, 50%, and 75% of trials. Superscripts identify statistically distinguishable groupings.
a) DS
>5%
Baboons
100a
Chimpanzees 100a
Humans
7.5b

>25%
100a
90.0a
7.5 b

Baboons
6.7a
Chimpanzees 50.0b
Humans
1.9 a

0 a,b
30.0b
0a

>50%
100a
70.0a
7.5 b

>75%
93.3a
30.0b
3.8c

b) SS

3.5.5

Impact of Strategy on Performance
To assess the impact of strategy on performance, we investigated subjects’ average

accuracies in BASE and PROBE trials. Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks tests showed that, like
chimpanzees (and described in Section 3.3.3), baboons’ PROBE (Mdn = 97.08, SD = 3.50)
accuracies were significantly higher than their BASE (Mdn = 79.58, SD = 15.87) accuracies (Z=
-3.411 , p = .001). However, for humans, PROBE (Mdn = 91.67, SD = 10.33) accuracy was
significantly lower than BASE (Mdn = 93.75, SD = 10.03) accuracy (Z= -2.151 , p = .031),
indicating that although they typically do not use the DS, the presence of the Triangle in PROBE
trials may be distracting for humans.
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3.5.6

Switch Cost Analysis
We also analyzed baboons’ switch costs, as they were not assessed in the previous report

(Pope et al., 2015). For baboons, a related samples Friedman’s test showed no effect of trial type
(same/different) on Response 1 accuracy. Although, similarly to chimpanzees, there was a
significant effect of condition [χ2(3, N = 15) = 30.15, p < 0.001], which (as previously described)
is indicative of their enhanced accuracy on PROBE compared to BASE trials (Table 3.5-3).
Unfortunately due to experimenter error, baboon response times were not accurately recorded
and could not be assessed for switch costs.
For the humans, only 4 subjects reliably used the DS (i.e., switched strategies); thus, we
were unable to statistically assess for switch costs in humans. However, we report a descriptive
account of the 4 human subjects’ RT and accuracy switch costs (Table 3.5-3). Note: there was a
significant difference between chimpanzees’ and humans’ BASE RT1s [Chimp: M = 315.47, SD
= 81.34; Human: M = 622.24, SD = 164.47; F(1,61) = 32.94, p < .001)], RT2s [Chimp: M =
779.14, SD = 148.32; Human: M = 227.19, SD = 77.83; F(1,61) = 304.8, p < .001)], RT3s
[Chimp: M = 846.59, SD = 88.21; Human: M = 509.75, SD = 71.34; F(1,61) = 172.5, p < .001)].
Table 3.3 For BASE/PROBE conditions, mean response time (ms) and median accuracy
(%) for subjects’ Response 1 in stay/switch strategy types and same/different trial types. SD in
parentheses.
Response Time
BASE stay
BASE switch
PROBE stay PROBE switch
Baboons
----Chimps
305.1 (79.6) 317.8 (153.6)
322.2 (85.9) 329.6 (101.9)
Humans
485.2 (88.6) 487.0 (111.9)
443.8 (128.2) 508.9 (189.5)
Accuracy
Baboons
Chimps
Humans

BASE same
95.8 (2.8)
87.2 (8.3)
97.8 (4.1)

BASE different
94.7 (3.9)
90.0 (6.0)
94.6 (5.2)

PROBE same
100 (1.8)
95.5 (4.8)
95.3 (2.4)

PROBE different
100 (1.1)
94.9 (6.7)
96.3 (3.9)
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3.6

Discussion
The interplay between flexible strategy updating and the maintenance of existing solution

strategies presents an interesting opposition. On one hand, if an existing representation is too
concrete and impervious to contextual inputs, then newly relevant information is ignored,
resulting in a familiar but potentially inefficient response. On the other hand, if the
representation is too easily perforated, then response efficiency is impaired via distractability by
irrelevant or even maladaptive information (Cools, 2008; Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Roberts,
2008). For example, if a foraging animal is unable to flexibly adapt to shifting environments,
they might starve; yet if foraging habits are too flexible, a novel and potentially poisonous food
item might be consumed (Rosati, 2017). Optimal behavior requires a balance between persistent
and flexible behavior and should be task-dependent (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014; Chrysikou et al.,
2013).

3.6.1

Implications for Cognitive Flexibility in Chimpanzees
In this study we found that chimpanzees exhibited an intermediate susceptibility to

cognitive set. On one hand, their shortcut-use resembled baboons,’ in that it was far greater than
humans’. However, as evidenced by their enhanced inter-individual variation in strategy
selection (Figure 3.6-1) as well as their use of the SS, chimpanzees are still influenced by habitbased responses to some extent. What might facilitate this semi-flexible response-style and the
implications for the evolution of cognitive set are now discussed.
As we described earlier, previous studies report considerable conservatism in
chimpanzees. Specifically, compared to naïve individuals, subjects trained to use a certain
solution are less able to use a better alternative once it is available (Davis, 2017; Hrubesch et al.,
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2009; Manrique & Call, 2015; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price et al., 2009). However,
there are several (often necessary) pitfalls of non-computerized tasks, which might suppress
flexibility.

Figure 3.1 The proportion of each subjects’ PROBE trials in which the DS was used,
accounting for within subject error.

First, a portion of the social learning studies depicting conservatism in apes may have
inadvertently negatively reinforced the alternative strategy during training by ‘locking’ it or
rendering it ineffective (Davis et al., 2016; Manrique & Call, 2015; Price et al., 2009). This is
important because if subjects attempt to use the alternative during training (the reason it is
locked) and are met with failure, subsequent avoidance of the alternative solution could just be a
product of their own personally unrewarding experience with that strategy (i.e., it did not work).
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Second, many of these studies rely on a model to demonstrate the more efficient
alternative (Davis, 2017; Dean et al., 2012; Gruber et al., 2011; Hanus et al., 2011; Hrubesch et
al., 2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Price et al., 2009), introducing the possibility that
conservatism may not be derived from cognitive inflexibility but from a failure to extract the
relevant information from (or even attend to) the demonstration. In the LS-DS task, subjects are
not shown how to enact the shortcut. DS-use is entirely self-motivated therefore our findings are
not confounded by social learning ability.
Finally, many of the tasks which describe conservative behavior in chimpanzees state that
the behavior is clearly within the species’ repertoire (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008) and
thus, would be readily utilized if subjects were not influenced by a more familiar solution.
However, what may be present in the species’ repertoire is not necessarily present within the
individual’s and inexperience with specific manipulations, especially those involving fine motor
control or tool-use, should not be discounted (Dean et al., 2012; Gruber et al., 2011). The time
spent learning how to perform the seemingly more efficient alternative, may easily render it less
so. By comparison, the LS, DS, and SS strategies enlist motorically identical actions. Our
findings clearly demonstrate that, under certain conditions, chimpanzees are capable of flexibly
switching between abstract response strategies. However, the extent to which this carries over
into more naturalistic settings should be elucidated in future endeavors.

3.6.2

Species Differences in Cognitive Flexibility on the LS-DS Task
By design, the LS-DS task is meant to promote shortcut use in PROBE trials.

Accordingly, the DS is more desirable than the LS in several ways. First, the DS does not rely
on working memory. Once the Triangle appears it remains on the screen until subjects select a
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response. In PROBE trials, after the demonstration is over, all that remains on the screen are
three blank response Squares and the Triangle. Thus, the DS is more salient and less cognitively
demanding than the LS. Furthermore, the Triangle is highly associated with reward. Every time
it is selected, throughout Training 3 and the experimental trials (both BASE/PROBE), subjects
receive a reward. This is in stark contrast to the squares, which are only directly associated with
reward before Training 3 and often, if erroneously selected, lead to the incorrect screen, a
timeout, and no reward. Indeed, by employing the SS, chimpanzees are effectively overriding an
initial – perhaps habit-based – LS response in order to select the Triangle. In fact, subjects (of all
species) which used the shortcut the very first time it was available (baboons N = 15/15,
chimpanzees N = 6/10 , humans N = 3/53) clearly recognized the Triangle’s role as a direct path
to reward.4
Given the task design, it is not surprising when subjects, of any species, prefer the DS.
What is remarkable is humans’ robust proclivity for LS-use. Although chimpanzees’ global
perceptual biases or ‘collective’ sequential processing could have contributed to SS-use or
reduced DS-use, they far from prevented chimpanzees from using the shortcut. In fact, overall,
chimpanzees responded most similarly to baboons. We will next explore why humans’ but not
baboons nor (to a large extent) chimpanzees, are affected by cognitive set in the LS-DS task.
Thousands more training trials were needed for chimpanzees (Min = 2,784; Max =
36,966) and baboons (Min = 5,043; Max = 20,060) to learn the LS, compared with humans (Min
= 24; Max = 152). We suggest that LS-use may be aided by humans’ enhanced ability to encode
strategies either through verbal encoding (Ghirlanda et al., 2017), heightened working memory
(Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; but see: Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007), or chunking strategies (Gobet et
al., 2001; Kolodny et al., 2015). In fact, many of the human subjects were able to learn the rule
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after only 8 trials – a quarter of the total possible configurations – illustrating that, once learned,
humans are capable of accurately applying the LS to novel situations (Pope et al., Submitted;
Pope et al., 2015). On the other hand, chimpanzees and baboons required many encounters with
the same trial configurations before they began to accurately respond. Chimpanzees’ and
baboons’ errors seem to have been driven, to a large extent, by erroneously reversing the order of
the demonstrated squares (i.e., selecting Square2 first). This reversal error is in line with recent
findings which suggest that humans exhibit a pronounced advantage when it comes to sequential
encoding (Ghirlanda et al., 2017). Indeed, a less firmly encoded LS might reasonably facilitate
baboons’ and chimpanzees’ enhanced ability to replace it.
In line with this assertion, the current study found that chimpanzees, unlike humans
(Pope et al., Submitted), did not exhibit switch costs on the LS-DS task. As far as we are aware,
this is the first study to investigate deficits associated with switching between abstract rules in
chimpanzees. Stoet and Snyder (2003) posited that switch costs are a product of firmly encoded
rules, such that greater cognitive effort is required to suppress the previous strategy and activate
the current. Additionally, less entrenched rules have been hypothesized to amplify distractibility
(Stoet & Snyder, 2008), which for the LS-DS task might further promote the use of the shortcut.
That being said, chimpanzees, but not baboons, utilized the SS, suggesting that
chimpanzees were influenced by the habit of LS-responding to a greater extent than baboons.
We posit that differences in how old world monkeys and apes group the components of the LS
could have affected their relative abilities to separate the shortcut from the sequence as a whole.
Although somewhat unclear, there is some reason to think that baboons might identify the
individual components of a sequence, while chimpanzees might process the sequence as a whole
(Ohshiba, 1997); however, this is up for some debate (Beran et al., 2004). Similarly, in a match-
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to-sample task, baboons seemed to encode only the relevant aspects of a stimulus; yet, humans
encoded irrelevant dimensions as well (Fagot, Kruschke, Depy, & Vauclair, 1998). Furthermore,
in a serial recall task, baboons but not humans benefitted from sequence structure (Fagot & De
Lillo, 2011). Thus, it seems reasonable to suspect that chimpanzees may exhibit intermediate
susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task because, unlike humans, they are not verbally
encoding their solution strategy but also differ from baboons in the way the LS is encoded.
Future efforts aimed at disentangling these influences might compare cognitive set between
monkeys and apes utilizing a non-sequential task.

3.6.3

Evolutionary Implications
Distinct response patterns are observed between baboons, chimpanzees, and human

adults on the LS-DS task. We suggest that these may be explained by a trade-off between how
quickly abstract rules can be learned and the degree to which they can be flexibly used, a process
potentially governed by differences in strategy encoding.
In summary, the current study found that, like baboons, chimpanzees used the shortcut
significantly more often than humans. However, they did not exhibit switch costs when shifting
between the LS and the DS. Furthermore, they sometimes employed a unique solution, wherein
they switched strategies mid-trial (the SS). These data suggest that chimpanzees’ experience an
intermediate susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task.
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Footnotes
1

Note that Huguet, Barbet, Belletier, Monteil, and Fagot (2014) did observe RT costs

when baboons switched between trials which did or did not conflict with their learned strategy;
however, this was only observed for the longest RTs (bin 5/5) and only when tested in isolation.
Perhaps indicating that subjects were more distracted by the shift between the trial types. If
these costs were associated with a shift in cognitive approach, we would expect them to appear
within immediate responses, rather than only the slowest response times.
2 In

our original assessment of cognitive set between baboons and humans (Pope et al.,

2015), we calculated DS-use based on the percentage of trials in which subjects used the DS in
PROBE trials and compared it to BASE DS-use. In subsequent analyses (including the current
report and (Pope et al., Submitted)), we opted to calculate a “true” measure of DS-use by
subtracting subjects’ BASE DS-use from PROBE DS-use. Additionally, our original analyses
did not distinguish between SS-use and DS-use, they were both classified as DS responses.
When we separate these strategies and re-run our analyses on the first 48 trials for each subject,
the main finding, that baboons used the shortcut significantly more than humans, is preserved
[χ2(1, N = 104) = 49.63 p <.001]. However, the age-related findings suggesting that children
(ages 7-10; n = 27; DSers = 18.5%) used the DS more than adolescents (ages 11-18; n = 25;
DSers = 9.6%) or adults (ages 19-68; n = 52; DSers = 4.0%) were no longer significant [χ2(2, N
= 104) = 2.995 p = 0.224; note: two cells had expected counts less than 5]. Further, children’s
SS-use (25.9%) was not significantly different from adolescents’ (12.0%) or adults’ (7.7%).
This was also true if we combined DS and SS use into a single measure, indicating that
erroneous DS-use may have driven the originally reported statistical difference in children.
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3 Baboons

were required to achieve 80% or more, twice, assessed after each block of 96

trials. Humans were required to achieve 80% or more, assessed after each block of 8 trials.
Chimpanzees were required to achieve 80% or more, twice, assessed after each block of 24 trials.
However, because we altered the pass criteria partially through chimpanzees’ training, some of
the subjects progressed immediately after the decision was made and therefore had already
completed many more training trials than some of their peers were required to.
4 Yet,

notably, half of the chimpanzee subjects avoided selecting the Triangle when it first

appeared in Training 3 (one subject even ran away from the touch screen the very first time it
appeared), only selecting it when a modified version of the task removed all other options. This
suggests that chimpanzees’ flexibility on the LS-DS task was reliant upon their familiarity with
the Triangle.
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Abstract
By applying learned rules, humans are able to solve problems with minimal cognitive
effort. Yet this sort of habit-based problem solving may readily foster cognitive inflexibility or
set. This occurs when an alternative – even more efficient – strategy is masked by a known,
familiar solution. Here we sought to explore how cognitive set occludes alternatives, by
identifying whether better solutions are a) visually overlooked or b) seen but disregarded.
Subjects’ eye movements were tracked while they conducted the computerized LS-DS task,
which measures an individual’s ability to depart from a learned strategy (LS) in order to adopt a
more efficient, direct strategy (DS or the shortcut). Indeed, we found that subjects fixated on the
DS prior to responding, indicating that they did not simply overlook the alternative strategy; yet,
the vast majority (86.2%) did not adopt it, instead continuing to use the LS. Next, subjects were
shown a video demonstrating either the DS (Informed) or the familiar LS (Control). In
subsequent trials, Informed subjects fixated more on the DS prior to responding, were more
likely to use the DS after seeing it, and were more likely to be classified as shortcut-users
(69.0%) than Controls (6.9%). Thus, unsurprisingly, after learning that a more efficient
alternative was possible, many subjects were able to break away from their familiar solution.
That being said, 31.0% of subjects continued to use the learned strategy despite viewing a
demonstration of the shortcut. We discuss implications for rule-based problem solving and the
potential impacts on cognitive flexibility.
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4.1

Introduction
Codified solutions enable humans to solve complex problems with minimal cognitive

effort. However, once learned, rules may be blindly applied with little consideration for
alternative strategies. In 1945, Max Wertheimer noted that children who had recently learned a
method of finding the area of a parallelogram were unable to solve an identical problem after it
had been rotated 90. Subjects either did not try the new problem, stating that they had not
learned how to solve it, or continued to apply their learned method, albeit unsuccessfully
(Wertheimer, 1945). In fact, humans of all ages have exhibited problem-solving deficits
stemming from over-reliance on familiar strategies or learned rules.
In another classic example, subjects are presented with a set of arithmetic ‘water jar’
problems all solvable by the same, four-step solution; however, the 7th problem can be solved not
only by the learned solution but also by a more efficient alternative (Luchins, 1942). Luchins
(1942; 1950) tested thousands of subjects, of all ages and under various manipulations, and
found that consistently the majority of subjects did not use the more efficient alternative.
Termed ‘cognitive set,’ the propensity, for known solutions to occlude alternative - even more
efficient – strategies, has been demonstrated across a wide variety of tasks (Bilalić et al., 2008;
Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Lemaire & Leclere, 2014; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins,
1950; Pope et al., Submitted; Pope et al., 2015; Sweller et al., 1982), yet little is known regarding
the underlying causes.
One hypothesis is that cognitive set biases visual search during problem solving, such
that only stimuli relevant to the familiar method are perceived. In other words, once a strategy is
adopted, alternatives are simply overlooked. For example, Bilalić et al. (2008) found that expert
chess players, after finding one possible move, reported that they were looking for another, yet
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subjects’ gaze indicated that were continuing to look at the solution they had already found. In
Luchins’ task, efforts to increase the saliency of the alternative strategy were met with some
success (Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950; Sweller & Gee, 1978), yet to what extent
these findings were conflated with other changes, like increased difficulty of the learned strategy,
are unclear.
Another hypothesis is that cognitive set may arise from an inability to conceptually
identify the alternative as a viable solution strategy. Simply, subjects may not realize that they
can or should use it. Knoblich et al. (2001) presented subjects with ‘matchstick’ arithmetic
problems, in which they were required to alter the problem space (by moving one matchstick) to
balance equations. Subjects struggled with problems requiring them to disassemble meaningful
components (e.g., using Roman numeral X to create V) or alter operators (e.g., using + to create
= ), which the authors suggested may stem from their prior experience with mathematics.
Another example comes from the Luchins’ water jar task. Luchins (1942) found that instructing
subjects to write “Don’t be blind” increased their use of the more efficient alternative. This was
also true when subjects were given an extinction problem that could only be solved by the
alternative strategy. However, a shocking number of subjects proclaimed that the extinction
problem was unsolvable (note: this problem was easily solved by naïve individuals),
demonstrating the remarkable constraints imposed by the learned rule on adaptive problem
solving.
We recently reported similar results using the computerized LS-DS task, a nonverbal
nonmathematical adaptation of Luchins’ task, which first trains subjects to utilize a three-step
sequence (Square1→Square2→Triangle) and then presents them with an opportunity to use a
more efficient shortcut (Triangle; Pope et al., 2015). Susceptibility to cognitive set is measured
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by subjects’ ability to depart from their learned strategy (LS) in order to adopt the more direct
strategy (DS or the shortcut). Interestingly, baboons and chimpanzees seemed relatively
unaffected by cognitive set on the LS-DS task, yet less than 10% of American adults were able to
employ the shortcut in more than 5% of trials (Pope et al., 2015).
Here, we sought to identify how perceptual and conceptual constraints impact
susceptibility to cognitive set. By tracking subjects’ gaze while they completed the LS-DS task
we sought to identify if and to what extent persistent LS-use may be driven by perceptual
constraints. In other words, do subjects see the shortcut and just not use it or, do they not even
see it? Further, we measured subjects’ shortcut-use following a video demonstration of either
the LS or the DS to investigate how subjects’ conceptual understanding of the DS as a potential
solution might influence their ability to use it. Rule-based strategies provide a framework from
which many problems may be solved; however rules are only truly useful when flexibly applied.
The current study aimed to elucidate the factors contributing to cognitive set, in an effort to
promote efficient selection between learned rules and alternative strategies that co-occur within a
problem space.

4.2
4.2.1

Methods
Subjects
Data were collected from 58 subjects (52 females and 6 males) recruited from the pool of

undergraduate students at Georgia State University by posting the study on the SONA
Experiment Managements System. Subjects were tested on the Georgia State University campus
in a room with dimmed lights. All subjects were above 18 years of age (Max = 37, M = 20.47,
SD = 4.23). Fourteen subjects were not included in the analyses as a result of either technical
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malfunctions (N = 12), their accuracy being below 65% during experimental trials (N = 1;
62.5%), or an inability to pass the training trials (N = 1).

4.2.2

General Methods
Subjects were seated approximately 60cm from a 19inch monitor (1280 x 1040 Native

Resolution; 1915L Desktop Touchmonitor, Elo Touch Solutions). Using the Eye Tribe Tracker
(The Eye Tribe) subjects completed a 16-point gaze calibration. Next, OpenSesame (version
3.1.1; OpenSesame Experiment Builder; Mathot, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012), was launched and
using the PyGaze plugin (version 0.6.0a16; default settings), subjects’ gaze was calibrated again.
Next, the feedback screens (and accompanying sounds) indicating correct and incorrect
responses were demonstrated and subjects were told that they would need to ‘select the shapes to
figure out the right answer.’ Following this, using the PyGaze drift-correct feature, subjects were
instructed to look at the fixation cross while pressing the SPACE bar to start each trial. At the
beginning of each trial, if subjects’ gaze was not detected as being directed at the fixation cross
(within a 1.5 threshold), an error sound was elicited and subjects remained on the fixation
screen until it was. This ensured that subjects’ gaze started from the same location in every trial
and that detection remained accurate throughout the testing session. If, at any point, subjects
struggled to move past the fixation screen, the experiment was paused and gaze was recalibrated.
No further instructions were provided and the experimenter remained in an adjacent room (out of
sight) unless recalibration was required.
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4.2.3

The LS-DS Task
A full description of the LS-DS task can be found in Pope et al. (2015); however, briefly:

the task is comprised of three training levels followed by 96 experimental trials. In Training 1,
two squares flash red (250ms each) in sequence and subjects must reproduce this demonstration
by selecting them in the correct order. In Training 2, two out of four squares flash red (200ms
each) in sequence and subjects must reproduce this demonstration by selecting the two correct
squares (now out of four options), in the correct order. In Training 3, two out of four squares
flash red (150ms each), however after the subject correctly selects Square1 and Square2 they
must then select a blue triangle, which appears in one of the remaining locations. Subjects do
not progress to the next training level until they achieve 80% accuracy, assessed after each 8 trial
block.
After training, BASE and PROBE experimental trials were presented (Figure 1.6-1) and
gaze data were recorded (sample rate = 30 Hz). For PROBE trials, the blue Triangle appears
alongside the Square1 → Square2 demonstration and remains visible throughout subjects’
response. Crucially, on PROBE trials, subjects can either continue to use the
Square1→Square2→Triangle sequence [i.e., the learned strategy (LS)] or they can simply ignore
the demonstration and select the Triangle [i.e., the direct strategy (DS or shortcut)]. BASE trials
are identical to Training 3, however if subjects select the Triangle’s ‘hidden’ location their
response is recorded as if they had used the DS, providing a measure of accidental DS-use for
each subject. In summary, the LS-DS task assesses subjects’ propensity to forego their learned
response and adopt the more efficient shortcut when it is available (PROBE trials), thereby
measuring susceptibility to cognitive set.
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Following the first 48 (PRE) experimental trials, consisting of 24 BASE and 24 PROBE
trials randomly presented, subjects encountered a PAUSE screen. At which point, they were
given a questionnaire requesting descriptions of various components of the task. Once they
completed the questionnaire (~5-10 minutes), subjects were shown a brief video twice,
demonstrating either the shortcut (Informed, n = 29) or the learned strategy (Control; n = 29)
being performed in four consecutive PROBE trials. Groups were comprised of an equal number
of males and females but were otherwise randomly assigned. After the video, subjects
completed an additional 48 (POST) trials, again consisting of 24 BASE and 24 PROBE trials
randomly presented, followed by another, identical questionnaire. Thus, each subject completed
48 PRE trials, a PRE questionnaire, 48 POST trials, and a POST questionnaire. 1

4.2.4

Data Analysis
The percentage of correct trials in which the DS was used was calculated for both BASE

and PROBE trials. For each subject, BASE DS-use was subtracted from PROBE DS-use to
yield a measure of DS-use which accounts for within-subject error. In accordance with previous
methodologies, we classified subjects that used the DS in greater than 5% of trials as DSers
(Pope et al., 2015). Whenever the data violated the assumptions for parametric statistical
analyses, non-parametric analyses were used and group medians rather than means were
reported.

4.2.5

Gaze Analysis
For each trial, we assessed whether or not subjects looked at the Triangle prior to their

first response. This was accomplished by classifying the raw data points from the eye tracker
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into Top Left, Top Right, Bottom Left, and Bottom Right quadrants, excluding the middle 50
pixels extending across the screen both vertically and horizontally, which also encompassed the
central location of the fixation point. For each subject, the percentage of correct PRE trials in
which they fixated on the Triangle’s location before responding was calculated and compared
between BASE and PROBE conditions. Remember, in BASE trials, the location of the Triangle
is ‘hidden’ until Square 1 and Square 2 have been correctly selected; thus, this comparison
controls for the number of times subjects might randomly look at the Triangle’s location on the
screen. Note, by only including data points in which subjects fixated, we excluded any potential
saccades to the Triangle, making this a highly conservative measure.

4.2.6

Questionnaire Analysis
PRE and POST questionnaires were analyzed for indications that subjects recognized the

Triangle’s differential presence in PROBE and BASE trials. Thus, each subject received two
scores of either noticed (1) or did not notice (0) based on their PRE and POST responses. Terms
like “distraction” in reference to the Triangle were categorized as noticing a difference between
BASE and PROBE trials and were scored as 1. Additionally, subjects’ PRE and POST
responses were analyzed for any mention of the Triangle as having either positive or neutral
importance, compared with the squares. Subjects were scored based on whether they described
the Triangle as more important (1) or of equal importance (0). Responses noting that it was
“how to progress to the next trial,” “how you knew you were correct,” or “the goal” were
considered indications of positive importance and were scored as 1. Thus, for both PRE and
POST trial blocks, each subject received two scores, noticed/did not notice (1/0) and
positive/neutral importance (1/0). The experimenter was blind to video condition during coding
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however, to ensure that bias did not factor into scoring, 24 (20.69% of the total) scores were recoded by a second experimenter who was blind to trial block (PRE/POST) and the subjects’
condition (Informed/Control). A Spearman rank order correlation between the two observers
revealed that scoring was reliable (rs = .781, p < .001).

4.3

4.3.1

Results

Effects of Seeing the Triangle
First, we investigated whether subjects saw the shortcut prior to their first response on

PROBE trials. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test showed that indeed, subjects fixated on the
Triangle’s location more often prior to responding to PROBE trials (M = 22.93%, SD = 16.05)
than BASE trials (M = 12.06%, SD = 8.43; Z = -4.34, p < .001; Figure 4.3-1). Figure 4.3-2
displays a heatmap of all subjects’ gaze data for the Top Left → Bottom Left → Top Right
configuration in both BASE and PROBE conditions.
Next, we explored whether visual search influenced strategy choice. If seeing the
Triangle prior to the first response promotes DS-use, we would expect less LS-use following
Triangle fixations. We chose to analyze LS-use because it is inversely related to DS-use, but is
not conflated with whether or not subjects searched for the Triangle in order to select it (i.e., use
the DS). We calculated the proportion of PROBE trials in which subjects used the LS after
fixating on the Triangle (Look LS) or not (No Look LS). A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
revealed that, for PRE trials, there was no difference between the proportions of LS-use
depending on whether subjects did (Mdn = 100%; SD = 23.98) or did not (Mdn = 100%; SD =
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17.48) see the Triangle (Z = -.051, p = .959), indicating that seeing the Triangle did not influence
strategy selection for PRE trials.

4.3.2

Impact of Video Information
For POST trials, we analyzed the impact of the video information on visual search. A

Mann-Whitney U test revealed that Informed subjects fixated on the Triangle significantly more
often (Mdn = 45.83%, SD =5.15) than Controls (Mdn = 12.50%, SD = 9.23; U = 120.0 p < .001;
see Figure 4.3-1) on PROBE trials. There was no significant difference between groups on
BASE trials.
Further, after looking at the Triangle, Informed subjects (Mdn = 6.27%, SD = 45.40) used
the LS less often than Controls (Mdn = 100.0%, SD = 36.25; U = 197, p < .001). Thus, after
watching a demonstration of the DS, subjects were more likely to fixate on the shortcut and more
likely to use it after seeing it.
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Figure 4.1 The percentage of BASE and PROBE trials in which subjects fixated on the
Triangle in PRE and POST blocks. Informed and Control subjects viewed the DS and LS video
demonstrations, respectively. ** p < .001.

Finally, to understand how the video information affected strategy-selection, we analyzed
whether the proportion of DSers in PRE and POST trials differed between Informed and Control
subjects. In other words, did the DS demonstration affect Informed subjects’ strategy choices to
a meaningful extent? For PRE trials, a Yates’ continuity-corrected Chi square (two of the
expected values were smaller than 5) confirmed that there was no difference in the proportion of
Informed (13.8%) and Control (13.8%) DSers [χ2(1, N = 58) = .000, p = 1.00). For POST trials
however, there were significantly more Informed (69.0%) than Control (6.9%) DSers [χ2(1, N =
58) = 23.73, p < .001; see Table 4.3-1].
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Figure 4.2 Response 1 gaze data compiled across all subjects during the Top Left
(Square1), Bottom Left (Square2), Top Right (Triangle) BASE and PROBE trial configurations,
for PRE and POST trial blocks.

We further explored the consistency of DS-use between groups by applying progressively
more stringent DSer classification requirements: DS was used in more than 25%, more than
50%, and more than 75% of trials (Table 4.3-1). For PRE trials, as with the 5% classification
criterion, there were no significant differences between groups. Additionally, only 2 subjects
used the DS the first time it was available, both of whom went on to be categorized as DSers,
and no subject used it in every PROBE trial. In contrast, for POST trials, Chi square analyses
revealed that there were significantly fewer Control DSers than Informed DSers when the
criterion was set to more than 25% [χ2(1, N = 58) = 26.95, p < .001], more than 50% [χ2(1, N =
58) = 24.73, p < .001], and more than 75% of trials, [χ2(1, N = 58) = 20.62, p < .001; Table 4.31]. Further, 14 subjects used the shortcut the first time it was available, 13 of whom had seen the
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DS-video. All 14 went on to be classified as DSers and 4 of them used the DS every time it was
available.
The task permits a third correct strategy, in which subjects begin to use the LS but then
switch to the DS (Square1→Triangle). Subjects rarely used this ‘switch strategy’ in either PRE
(M = 0.86, SD = 3.56) or POST (M = 1.81, SD =7.93) trials. However, a few subjects used it in
more than 5% of PRE (N = 2, Max = 22.73%) and POST (N = 4, Max = 58.33%) PROBE trials.

4.3.3

Impact of Strategy on Performance
First, we isolated subjects’ first response time (i.e., the time between the end of the

demonstration and their first response (RT1) for each trial. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test
revealed that when the LS was used, subjects took longer to make their first response in PROBE
(Mdn = 682.50 ms, SD = 190.09) compared to BASE (Mdn = 645.50, SD = 276.74) trials (Z = 2.139, p = .020).
We calculated switch costs for subjects who used the DS in greater than 50% of trials.
We did not analyze PRE trials, as there were only four subjects who used the DS in greater than
50% of trials. However, for POST trials, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed that for greater
than 50% DSers (N = 20) trials in which subjects repeated a strategy (e.g., LS-to-LS or DS-toDS; stay trials; M = 614.48 ms, SD = 194.93) were significantly faster than trials in which
subjects switched strategies [e.g., DS-to-LS or LS-to-DS; switch trials; M = 666.18, SD =
209.69; F(1,19) = 5.097, p = .036)]. There was no effect of BASE/PROBE condition.
Additionally, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test confirmed that overall trial times were significantly
longer when subjects used the LS (Mdn = 1605.90, SD = 430.85) compared to the DS (Mdn =
637.10, SD = 316.02; Z = -4.782, p < .001).
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Table 4.1 Proportion of each group that used the DS in greater than 5%, 25%, 50%, and
75% of trials. Superscripts denote statistically distinguishable groupings.
PRE
5%
25%
50%
75%
a
a
a
Control
13.8
6.9
6.9
0a
a
a
a
Informed
13.8
6.9
6.9
6.9a
POST
Control
Informed

4.3.4

6.9a
69.0 b

3.4a
69.0 b

3.4a
65.5b

3.4a
58.6b

Impact of Conceptual Understanding on Strategy
Next, potential interactions between subjects’ questionnaire responses and their response

strategies were assessed. For PRE trials, 46.6% of subjects (N = 27) indicated that they noticed a
difference between PROBE and BASE trials and 24.1% of subject (N = 14) attributed positive
importance to the Triangle. For PRE trials, Yate’s continuity corrected Pearson’s Chi-square
tests showed that DSer classification was not significantly associated with either ascribing
enhanced importance to the Triangle [χ2(1, N = 58) = .26, p = .61] nor noticing the difference
between BASE and PROBE trials [χ2(1, N = 58) = 1.84, p = .18]. Further, 77.8% of subjects
who noticed the difference between the PROBE and BASE trials and 50.0% of subjects who
attributed increased importance to the Triangle still did not use the shortcut.
For POST trials, 37.9% of subjects (N = 22) reported noticing a difference between
PROBE and BASE trials and 48.3% (N = 28) recognized the Triangle as being more important
than the squares. A Yate’s continuity corrected Pearson’s Chi-square test showed that DSer
classification was significantly associated with ascribing enhanced importance to the Triangle
[χ2(1, N = 58) = 13.88, p < .001]. That said, 35.7% of subjects who attributed increased
importance to the Triangle, still went on to use LS. Furthermore, DS-use was not significantly
associated with noticing the difference between BASE and PROBE trials. The change between
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PRE and POST appears to have been driven by Informed subjects, as only 2 Control subjects
were classified as DSers in POST trials.

4.4

Discussion
In the current study we found that while operating under a cognitive set, subjects did, in

fact, fixate on the shortcut prior to responding, yet seemingly ignored it. Consistent with this, in
PRE trials, 27 out of the 58 subjects reported noticing a difference between PROBE and BASE
trials and 14 subjects attributed greater importance to the Triangle over the squares; yet only 8
used the DS. After viewing a video demonstration of the DS however, more subjects fixated on
the shortcut and then used it. In fact, prior to watching the video 13.8% of about-to-be Informed
subjects used the DS, but this number rose to 69.0% after watching the video. Additionally, DSuse correlated with both noticing the difference between PROBE/BASE trials and ascribing
increased importance to the Triangle but only in POST trials.
Our first hypothesis suggested that an inability to perceive the alternative strategy might
have promoted cognitive set; however, this was not supported. Subjects clearly fixated on the
shortcut yet subsequently used the LS. Additionally, when subjects used the LS, they took
longer to respond to PROBE than BASE trials, further suggesting that the presence of the
Triangle may have been distracting. Indeed, 77.8% of subjects who reported noticing the
difference between BASE and PROBE trials still applied the LS to every trial indiscriminately.
We conclude that cognitive set on the LS-DS task does not arise from an inability to visually
perceive the shortcut.
Our findings are somewhat contradictory to those of Bilalić et al. (2008), who concluded
that, in chess, subjects became stuck on a known solution, seemingly because they were not
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looking for alternatives. However, in chess, presumably the optimal move is no more visually
salient than the familiar approach. The LS-DS task is designed to promote shortcut use by
making the DS highly salient (during PROBE trials, the Triangle remains on the response screen
amongst the white squares); thus, it is no surprise that subjects fixate on it. What the current
study illustrates is that, even when subjects saw the alternative, they stuck to their familiar
solution. Discovering the shortcut relied on subjects’ propensity to explore the DS as an option
after seeing it.
The current results support our second hypothesis that cognitive set is influenced by the
ability to consider the alternative as a viable option. Informed subjects, who were explicitly
shown that the DS could function as a possible solution, were 10x more likely to be classified as
DSers than Control subjects, who saw the LS demonstrated. Thus, not surprisingly,
understanding that they could use the shortcut greatly increased subjects’ propensity to do so.
However, even after watching the video, only 4 subjects used the DS every time it was available,
illustrating subjects’ inability to completely forsake their learned approach.

“When the individual does not adequately deal with problems but views them merely
from the frame of reference of a habit; when he applies a certain habituated behavior to
situations which have a better solution or which, in fact, are not even solvable by the just
working habit; when, in a word, instead of the individual mastering the habit, the habit
masters the individual – then mechanization is indeed a dangerous thing.” - (Luchins,
1942, p. 93)
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Of note, a number of Informed subjects seemed wholly unaffected by the demonstration.
Initially we piloted the use of extinction trials, wherein only the Triangle was available (i.e., no
Square1→Square2 demonstration); however, these trials failed to invoke shortcut-use in
subsequent trials. Indeed, subjects simply switched back to using the LS when the
Square1→Square2 demonstration reappeared. Thus, we opted to directly demonstrate the DS,
via the video. We expected that subjects would surely employ the shortcut after watching the
video showing them how. Indeed, Informed subjects exhibited a stark increase in DS-use;
however, 31.0% of subjects (N = 9/29) – even after watching the video demonstrating the
shortcut, a minimum of 8 times – did not use it. Further, none of these nine subjects’ POST
questionnaire scores showed improvement over their PRE scores. Whether this arose out of an
inability to extract information from, or simply inattention to, the video is unclear. Similarly,
Luchins noted that if he explained the presence of the alternative strategy before the task began,
subjects readily embraced it. However, even under these conditions, when the alternative was
presented even a few trials after when subjects thought it would appear, a number of them did
not use it (Luchins, 1942). This clearly highlights the trade-off between exploring other response
options, which may take time and energy, and exploiting known solutions, which are effective
but perhaps not the most efficient.
Like many tasks wherein subjects shift between multiple response strategies (Diamond &
Kirkham, 2005; Ionescu, 2012; Lemaire et al., 2017; Luwel et al., 2009; Pope, Meguerditchian,
Fagot, & Hopkins, In Prep; Stoet & Snyder, 2008), we noted an increase in the time it took
subjects to respond when they switched between DS and LS responses. Chevalier, Blaye, Dufau,
and Lucenet (2010) tracked subjects’ gaze during a DCCS task and noted that switch costs were
seemingly related to the time required to identify the newly relevant aspects of the stimulus.
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Thus, it is possible that conservative LS-use might serve to mitigate the costs associated with
switching strategies. Yet, the overall advantage of this approach is dubious, especially
considering the increased efficiency of using the DS in overall trial times. Recall that the
Median DS trial time was approximately 968.8ms faster than the Median LS trial time (See
Section 4.3.3).
Interestingly, in PRE trials, 13.8% of Control subjects were classified as DSers; however,
after watching the video demonstration of the LS, this number dropped to 6.9%. In other words,
two DSers switched away from using the DS to embrace the LS as their primary PROBE
response strategy, after viewing the LS video. This suggests that they were, in a sense,
complying with the demonstration. Similarly, Luchins noted that, for his task, some subjects
reported that they already knew about the shortcut but used the learned solution because they
thought they were supposed to (Luchins, 1942, p. 89). Although we did not distinguish between
subjects believing that they could not vs should not utilize the DS, future efforts should address
the possibility that subjects’ proclivity for rule-based responses may be driven by a desire to
respond appropriately, rather than efficiently.
We conclude that cognitive set on the LS-DS task is not attributable to an inability to
perceive the alternative and suggest that subjects’ understanding of the problem space and
willingness to try alternatives contributes greatly to their ability to break cognitive set.
Additionally, we suggest that subjects’ experience with rule-based problem solving might
contribute to cognitive set. Alternative strategies are not used, because they are not sought. The
impact of rote memorization and mechanized rule-use, typical of Western educational
approaches, on cognitive inflexibility should be clearly elucidated in future endeavors.
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Footnotes:

1We

encountered several difficulties during data collection. First, occasionally the task

would not resume following the PRE-questionnaire/video pause. When this occurred, the
computer was restarted and a new program was launched which allowed subjects to return to the
PAUSE screen (skipping Training and PRE trials); however, this process sometimes took several
minutes. Therefore, subjects were shown the video once more before progressing to the POST
trials. Second, for unknown reasons, the eye tracker stopped recording one subject’s data on the
last 10 POST trials. We chose to include this subject (Informed, age = 18, female) in our final
analyses, which were all performed on proportions of trials (e.g., the proportion of correct trials,
in which subjects used the DS). Finally, for another subject the computer froze just before the
PAUSE screen. Thus, the experiment was restarted and the subject conducted an additional 48
trials (91 PRE trials total, rather than 48). Only the specific trials that were not completed in the
first attempt were included in final PRE trial analyses.
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Abstract
Through codified rule-use humans are able to accurately solve many problems; however,
mechanized strategies can also be costly. After adopting a solution strategy, humans consistently
become blind to alternatives – even when those alternatives are more efficient. This
predisposition towards inflexibility, or cognitive set, was considered a universal phenomenon in
humans however, prior to this study, only Western subjects had been tested. We used the
nonverbal Learned Strategy-Direct Strategy (LS-DS) touch screen task in which subjects are
presented with an opportunity to either use a learned strategy or a more efficient, but novel,
shortcut. We found that the remote, seminomadic Himba of northern Namibia exhibited
enhanced cognitive flexibility on the LS-DS task, thereby challenging the claim that cognitive set
affects humans universally. Additionally, we did not find support for the notion that variation in
local vs global perceptual processing contributes to cognitive flexibility. We discuss how other
aspects of cultural variation, namely educational background, might contribute to the observed
cross-cultural differences in problem solving flexibility.
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5.1

Introduction
In 1942, Abraham Luchins asked a group of university students, faculty, and staff to

solve a set of simple math problems (Luchins, 1942). He aimed to explore how rule-based
problem solving limits other, more creative solutions. The task began with several problems
solvable only by using a four-step rule, which participants quickly mastered. However, after
these 'learned rule' problems, Luchins added a twist. In addition to the familiar strategy,
problems seven and eight could also be solved by a more efficient, one-step method – a shortcut.
Remarkably, when the time came, not a single subject used the shortcut. Instead, they continued
to use the learned rule despite its relative inefficiency. This phenomenon - the inability to
implement an alternative strategy once a learned rule has been adopted - is termed 'cognitive set.'
Pope et al. (2015) devised a nonverbal, nonmathematical adaptation of Luchins' task in
order to compare baboons' and humans' susceptibilities to cognitive set (Pope et al., 2015). The
LS-DS task begins with several levels of training wherein subjects learn to utilize a three-step
(Square1→Square2→Triangle) sequence, which constitutes the learned strategy (LS; see Figure
1.6-1b). Once subjects consistently utilize the LS, experimental trials are presented in which
subjects can use the LS or they can use a direct strategy (DS or the shortcut) by skipping Square1
+ Square2 and going straight for the Triangle (See Figure 1.6-1d). We found that all of the 15
baboon subjects immediately switched to the DS when it became available and used it in 99.9%
of trials. Similar to Luchins’ findings, only 4 out of the 53 (i.e., 7.6%) adult human subjects used
the DS in more than 5% of trials. That is to say, adult humans but not baboons were affected by
cognitive set on the LS-DS task.
Flexible problem solving is a critical element of navigating dynamic environments;
hence, its role in cognition has been extensively studied. Typical cognitive flexibility measures,
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such as Discrimination Reversal, Transfer Index, and Wisconsin Card Sorting tasks, first allow a
subject to learn a correct solution method and then require them to abandon and replace it with
another (Berg, 1948; Harlow, 1949; Rumbaugh, 1971). Flexibility is then calculated as the
degree of persistence before the new, correct solution strategy is adopted. In these and other
cued task-switching paradigms, in which subjects switch strategies repeatedly, pronounced
‘switch costs’ have been noted in both children and adults (Diamond & Kirkham, 2005; Ionescu,
2012; Lemaire et al., 2017; Luwel et al., 2009; Stoet & Snyder, 2008). Switch costs are deficits
in response time or accuracy following a strategy switch and are thought to be associated with
disengaging with one strategy and initiating another (Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995;
Stoet & Snyder, 2007); however they are not exhibited by some nonhuman primates (Stoet &
Snyder, 2003; however, see Huguet et al. 2014), suggesting that they may be a byproduct of
human rule-encoding (Stoet & Snyder, 2008).
Cognitive set tasks, like Luchins’ and the LS-DS task, differ from typical measures of
cognitive flexibility in that subjects are not required to switch strategies. Subjects can (and do)
continue to use the learned strategy and it continues to be rewarded, albeit at a less efficient rate
than if they are flexible and switch to the alternative. We argue that this may be more
representative of flexibility in real life, where problems commonly have multiple solutions from
which to choose. Since it’s debut, thousands of subjects have been tested on Luchins' task with
various manipulations and consistently, 70-100% follow the learned rule (Luchins, 1942;
Luchins & Luchins, 1950). Luchins (1942; 1950) and others (McKelvie, 1984) concluded that
within human problem solving, this propensity toward cognitive set is universal. However,
although attempts were made to account for subjects' age, occupation, and education, any
potential cross-cultural differences in susceptibility to cognitive set were completely neglected.
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Recently, numerous studies have called into question the ‘universality’ of cognitive
processes, our understanding of which has been predominantly derived from Western, Educated,
Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (WEIRD) subjects’ data (Henrich et al., 2010). These findings
illustrate cultural differences in cognitive processing based on both visual perception (Caparos,
Ahmed, et al., 2012; Caparos, Linnell, et al., 2012; Davidoff et al., 2008; de Fockert et al., 2011;
de Fockert et al., 2007; Fagot, Goldstein, Davidoff, & Pickering, 2006; Ji et al., 2000; Masuda &
Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005) and problem conceptualization
(Abel & Hsu, 1949; Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Chiu, 1972; Clegg & Legare, 2016; Frank et al.,
2008; Ji et al., 2000; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Nisbett et al., 2001). Moreover, in typical (and
arguably less indicative) measures of cognitive flexibility such as the WCST, some cross-cultural
differences have been found, yet have been attributed to flaws in the task itself rather than
potential variation in cognitive processes across cultures (Avila, 2013; Coffey et al., 2005; Shan
et al., 2008). In fact, our own previous findings noted an effect of age on cognitive flexibility;
specifically, children 7-10 were more likely to use the shortcut than adolescents (11-18) or adults
(19-68) in the LS-DS task (Pope et al., 2015; however, see Chapter 3 Footnote 2), a further
indication that cognitive set does not affect humans uniformly.
As we have shown before, baboons, which process visual information with a local bias
(Deruelle & Fagot, 1998) are better able to break cognitive set and use the shortcut than Western
adults (Pope et al., 2015), who process visual information with a global bias (Navon, 1977).
This led us to consider that differences in global versus local visual processing between humans
and baboons might explain their divergent performance in breaking cognitive set. Namely,
perhaps humans’ attention to the global similarities between the LS-DS trials might have
promoted the use of the learned rule (i.e., cognitive set) even when relevant, local details (i.e.,
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the presence of the Triangle) were present that could have lead them to the shortcut (which the
baboons found and used immediately). Note, this is in stark contrast to the literature purporting
that global/local processing biases stem from holistic/analytic processing styles, that result in
flexible/persistent problem-solving strategies, respectively (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Ji et al.,
2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001, 2006; Nisbett et al., 2001). Granted, there is limited support for
a causal link between a global mindset and global perceptual processing (Kuhnen & Oyserman,
2002), however the assertions regarding perceptual processing and problem-solving approach are
largely unsupported (Davidoff et al., 2008; Peterson & Deary, 2006). Instead, we suggested that
a visual inability to discriminate the DS from the sequence as a whole might factor greatly into
humans inability to utilize the shortcut. An example of this inadvertent blindness comes from
previous research showing that after finding a non-ideal solution, chess players reported that they
were looking for alternatives, yet their eye movements did not stray from the one they had
already found (Bilalić et al., 2008).
Alternatively, differences in problem conceptualization might have driven the divergent
susceptibilities to cognitive set between baboons and humans. Namely, human subjects may
have responded according to how they thought they should, based on their previous experience
with rule-based problem solving. Undoubtedly, rules-of-thumb and equations offer a
tremendous advantage when solving many, similar problems. For this reason, repetitive rule-use
is a staple of Western education, yet the real-world applications of this problem solving approach
might reasonably lead to cognitive inflexibility (Star & Seifert, 2006). Alternative solutions are
not found because they are not sought. The LS-DS task does not instruct subjects how to
respond, they learn through trial and error however, it is possible that previous human subjects
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(Pope et al., 2015) did not consider the DS a viable option based on their history with repetitive
rule-use and/or single-solution problems.
The current study aimed to 1) test the hypothesis that cognitive set is a universal human
trait, invariant to cultural factors and 2) determine the relative effects of perceptual and
conceptual influences on susceptibility to cognitive set. The seminomadic Himba of northern
Namibia exhibit a strong local perceptual bias compared to Westerners (Davidoff et al., 2008; de
Fockert et al., 2007). Thus, we investigated the differences in cognitive set between Westerners
and traditional Himba using the LS-DS task (Pope et al., 2015). If a global perceptual bias
governed the previously tested Western humans’ susceptibility to cognitive set, then traditional
Himba should be better able to use the shortcut than Westerners. Yet, how could we confidently
attribute this to their local perceptual processing, rather than broader cultural distinctions
between traditional Himba and Westerners? Opportunely, a subpopulation of Himba have
moved to the small nearby town of Opuwo. Previous research has shown that traditional Himba
are less susceptible to the Ebbinghaus illusion and exhibit greater selective attention/reduced
distractibility than both Urban Himba and British participants, who responded similarly to one
another (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012; Caparos, Linnell, et al., 2012; de Fockert et al., 2011;
Linnell et al., 2013). These differences in perceptual processing between Urban and Traditional
Himba provide a natural control for external factors such as genetics, religion, language, climate,
and education. Thus, if perceptual processing affects shortcut-use, we predicted that urban
Himba would respond to the LS-DS task in a similar manner as Westerners but different from
traditional Himba.
In consideration of the conceptual influences hypothesis, we reasoned that if subjects’
conceptualization of the task affects cognitive set, then releasing subjects from potentially
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constraining presuppositions would enhance shortcut-use. In Luchins’ task, he achieved a degree
of success by using the prompt “Don’t be blind” (Luchins, 1942). However, he also noted that
some subjects interpreted this as Don’t be blind to the obvious rule. We decided to give the
prompt: “Don’t be afraid to try new things” halfway through the LS-DS task, predicting that
subjects’ shortcut use would increase following the prompt. Furthermore, any relative
differences in the prompt’s influence on shortcut-use between Westerners, Traditional Himba,
and Urban Himba might be indicative of the extent to which they were initially constrained by
preexisting conceptualizations.

5.2
5.2.1

Methods
Subjects
Data were collected from 54 Western (42 females and 12 males), 54 urban Himba (34

females and 20 males), and 75 traditional Himba subjects (34 females and 41 males). All
subjects were above 18 years of age; however, exact ages were not recorded because Himba do
not keep an accurate record of their age. All methods were approved by the Georgia State
University Institutional Review Board prior to testing. Western subjects were recruited from the
pool of undergraduate students at Georgia State University by posting the study on the SONA
Experiment Managements System, tested on the Georgia State University campus, and received
one course credit in exchange for their participation.
Himba subjects were recruited and tested in their villages by a hired guide after initial
permissions were received from the village leader(s). Testing took place inside a tent or in a
shaded area. Himba subjects were classified as ‘Urban’ if they lived within 20km of Opuwo, the
primary city in the Kunene region and ‘Traditional’ if they lived further than 100km from
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Opuwo. We only tested subjects that fell into these two categories. The number of times each
subject had been to a city (almost exclusively Opuwo) was recorded for all Himba subjects.
Urban subjects received 20 Namibian Dollars and Traditional subjects received 1kg maize meal
and 1kg sugar each.

5.2.2

LS-DS Task
The LS-DS task was programmed with OpenSesame software (Mathot et al., 2012) and

administered via a Lenovo Ideapad FLEX 4 (14”) 2-in-1 touchscreen laptop. All subjects
received basic instructions on touching the fixation cross to begin each trial and which feedback
screens/sounds indicated correct vs incorrect responses. As part of the instructions, all subjects
were told that they would need to touch the shapes to figure out the correct answer. However, in
the Himba’s language (Otjihimba) there is not a direct translation for ‘shapes.’ Thus, Himba
subjects were shown an illustration of a square and a triangle at that point during the
instructions.1
A complete description of the LS-DS task can be found in (Pope et al., 2015); however,
briefly: the task consists of three training levels and 96 experimental trials. In Training 1, a
demonstration shows two squares, which flash red sequentially (250ms each); the subject must
reproduce the demonstration by selecting the two squares in the correct order. In Training 2, the
demonstration shows four squares total, two of which flash red sequentially (200ms each) and
the subject reproduces the demonstration by selecting the two correct squares (now out of four
options) in the correct order. Training 3 is identical to Training 2 however after the subject has
correctly selected Square1 and Square2 (which are demonstrated for 150 ms each), they must
then select a blue triangle which appears in one of the remaining locations. Subjects do not
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progress to the next training level until they achieve 80% accuracy, measured after each 8 trial
block. After training, BASE and PROBE experimental trials are presented (Figure 1.6-1a-d). In
PROBE trials, the Triangle appears alongside the Square1 → Square2 demonstration and
remains visible on the response screen. Importantly, to be correct subjects can either continue to
use the Square1→Square2→Triangle sequence (i.e., the LS) or they can simply ignore the
demonstration and select the Triangle (i.e., the DS or shortcut). BASE trials look identical to
Training 3 however if subjects select the Triangle’s hidden location they are marked as having
used the DS; thereby providing a measure of accidental DS-use within each subject. In
summary, subjects initially learn via the training to reproduce a two-square demonstration and
then touch the Triangle. Cognitive set is measured by their propensity to forego this learned
method in order to use a more direct strategy when the Triangle is already present.
For the current study, after the first 48 PRE trials, the task was paused and the
experimenter issued the “Don’t be afraid to try new things” prompt. Subjects then completed an
additional 48 POST trials. PRE and POST trial lists consisted of one BASE and one PROBE
trial for each of the possible 24 configurations; trial order was randomized.

5.2.3

Data Analysis
The percentage of accurate trials in which subjects used the DS was calculated for both

BASE and PROBE trials. Each subject’s BASE DS-use was subtracted from PROBE DS-use to
yield a measure of DS-use that accounts for within-subject error. In accordance with our
previous studies, subjects were classified as DSers if they used the DS in more than 5% of trials
however, we also included progressively more stringent DSer qualification criteria (more than
25%, more than 50%, and more than 75%) to gain a more complete understanding of DS-use
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between groups. Whenever the data violated the assumptions for parametric statistical analyses,
we used non-parametric analyses and reported group medians rather than means.
The switch costs associated with using the DS were also analyzed. Recall that during
BASE trials, subjects typically only use the LS. Thus, for DSers who were switching between
the DS and the LS for PROBE and BASE trials respectively, we expected to see switch costs.
We isolated the time between the end of the Square1→Square2 demonstration and subjects’ first
response (RT1) for BASE trials in which subjects repeated (BASE stay) or switched (BASE
switch) their strategy and for PROBE trials in which subjects repeated (PROBE stay) or switched
(PROBE switch) their strategy. All trials that were precluded by an incorrect trial and those in
which the first response was incorrect were excluded. Finally, we applied a natural log
transform to normalize the data. Because some subjects did not ever use the DS, and thus did not
switch, we analyzed only those who had used the DS in more than 50% of PRE (n=40) and
POST (n=50) trials. Group (Western, Urban, Traditional) did not significantly impact any of the
analyses.

5.3
5.3.1

Results
DS-Use
In accordance with our previous studies, subjects were classified as DSers if they used

the DS in more than 5% of trials. A Pearson’s chi-square revealed that, in PRE trials, a
significantly smaller proportion of Westerners were classified as DSers (5.6%; n = 3) than either
Urban (42.6%; n =23) or Traditional (34.7%; n = 26) Himba participants [χ2(2, N = 183) = 20.65,
p < .001], whose proportions did not differ from each other (Figure 2).
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5.3.2

Conceptual Influences on Cognitive Set
In POST trials, after subjects were told: “Don’t be afraid to try new things,” a Pearson’s

chi-square analysis revealed that the proportion of DSers significantly increased for Westerners
(50.0%; n = 27), significantly decreased for Urban Himba (27.8%; n = 15) and did not change
for Traditional Himba [36.0%; n = 27; χ2(2, N = 183) = 38.989, p <.001]. In other words, the
prompt effectively increased DS-use for Western, but not Himba, participants (Figure 5.3-1).

Figure 5.1 The proportion of DSers within each group for before (PRE) and after (POST)
receiving the prompt. ** p < .001.
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5.3.3

Immediacy and Consistency of DS-use
Significantly more Traditional (25.3%) and Urban (27.8%) Himba used the DS the very

first time it was available (i.e.,, in PRE trials) compared with Westerners [3.7%; χ2(2, N = 183) =
12.48, p = .002]. However, following the prompt (i.e., in POST trials), Westerners (24.1%) used
the first available shortcut as much as Urban (20.4%) or Traditional (33.3%) Himba [χ2(2, N =
183) = 2.976, p = .226]. We next investigated whether any subjects used the DS in every single
trial. In PRE trials, 3.7% of Westerners, 3.7% of Urban, and 9.7% of Traditional Himba used the
DS every single time it was available and, in POST trials, those numbers increased slightly to
5.6% of Westerners, 5.6% of Urban, and 18.7% of Traditional Himba. Notably, of the three
Westerners classified as DSers in PRE trials, two of them used the DS in every trial that it was
available and the third used it in 95.3% of trials, illustrating a stark contrast between them and
Western LSers.
We decided to expand our understanding of the consistency of DS-use across groups by
applying progressively more stringent DSer classification requirements: DS was used in more
than 25%, more than 50%, and more than 75% of trials (Table 5.3-1). For PRE trials, as with the
5% classification criterion, there were significantly fewer Western DSers than Traditional or
Urban Himba DSers when the criterion was set to more than 25% of trials [χ2(2, N = 183) =
14.57, p = .001], and more than 50% of trials [χ2(2, N = 183) = 13.07, p = .001]. When the
criterion was set to more than 75% of trials, there were significantly more Traditional Himba
DSers than Western DSers, but Urban Himba did not significantly differ from either group [χ2(2,
N = 183) = 9.099, p = .011]. In POST trials, DSer proportions did not significantly differ
between groups for any of the DSer classification criteria.
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Table 5.1 Proportion of each group that used the DS in greater than 5%, 25%, 50%, and 75% of trials.
Sub-groups based on the number of city visits are included for Traditional Himba. Superscripts denote statistically
distinguishable groupings.
PRE
Traditional
0-1 visits
2+ visits
Urban
Western
POST
Traditional
0-1 visits
2+ visits
Urban
Western

5.3.4

>5%
34.7a
39.0a
29.4a
42.6a
5.6b

>25%
33.3a
36.6a
29.4a
29.6a
5.6b

>50%
32.0a
34.1a
29.4a
24.1a
5.6b

>75%
25.3a
26.8a
23.5a,b
14.8a,b
5.6b

36.0a
41.5a
29.4a
27.8a
50.0a

32.0a
36.6a
26.5a
22.2a
42.6a

30.7a
36.6a
23.5a
20.4a
29.6a

26.7a
29.3a
23.5a
20.4a
20.4a

Influence of Urban Exposure
In Caparos et al.’s assessment of the differences between Westerners and Urban and

Traditional Himba’s perceptual processing, they noted that Traditional Himba that had visited
the city fewer times within their lifetimes categorized more figures based on local, rather than
global, features (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012); thereby suggesting that that exposure to an urban
environment corresponds to lasting changes in perceptual processing, biasing global rather than
local features. To explore how urban exposure might have impacted our assessment of LS-DS
performance, we re-grouped the Traditional Himba into those that had visited the city either one
or fewer (N = 41; M = 0.24; SD = 0.43) or two or more times (N = 34; 16 participants reported
“many” instead of an exact number, but for the other 18 Traditional Himba subjects, M = 3.06;
SD = 1.70). In PRE trials, for the more than 5% DSer classification criterion, a Pearson’s chi
square analysis again revealed that the proportion of DSers within the Western group was
significantly less than the Himba groups’ [χ2(3, N = 183) = 21.49, p <.001; Western = 5.6%,
Urban = 42.6%, Traditional 0-1 = 39.0%, and Traditional 2+ = 29.4%]; however, there was no
difference in the proportion of DSers between Himba based on location (Urban vs Traditional) or
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the number of urban exposures (Table 5.3-1). This finding was preserved for the more than 25%
and more than 50% DSer classification criteria. However, for the more than 75% DSer
classification criterion, only Traditional Himba that had been to the city 0 or 1 times were
statistically distinct [χ2(3, N = 183) = 9.25, p = .026] from Westerners, and both Traditional
Himba that had been to the city 2+ times and Urban Himba displayed intermediate DS-use (i.e.,,
the proportions of DSers within these groups did not differ significantly from either of the other
groups or each other). Like before, in POST trials, DSer proportions did not differ significantly
between groups for any of the DSer classification criteria.

5.3.5

Effect of Training
As noted previously, Western participants were more likely to successfully complete the

training than Himba, who often took much longer to reach criterion. A Kruskal-Wallis analysis
of variance confirmed that Westerners differed from Urban and Traditional Himba (which did
not differ from each other) in the total number of training trials needed before graduating to the
experiment [H(2) = 63.48, p < .001; Mean trials (SD): Western = 39.0 (33.44), Urban = 73.2
(40.12), Traditional = 86.2 (44.98)]. To assess whether increased training affected strategy-use,
we used Logistic Regressions to analyze the effects of group (Western, Urban, Traditional) and #
of training trials on DSer classification. As noted before, group significantly corresponded to
DSer classification, correctly predicting 71.6% of cases. However, there were no significant
effects of training (for any level) on DSer classification. 2
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5.3.6

Effects of Shortcut-Use on Performance
To explore the impact of strategy on accuracy, subjects’ PROBE trial accuracies were

compared using a Mann-Whitney U test, which indicated that for PRE trials, DSers (Mdn =
91.7%) had significantly higher (U = 4,187, p = .015) accuracy scores than LSers (Mdn =
83.3%). This was also true for POST trials, DSers (Mdn = 95.8%) had higher accuracy than
LSers (Mdn = 83.3%; U = 6,202, p <.001). Next, to investigate the impact of strategy on
efficiency, we compared subjects’ average trial times for DS and LS responses in PROBE trials.
A natural logarithm transform was applied to normalize the data. A paired samples T-test
revealed that trial times were significantly faster when subjects used the DS (M = 1655.1 ms; SD
= 1194.0) than when they used the LS (M = 2543.6; SD = 1459.0), validating the enhanced
efficiency of the DS; t(84)=8.13, p <.001.

5.3.7

Switch Costs
We also identified the switch costs for subjects who utilized both DS and LS solutions.

For PRE DSers, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant (F(1,39) = 5.566, p =.023)
interaction between condition (BASE vs PROBE) and trial type (stay vs switch) on subjects’
RT1s. PROBE stay RT1s (M = 1188.6 ms; SD = 540.2) were significantly faster than PROBE
switch (M = 1373.4 ms; SD = 816.3), which were faster than both BASE stay (M = 1686.0 ms;
SD = 961.1) and BASE switch (M = 1587.5 ms; SD =637.1) RT1s, which did not differ from
each other. Thus, although DS responses were faster than LS responses, DSers experienced
switch costs during their LS-to-DS strategy switch.
For POST trials, again, we found a significant [F(1,49) = 4.56, p = .038] interaction
between condition (BASE vs PROBE) and trial type (stay vs switch). Again, PROBE stay RT1s

122

(M = 850.2 ms; SD = 472.3) were significantly faster than PROBE switch (M = 960.7 ms; SD =
495.3) RT1s, which were faster than both BASE stay (M = 1233.9 ms; SD = 543.6) and BASE
switch (M = 1261.2 ms; SD =532.8) RT1s, which did not differ from each other. Thus, the DS
was, in fact, the more efficient strategy, even in the face of switch costs associated with going
between LS and DS responses for BASE and PROBE trials, respectively.
Lastly, we assessed LSers’ RT1s for BASE and PROBE trials. For PRE trials, BASE
RT1s (M = 1152.2 ms, SD = 535.1) were significantly faster than PROBE RT1s (M = 1297.7 ms,
SD = 600.7; t(142)=-10.95, p <.001). This was also found for POST trials (BASE M = 1148.9
ms, SD = 440.1; PROBE M = 1202.6 ms, SD = 542.5; t(132)=-2.19, p <.031) suggesting that the
presence of the Triangle in PROBE trials may have been distracting.
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Figure 5.2 Mean BASE and PROBE same and switch trials’ RT1s for subjects who used
the DS in greater than 50% of trials. * < .05.

5.4

Discussion
The ability to break away from a learned rule and use a shortcut was enhanced in Urban

and Traditional Himba compared to Westerners, providing the first evidence that cognitive set is
not a universal human trait. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that differences in global
vs local perceptual processing affect susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task, based on
the previously observed differences between Urban and Traditional Himba’s perceptual
processing (Caparos, Ahmed, et al., 2012) and their predominantly indistinguishable strategy
selection on the LS-DS task. Our efforts to promote shortcut-use, by issuing the “Don’t be afraid
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to try new things” prompt, successfully increased the proportion of Western DSers to levels
equivalent with the Himba. These findings support the hypothesis that cognitive set is
influenced by participants’ conceptualization of the problem. That being said, a large proportion
of Westerners (50%; n = 27), Urban (72.2%; n = 39), and Traditional (64%; n = 48) Himba
participants were still affected by cognitive set in POST trials: they did not adopt the shortcut
even after the prompt. We discuss this persistence of cognitive set and propose potential causes,
repercussions, and solutions.
The Himba’s enhanced DS-use provides a clear contrast to Westerner’s firm LS-use,
allowing us to glimpse potentially causative environmental factors which might be limiting
problem solving flexibility in Westerners. These two culturally distant groups differ in many
ways, including social structure, physical environment, language, and educational background.
Although, some of these factors have qualities more likely to influence cognitive flexibility than
others.
First, a consequential impact of social structure on shortcut-use seems unlikely when one
considers that male and female Himba play vastly different social roles, yet we found no sexdifferences in LS vs DS strategy selection (see supplementary data in Appendix B). Further, the
social structure hypothesis predicts that interdependent (such as the Himba) more than
independent peoples (such as Westerners) should utilize more holistic response styles (i.e.,
consider the sequence as a whole (Nisbett et al., 2001); however, we found the opposite.
Compared to Westerners, the Himba were better able to extract the Triangle from the larger LS
sequence.
Second, the possibility that physical environment or visual clutter might play a role in
susceptibility to cognitive flexibility also seems unlikely, given that we found very little evidence
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that urban exposure biased individuals’ response strategy, as would be predicted by the visual
clutter hypothesis. Traditional Himba that had been to the city two or more times and Urban
Himba did exhibit intermediate DS-use but only when the criterion was set to more than 75% of
trials. This is indicative of a potential association between urban exposure and the consistency
with which subjects evoked the shortcut, rather than their propensity to break cognitive set in the
first place.3
Third, language, or verbal encoding, is considered vital to rule-based problem solving
(Stoet & Snyder, 2008). Without a word for ‘shapes’ the Himba may have been less equipped to
verbally encode the LS, resulting in it imposing relatively weaker constraints on problem solving
compared to Westerners. This could also explain the comparatively lower number of Himba
participants who passed the training levels. We suggest that weaker verbal encoding would be a
more viable explanation if all of the Himba subjects were less susceptible to cognitive set, given
that all of the Himba were monolingual in Otjiherero. Yet, there were fewer DSers than LSers,
even in Himba subjects. Further, our finding that Himba and Westerners were equally affected
by switch costs suggests that the rule is similarly encoded in both populations. That said, the
possibility that the strength with which the initial habit is codified could influence shortcut-use
should be explored in future studies.
Consequently, we are left to focus on the putative impact of educational background (i.e.,
problem solving history) on cognitive set. Luchins’ discussed the potentially set-inducing
instructional methods typical of Western education in his initial description of cognitive set
(Luchins, 1942). He asserted that, “Methods are needed which will teach the child to stand on
his own feet, to face the world freely and act through intelligent thinking rather than by blind
force of habit” (p. 93). We posit that the blind repetition characteristic of Western education
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deters subjects from interpreting the DS as a viable solution. They may never even consider that
the problem could have multiple solutions, until explicitly told, “Don’t be afraid to try new
things” which clearly states the possibility of multiple solutions.
In support of this, following the prompt, 24.1% of Westerners (compared to 3.7% before)
used the shortcut the very first time it was available. Additionally, we noted that Urban Himba’s
shortcut use significantly decreased following the prompt, however considering that in PRE
trials Urban Himba showed the largest degree of shortcut-use, this might be interpreted as
adherence to the prompt’s suggestion to try new things. We argue that, because the prompt did
not elicit enhanced shortcut use in either Urban or Traditional Himba, they may have already
been operating without a single-solution assumption. Instruction has been found to induce set in
other paradigms (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005) and this susceptibility may even vary across
cultures (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Clegg & Legare, 2016; Legare & Nielsen, 2015). A small
caveat to this interpretation is necessary: although the vast majority of Himba do not partake in
formal education, a very small portion of both Urban and Traditional Himba attend or have
briefly attended small schools. We estimate that very few (<10%) of our subjects had been
exposed to schooling and posit that any potential influence would have served to suppress DSuse, not enhance it.4 Nevertheless, future studies directly aimed at addressing the impact of
educational background and literacy on cognitive flexibility, especially in remote cultures, would
be sapient.
In this study we confidently reject the universality of cognitive set by demonstrating a
remote culture’s enhanced ability to break away from a set strategy to adopt a more efficient
alternative. We effectively promoted shorctut-use in a population previously bound to a learned
rule by altering their conceptual understanding of the task. Lastly, we proposed that educational
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background might contribute to the observed cross-cultural differences in cognitive set. Simply
put, we may be mechanizing ourselves by approaching multivalent problems with single-strategy
solutions.
As with any cognitive process, cognitive set is likely mediated by multiple influences.
This should certainly be taken into consideration when studying cognitive processes, not only to
avoid erroneous predictions but also in an effort to understand why certain differences arise.
What exactly allows some participants but not others to readily switch to the shortcut remains
opaque but could be vital to enabling the rest of us to intentionally utilize both persistence and
flexibility in problem solving. As a final consideration, we highlight the large proportion of
LSers even during each group’s peak DS-use (Westerners POST: 50.0% LSers; Urban PRE:
57.4% LSers; Traditional PRE: 64.0% LSers). What drives this partial, yet pervasive, propensity
for cognitive set in all groups? We suggest that the relative trade-offs between exploring
alternative strategies and exploiting familiar ones may serve to equilibrate response styles in the
absence of external biases (Ionescu, 2017). Exploring alternatives can be advantageous when a
more efficient reward is discovered but it can also be risky by consuming time and resources
especially when the outcome is unknown (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014; Hommel & Colzato, 2017).
Thus, a balance between flexible and persistent response-styles is likely beneficial, an assertion
that makes Westerners’ proclivity for rule-based problem solving a worrying prospect. Future
endeavors might explore other populations’ relative propensities toward cognitive set in an effort
to understand the balance between flexible and persistent strategy-use across humans, especially
over multiple contexts.
This is the first study to explore cross-cultural differences in cognitive set. Many
psychological pursuits have made conclusions based on Western participants’ responses and as
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the spread of Western culture begins to reach even remote cultures such as the Himba (Caparos,
Ahmed, et al., 2012), a process that may eventually render this type of research impossible, we
argue that strengthening the current efforts toward understanding cross-cultural cognition is
invaluable.
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Footnotes:
1 Many

Himba exhibited great difficulty reproducing the Square1 → Square2 sequence in

Training levels 1, 2 & 3 than Westerners. Thus, immediately following the initial instructions
they were prompted to show the experimenter “Which came first?” then “Which came second?”
Even with this extra instruction, a large portion of both Urban (55.7%) and Traditional (57.0%)
Himba that began the LS-DS task did not pass the Training levels (compared to 10% of
Westerners). We posit that this difficulty might be due to their lack of corrective eyewear and/or
the speed of the demonstrations (Min = 150ms). Alternative explanations and potential
implications are discussed; however, we reasoned that if increased instruction affected subjects’
responses, it would only serve to concretize the LS (Crooks & McNeil, 2009).
2

The main effect of including Training 3, although not significant [χ2(1, N = 183) = 3.82,

p = .051], increased the predictive power of the model to 75.4% of cases. Subjects with more
Training 3 trials tended to be classified as DSers. This could be interpreted as indicating that the
Himba’s increased experience with the Triangle could have contributed to their enhanced ability
to use the shortcut. However, none of the 3 Western DSers, had abnormally increased
experience with Training 3 (mean number of Training 3 trials for Westerners = 8.47), illustrating
that although differences in rule familiarity could conceivably influence susceptibility to
cognitive set, a causative role is unsupported.
3 We

also considered that working memory availability might influence shortcut use. In

fact, Beilock and DeCaro found that, under stress, humans with less working memory
availability were more likely to use the shortcut in Luchins’ task than subjects with more
working memory (Beilock & Decaro, 2007). In the LS-DS task, the LS requires the subject to
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recall the demonstration before selecting the Triangle. Thus, lower working memory availability
might result in 1) an increased number of training trials before the accuracy criterion is reached
and 2) increased use of the DS, which does not require any working memory. Yet previous
research has shown increased working memory availability in Urban compared with Traditional
Himba (Linnell et al., 2013). Thus, if working memory played a causative role in the Himba’s
difficulty during the training we might have expected to see group differences in the number of
training trials between Urban and Traditional Himba, but we did not.
4

Although it has been suggested that exposure to reading/writing could promote global

processing biases (Davidoff et al., 2008; Dukette & Stiles, 2001), Caparos et al. (2012) found
that excluding Urban Himba who had been to school did not alter their results, Urban Himba and
British subjects still exhibited a similarly global perceptual bias compared with Traditional
Himbas’ more local bias.
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6

6.1

DISCUSSION

Summary of Findings
This research describes differences in susceptibility to cognitive set between primate

species and across human cultures. Chapter 2 illustrates baboons’ nearly exhaustive use of the
shortcut and humans’ considerable preference for the learned strategy. Chapter 3 depicts
intermediate shortcut-use in chimpanzees and provides a comparative analysis of cognitive set on
the LS-DS task across primate species. Chapter 4 showed that although human subjects saw the
shortcut, they did not use it until their conceptualization of the problem constraints were altered.
Chapter 5 found that shortcut-use varied across human cultures and presented further evidence
that problem conceptualization, rather than visual perception, influences susceptibility to
cognitive set in humans.

6.2

Species Differences in Shortcut-Use
Baboons and chimpanzees, but only a minority of humans, used the Triangle when it was

available as a shortcut (the DS). Furthermore, chimpanzees were the only species to consistently
utilize a partial shortcut, characterized by selecting the first Square(1) but then skipping
Square(2) and selecting the Triangle (the SS). In the Introduction, I discussed primate behavioral
flexibility across a range of tasks; however, here I will focus on the LS-DS task and the potential
factors that might have contributed to the observed species’ differences in shortcut-use. Keep in
mind that, in the LS-DS task, the Triangle is highly salient (in PROBE trials), familiar, and has
an impeccable reward history. By design, the task promotes the use of the shortcut. Thus, it is
not as much surprising when the shortcut is used, as when it is not used.
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6.2.1

The Frontal Cortex, Cognitive Flexibility, and Language
First, I will briefly discuss how the likely cortical underpinnings of cognitive set in

primates might interact with strategy encoding. There is much evidence that regions of the
frontal cortex mediate cognitive flexibility in primates (Brass & Von Cramon, 2002; Bunge et
al., 2005; Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; Chrysikou et al., 2013; Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013; Hyafil,
Summerfield, & Koechlin, 2009; Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007; Qiu et al., 2010; Roberts, 2008;
Rygula, Walker, Clarke, Robbins, & Roberts, 2010; Sakai, 2008; Zelazo, 2008); note, these are
by no means the only regions involved in flexible problem solving (Holmes & Cohen, 2014;
Miller & Buschman, 2008; Stoet & Snyder, 2004). Within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in
particular, sensory information from the environment is integrated with previous experience,
allowing a contextually appropriate response to be selected and relayed to motor areas, where the
behavior is produced (Bunge & Wallis, 2008; Hoshi, 2008; Miller & Buschman, 2008; Petrides,
2008).
Importantly, the PFC has undergone extensive evolutionary changes within the primate
lineage. Evidence suggests that the human neocortex is significantly larger and more convoluted
than expected for our brain size and exhibits a disproportionate increase in white matter
composition compared to other primates’ (Rilling & Insel, 1999; Schoenemann, Sheehan, &
Glotzer, 2005). In fact, although some studies suggest that relative brain size (calculated from
brain to body size ratio) is similar across apes and humans (Semendeferi, Lu, Schenker, &
Damasio, 2002), a recent investigation provided strong evidence for non-allometric expansions
of the prefrontal cortex in apes and humans (Smaers, Gomez-Robles, Parks, & Sherwood, 2017).
Furthermore, lateralization of neuroanatomical features within the PFC have been observed
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between monkeys, apes, and humans, which, along with cortical expansion, has been suggested
to underlie species differences in cognition (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Hopkins,
Misiura, Pope, & Latash, 2015; Rosati, 2017; Sakai, 2008; Schenker et al., 2010; Schoenemann
et al., 2005; Stoet & Snyder, 2003).
Of particular note, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) has been found to be
associated with various types of strategy/rule use in primates (Brass, Derrfuss, Forstmann, & von
Cramon, 2005; Bunge, 2004; Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller, & Wagner, 2003; Bunge & Zelazo,
2006; Christoff & Keramatian, 2008; Crone et al., 2006; Miller & Buschman, 2008; Petrides,
2008; Roberts, 2008; Rushworth et al., 2008; Rygula et al., 2010). Additionally, in humans, the
left VLPFC also houses Broca’s area (Badre & Wagner, 2007), which has long been known to be
involved in language (Broca, 1861). This co-localization of rule-encoding and language within
the VLPFC have led some to consider that humans’ apparently advanced use of abstractions may
have developed from an enhanced ability to verbally encode rules (Sakai, 2008).
Although not necessarily a function of neuroanatomical proximity, rule encoding and
verbal processing are closely linked in humans (Bahlmann, Schubotz, Mueller, Koester, &
Friederici, 2009; Davidoff & Fagot, 2010; Ellis & Reingold, 2014; Jacques, 2001; Sakai, 2008;
Zelazo, 2008). In fact, VLPFC activity diminishes after a rule is learned (Della-Maggiore &
McIntosh, 2005; Toni, Rowe, Klass, & Passingham, 2002) and, in humans, disrupting inner
speech leads to significantly longer switch costs (Emerson & Miyake, 2003). Thus, species that
do not verbally encode strategies may be at a disadvantage when learning problem solving rules,
especially as prescribed solutions become more complex or abstract. Indeed, I propose that
differences in rule-encoding processes contribute to cognitive set by mediating how easily a rule
is learned and how readily it can be replaced.
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6.2.2

Species Differences in Rule Encoding

6.2.2.1 Sequential Processing
The LS is a three-step sequence, which requires subjects to identify which Square (1)
came first, which Square (2) came second, and then select the Triangle. The ability to separate
the Triangle from this sequence is paramount to using it as a solution by itself (i.e., the shortcut).
Thus, presumably, cross-species variation in sequential processing could influence cognitive set.
Specifically, processing each step of the LS sequence as an individual component [ie. (Square1)
+ (Square2) + (Triangle)] or even just processing the Triangle as separable from the Squares
[(Square1 + Square2) + (Triangle)] might allow subjects to more readily identify the shortcut
(Triangle). Conversely, processing the LS sequence as a whole construct [ie. (Square1 +
Square2 + Triangle)] might render the DS more difficult to disentangle.
There are numerous similarities between humans’ and nonhuman primates’ abilities to
process sequences (reviewed in Conway & Christiansen, 2001); however, important differences
have also been reported. First, humans seem better able to conceptualize hierarchical sequences
(Conway & Christiansen, 2001; Gobet et al., 2001) and, in contrast with baboons, are better able
to recall structured sequences (Fagot & De Lillo, 2011). Second, there is evidence to suggest
that old world monkeys might solve sequential problems by identifying and selecting each step
individually, but humans and chimpanzees appeared to identify the entire sequence before
reproducing it (Biro & Matsuzawa, 1999; Ohshiba, 1997). Yet, other reports suggest that both
monkeys and chimpanzees are affected by a sequence in its entirety (Beran et al., 2004; Fagot &
De Lillo, 2011).
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There do appear to be species differences in sequential processing (Conway &
Christiansen, 2001; Ghirlanda et al., 2017); however, if and to what extent these interact with the
observed species differences in cognitive set on the LS-DS task is not clear. Future endeavors
would benefit from comparing primate species’ abilities to learn and replace a non-sequential
learned strategy.

6.2.2.2 Rule Representations
Compared to humans, nonhuman primates require extensive training to acquire abstract
strategies (Beran et al., 2004; Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; Pope et al., 2015; Stoet & Snyder, 2003).
Likewise, in the present research, the amount of training that was required to learn the LS
differed dramatically between nonhuman primates and humans. From the data in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3, the minimum number of training trials required for baboons and chimpanzees were
5,043 (Max = 20,060) and 2,784 (Max = 36,966), respectively; yet, 25 out of the 53 adult humans
only conducted the minimum number of training trials: 24 (Max = 152). When analyzed, it was
revealed that baboons’ and chimpanzees’ errors during training stemmed, not from inattention to
the demonstration or from blindly reselecting recently correct squares, but from committing
‘reversal’ type errors, in which the correct order of Square1 and Square2 was misjudged
(Chapter 3.3.1).
It is not unreasonable to suggest that humans adopted the LS more quickly due to their
ability to verbally encode the LS. In fact, in humans, words are remembered more easily than
nonwords but nonwords are more readily deconstructed (Ellis & Reingold, 2014). Thus, verbally
identifying the rule may allow humans to remember and access abstract strategies more readily
than other primates (Fagot et al., 1998; Ghirlanda et al., 2017). Indeed, perhaps baboons’ and
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chimpanzees’ inability to verbally encode the LS might have made it more difficult to learn
initially but subsequently easier to replace.

6.2.2.3 Switching Strategies
Humans (Chapter 5), but not chimpanzees and baboons (Chapter 3), exhibited switch
costs on the LS-DS task. In monkeys, distinct neuronal populations underlie different abstract
rules within the PFC (Genovesio et al., 2005) and similarly, in humans, the location of ruleencoding activity in the PFC varies by region depending on which rule is being used (Sakai &
Passingham, 2003). Likely, human rule-use includes, not only the distinct neuronal populations
encoding strategies’ dynamics, but also a verbal description of the rule, at least to some extent.
Switching strategies might take more time for humans (resulting in switch costs) because their
current strategy is verbally represented (Emerson & Miyake, 2003). If, for humans, strategy
descriptions (e.g., ‘choose the blue objects’ or ‘choose objects shaped like a boat’) accompany
each rule, then switching might require inhibiting and accessing a greater number of associated
components of the old and new strategies, respectively. That said, given chimpanzees’, but not
baboons’, use of the SS, it seems unlikely that they represent rules in exactly the same way.
Even in simple discrimination reversal tasks, apes tended to catch on to the new rule faster than
monkeys, indicating that their grasp of abstract contingencies may be better (Rumbaugh, 1971).

6.2.3

Summary
In summary, this research found that humans, but not nonhuman primates were affected

by cognitive set on the LS-DS task. I posit that these species differences stem from differences
in rule encoding processes, which may ultimately derive from differences in linguistic processing
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and/or underlying neural architecture. Indeed, the cortical machinery associated with abstract
problem solving is certainly expanded in humans compared to apes, as well as in apes compared
to monkeys (Rosati, 2017; Semendeferi et al., 2002) and this might go far to explain the
observed species differences in susceptibility to cognitive set on the LS-DS task.

6.3

Human Variation in Shortcut-Use
Humans demonstrated substantial inter-individual differences in shortcut-use on the LS-

DS task. In Chapter 2, we noted an age effect on shortcut-use. In Chapter 4, we found that
conceptual but not perceptual influences seemed to impact humans’ shortcut-use. And in
Chapter 5, we discovered differences in shortcut-use across human cultures. Thus, clearly, there
are factors that influence individuals’ propensity toward cognitive set on the LS-DS task.

6.3.1

Developmental
The current research noted that children utilized the DS in PROBE trials significantly

more often than adolescents or adults (Chapter 2; Pope et al., 2015). However, reanalysis using
the ‘true’ measure of DS-use, in which BASE DS-use is subtracted from PROBE DS-use, this
trend (children = 18.5% DSers, adolescents = 4% DSers, and adults = 9.6% DSers) was no
longer significant (See Chapter 3 Footnote 2), suggesting that erroneous DS-use may have been
driving the age-effects. It is also possible that this trend was driven by the younger children (3 of
the 5 ‘true’ DSers within the 7-10 age group were 7 years old) and that children under 7 years
old might be even better able to utilize the DS; however, further investigation is required.
Despite somewhat mixed findings regarding human development and cognitive
flexibility, it has been posited that a juvenile period of plasticity may be favorable (even selected
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for) because it might encourage, or simply allow, a chance for more exploratory learning
(Gopnik et al., 2015; Griffin, 2016; Ionescu, 2017; Thompson-Schill et al., 2009). In fact,
Ionescu (2017) posited that when learning a behavioral strategy, humans engage in an initial
exploratory period, followed by a period of stability, followed by another period of flexibility. It
is plausible that this so-called ‘variability-stability-flexibility’ pattern underlies human
differences, even beyond developmental differences, in one’s propensity to adopt the shortcut on
the LS-DS task.

6.3.2

Working memory
In Chapter 2, we suggested that working memory availability might influence

susceptibility to cognitive set. Specifically, we posited that baboons’ and children’s enhanced
propensities to use the shortcut might stem from their limited working memory availability
compared to adults (Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; Miles et al., 1996; Thomason et al., 2009), such that
the LS is inherently more difficult (as it requires remembering the locations of Square1 and
Square2) making the DS more attractive by comparison (see Beilock & Decaro, 2007).
However, the data from Chapter 5 do not support this contention; although Traditional and
Urban Himba differ in their working memory capacities (Linnell et al., 2013), we did not find a
consistent difference in their DS-use. Furthermore, preliminary findings from a modified LS-DS
task hint that, when the LS working memory requirements are alleviated, humans may actually
utilize the DS more, while capuchins and rhesus macaques exhibit DS-use similar to that of
baboons (Watzek & Pope, Unpublished). Thus, although certainly not concrete, the available
data do not suggest that higher working memory availability – in and of itself – promotes
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inflexibility on the LS-DS task. However, future investigations might also consider increasing
cognitive load during testing to examine this possibility further.

6.3.3

The Influence of Problem Conceptualization on Cognitive Set
Chapters 4 and 5 made use of interventions, midway through testing, aimed at altering

subjects’ conceptualization of the problem. In Chapter 4, we showed half the participants a
video that demonstrated the DS (Min = 8 times) and in Chapter 5, we told them “Don’t be afraid
to try new things.” Increased shortcut-use was observed following both manipulations,
indicating that understanding that the shortcut was a viable strategy, effectively enabled subjects
to use it. This is not surprising. Essentially, Chapter 4 taught subjects how to use the shortcut
and Chapter 5 clearly implies the possibility of multiple solutions. However we observed two
outcomes that were unexpected.
First, after viewing the DS demonstration (Chapter 4), five times as many subjects were
classified as DSers; however 31% still did not use the shortcut. Simply put, a subset of subjects
watched a video that showed the task being solved via the shortcut – and still did not use it,
thereby demonstrating the strength of set in some individuals. Seemingly, subjects were so
convinced that they had already identified the solution, they did not bother attending to the
demonstration. This is frighteningly reminiscent of confirmation bias, wherein incoming
information is inadvertently modulated to fit preconceived conceptions (Bilalić et al., 2008; Doll,
Hutchison, & Frank, 2011). Indeed, this lack of exploratory behavior goes far towards
explaining why certain subjects are able to break cognitive set.
The second unexpected finding is reported in Chapter 5. Following the “don’t be afraid
to try new things” prompt, nearly nine times more Westerners used the shortcut; yet, Himba
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participants’ shortcut-use did not increase. One possibility is that something was lost in the
translation of the prompt. However, this is unlikely given that Urban Himba’s DS-use
significantly decreased in POST trials. It seems that, because many Himba were already using
the shortcut, adhering to the “Don’t be afraid to try new things” prompt meant Use a different
strategy, resulting in decreased DS-use. Furthermore, we observed a similar response in Chapter
4 when, after Control subjects viewed the video demonstration of the LS, the number of DSers
dropped from 13.8% to 6.9%. Similarly, it appears as if they were conforming to the
demonstration, or what they thought they should do.

6.3.4

Summary
Humans’ were better able to break away from their cognitive set when their conceptual

understanding of the task changed. However, in some cases, not even a demonstration of the DS
was able to alter subjects’ conceptualization of the LS as the solution. I suggest that cognitive
set is, to some extent, a byproduct of codified rule-use such that strategic representations, once
formed, might be difficult to replace. That said, there is substantial inter-individual variability in
both initial susceptibility to cognitive set and the propensity to break it in humans.

6.4

Broader Implications
Altering subjects’ conceptualization of the problem effectively alters their ability to break

cognitive set; however, what pre-existing conceptualizations might allow some subjects to be
less affected by cognitive set to begin with is unclear. The following sections present several
speculative hypotheses on this topic, as well as thoughts for future directions.
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6.4.1

Cultural Influences
Throughout this research, remarkably few Western subjects were classified as DSers,

prior to intervention (See Table 6.3-1). However, in stark contrast, 38% of the remote Himba
adults adopted the shortcut within their first 48 trials. As Chapters 4 and 5 showed, perceptual
influences do not appear to impact shortcut-use on the LS-DS. Thus, I will not discuss the
known cultural differences in perceptual processing. Instead, I will focus on cultural differences
that might impact problem conceptualization.

Table 6.1 The proportions of human populations classified as DSers.
Nationality

N

%DSers

American

53

7.5%

French

14

7.1%

Chapter 4:

American

58

13.8%

Chapter 5:

American

54

5.6%

Namibian

129

38.0%

Chapter 2/3:
Pilot:

Westerners and Himba participants differ in many ways, including social structure,
physical environment, language, and educational background. Here, we will focus on the
potential influence of language and educational background. Note that, although group
differences in genetic predispositions biasing problem-solving approach toward either
persistence or flexibility are certainly possible (Hommel & Colzato, 2017), I find this an unlikely
explanation given the extremely diverse population of Western students sampled: out of 904
students active on Georgia State University’s SONA system (as of November 2 nd, 2017), 17%
identify as Asian, 50% identify as Black/African American, 23% identify as White/Caucasian,
and 10% identified as more than one race.
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6.4.2

The Impact of Language on Cognitive Set
As discussed briefly in Section 6.2.1, for humans, language provides the scaffolding upon

which abstract constructs are compiled into problem-solving strategies (Emerson & Miyake,
2003; Lipton & Eichenbaum, 2008). Humans are capable of performing novel actions, even a
complex series of actions, in the complete absence of demonstration and without resorting to trial
and error, simply by following a set of verbal or written instructions (reviewed by Stoet &
Snyder, 2008). This cognitive hack allows a large number of people to benefit from the
knowledge of a few (e.g., textbooks). However, the close association between language and rule
use means that differences in linguistic encoding might easily interact with strategy-use (Jacques,
2001).
Recall the assertion that the observed differences in susceptibility to cognitive set across
primate species might stem from differences in rule-encoding, potentially underlain by the ability
to verbally encode abstract rules (discussed in Section 6.2.2.2). The Himba do not have a direct
translation for the word ‘shapes.’ Thus, their ability to encode the LS might have suffered to
some extent and conceivably influenced their susceptibility to cognitive set. Indeed, Himba
participants had much more difficulty passing the training levels and the ones that did, required
significantly more training trials (M = 79.7) than Western participants (M = 39; Section 5.3.5).
That being said, all Himba participants were monolingual in Otjihimba; yet we observed
substantial inter-individual variation in susceptibility to cognitive set and there was no
interaction between the number of training trials and DS-use in humans. Furthermore, consider
that all of the human populations tested required thousands fewer training trials than the
nonhuman subjects and the majority of each group exhibited a preference for the LS.
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Thus, it seems reasonable that humans possess roughly equivalent abilities to encode
rules; although, certainly, formally educated participants might be more practiced in this regard.
Indeed, enhanced rule encoding, perhaps stemming from linguistic processes, might promote the
initial development of cognitive set in humans but this appears to have played a secondary role in
the observed inter-individual differences in humans’ abilities to break cognitive set. Specifically,
as evidenced in Chapters 4 and 5, subjects’ conceptualization of the task appears to greatly
influence their abilities to use the shortcut.

6.4.3

Potential Impact of Educational Background
Western education relies, in large part, on rote memorization of prescribed solution

strategies to boost efficiency and long-term retention (Fehr, 1953; Henderson & Pingry, 1953;
Schwartz, Bransford, & Sears, 2005). However, this approach might well be ineffective (Rohrer
& Taylor, 2006) and/or promote inflexibility (Sweller, 1983). I have discussed this possibility
throughout the text (Sections: 1.5.1; 1.6.4; 2.1; 4.1; 4.4; 5.1; 5.4); however, the current research
only hints at the possibility that educational practices might contribute to set. That being said, I
would like to briefly delve into the potential implications and practicalities.
First, it is also possible that exposure to formal education promotes the interpretation of
the experimental setup as a test of sorts, such that a fear of failure prevents exploration (Luchins,
1942). This goes a long way to explain why the “Don’t be afraid to try new things” prompt
effectively reduced cognitive set in Western but not Himba participants (Section 5.3.2). An
interesting manipulation might be to manipulate the reward values of correct (increase in reward)
and incorrect (neutral vs decrease in reward) responses.
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It is important to note in this discussion that, undoubtedly, mechanized rule-use has its
benefits: it lightens cognitive load and allows many different problems to be solved via the same
strategy (Christoff & Keramatian, 2008; Sweller, 1980; Sweller et al., 1982). Furthermore, a
recent meta-analysis reported that one year of education corresponds to an approximate increase
of 1-5 IQ points (Ritchie & Tucker-Drob, 2017). It would be impractical to completely forego
problem sets as educational tools to learn specific problem solving methods; however, a
seemingly common frustration among educators is that children do not know how to “learn for
themselves” (Schwartz et al., 2005). How do we balance “Exploit!” and “Explore!” in the
learning environment? A better understanding of how, exactly, cognitive flexibility is influenced
by educational styles and to what extent this might intersect with personality traits would be a
worthy pursuit for future endeavors. In particular, comparing Western and non-Western children
who either do or do not partake in formal education (e.g., public, private), in a longitudinal study,
would go far to elucidate the impacts of education on cognitive flexibility.

6.5

Concluding Remarks
Strategy selection can, and arguably should (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014), be biased by

situational factors (Hommel & Colzato, 2017; Kolodny et al., 2015). Effective strategies should
be maintained within both individual and group repertoires such that, when another solution
method becomes necessary or available, it can be capitalized upon (Reader, 2016). On a
proximate level, we might expect individuals with better faculty over explorative/exploitative
strategies to exhibit higher fitness, especially in dynamic environments (Carr et al., 2016;
Holmes & Cohen, 2014; Reader, 2003).
Humans exhibit a remarkable proclivity for invention; yet time and again, engage in
mechanized problem solving (Adamson, 1952; Bilalić et al., 2008; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005;
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Lemaire & Leclere, 2014; Luchins, 1942; Luchins & Luchins, 1950). How can humans’
sporadic yet conclusively innovative behavior be reconciled with their known predilection for
habit? I submit that explorative/exploitative tendencies exist in equilibrium within individuals
such that the relative risks and rewards are optimized. Furthermore, I would speculatively
propose that typical Western educational practices may impair human cognitive flexibility, by
heavily rewarding habit-based solutions.
Although learned responses or habit-based behavior is not always detrimental, defaulting
toward exploitative rather than explorative behavior doubtlessly contributes to inefficient
responses. In this research we observed striking species differences in susceptibility to cognitive
set between baboons, chimpanzees, and humans. This research also found evidence against the
contention that perceptual influences impact shortcut-use on the LS-DS task. However, problem
conceptualization was shown to impact subjects’ abilities to break cognitive set. Furthermore,
this is the first research to document cross-cultural differences in cognitive set in humans. I
speculatively suggest that formal education might contribute to problem solving inflexibility;
however future research is necessary to substantiate this claim.

146

REFERENCES
Abel, T. M., & Hsu, F. L. K. (1949). Some aspects of personality of Chinese as revealed by the
Rorschach Test. Rorschach Research Exchange and Journal of Projective Techniques,
13(3), 285-301.
Adamson, R. E. (1952). Functional fixedness as related to problem solving: A repetition of three
experiments. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 44(4), 288-291.
Aftanas, M. S., & Koppenaal, R. J. (1962). Effects of instructional problems and jar position
variation on the water-jar einstellung test. Psychological Reports, 10, 359-362.
Amici, F., Aureli, F., & Call, J. (2008). Fission-fusion dynamics, behavioral flexibility, and
inhibitory control in primates. Curr Biol, 18(18), 1415-1419.
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2008.08.020
Ardiale, E., & Lemaire, P. (2012). Within-item strategy switching: An age of comparative study
in adults. Psychology and Aging, 27(4), 1138-1151. doi:10.1037/a0027772
Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: why American psychology needs to become less
American. Am Psychol, 63(7), 602-614. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.63.7.602
Arrington, C. M., & Logan, G. D. (2004). The cost of voluntary task switch. Psychological
Science, 15(9), 610-615.
Avila, J. (2013). The effects of acculturation on neuropsychological test performance in Englishspeaking and Farsi-speaking Iranian individuals. (Master of Arts in Psychology),
California State University, Northridge.
Badre, D. (2008). Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex and Controlling Memory to Inform Action. In
S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 365-389).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Badre, D., & Wagner, A. D. (2007). Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the cognitive control
of memory. Neuropsychologia, 45(13), 2883-2901.
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.06.015
Bahlmann, J., Schubotz, R. I., Mueller, J. L., Koester, D., & Friederici, A. D. (2009). Neural
circuits of hierarchical visuo-spatial sequence processing. Brain Res, 1298, 161-170.
doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2009.08.017
Barth, J., & Call, J. (2006). Tracking the displacement of objects: a series of tasks with great
apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) and young
children (Homo sapiens). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(3), 239-252.
doi:10.1037/0097-7403.32.3.239
Beilock, S. L., & Decaro, M. S. (2007). From poor performance to success under stress: working
memory, strategy selection, and mathematical problem solving under pressure. J Exp
Psychol Learn Mem Cogn, 33(6), 983-998. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.33.6.983
Beran, M. J., Pate, J. L., Washburn, D. A., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2004). Sequential responding
and planning in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). J
Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 30(3), 203-212. doi:10.1037/0097-7403.30.3.203
Beran, M. J., Rossettie, M. S., & Parrish, A. E. (2016). Trading up: chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) show self-control through their exchange behavior. Anim Cogn, 19(1), 109121. doi:10.1007/s10071-015-0916-7
Beran, M. J., & Washburn, D. A. (2002). Chimpanzee responding during matching to sample:
control by exclusion. Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 78(3), 497-508.

147

Beran, M. J., Washburn, D. A., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2007). A Stroop-Like Effect in ColorNaming of Color-Word Lexigrams by a Chimpanzee (Pan Troglodyte). The Journal of
General Psychology, 134(2), 217-228.
Berg, E. A. (1948). A Simple Objective Technique for Measuring Flexibility in Thinking. The
Journal of General Psychology, 39(1), 15-22. doi:10.1080/00221309.1948.9918159
Berl, R. E., & Hewlett, B. S. (2015). Cultural variation in the use of overimitation by the Aka
and Ngandu of the Congo Basin. PLoS One, 10(3), e0120180.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120180
Besnard, D., & Cacitti, L. (2005). Interface changes causing accidents. An empirical study of
negative transfer. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 62(1), 105-125.
Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2008). Why good thoughts block better ones: The
mechanism of the pernicious Einstellung (set) effect. Cognition, 108(3), 652-661.
Biro, D., & Matsuzawa, T. (1999). Numerical ordering in a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes):
Planning, executing, and monitoring. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 113(2), 178.
Bonté, E., Flemming, T., & Fagot, J. . (2011). Executive control of perceptual features and
abstract relations by baboons (Papio papio). Behavioral Brain Research, 222(1), 176-182.
Bonte, E., Kemp, C., & Fagot, J. (2014). Age effects on transfer index performance and
executive control in baboons (Papio papio). Front Psychol, 5, 188.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00188
Brass, M., Derrfuss, J., Forstmann, B., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2005). The role of the inferior
frontal junction area in cognitive control. Trends Cogn Sci, 9(7), 314-316.
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.05.001
Brass, M., Derrfuss, J., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2008). The role of the Posterior frontolateral
cortex in task-related control` Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 177-195). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Brass, M., & Von Cramon, D. Y. (2002). The role of the frontal cortex in task preparation.
Cerebral Cortex, 12(9), 908-914.
Broca, P. (1861). Remarques sur la sige de la faculté du langage articulé, suivi d’une observation
d’aphémie. . Bulletin de la Societé Anatomique de Paris, 2, 300-357.
Brosnan, S. F., & Hopper, L. M. (2014). Psychological limits on animal innovation. Animal
Behaviour, 92, 325-332. doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.02.026
Bunge, S. A. (2004). How we use rules to select actions: a review of evidence from cognitive
neuroscience. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 4(4), 564-579.
Bunge, S. A., Kahn, I., Wallis, J. D., Miller, E. K., & Wagner, A. D. (2003). Neural circuits
subserving the retrieval and maintenance of abstract rules. J Neurophysiol, 90, 34193428.
Bunge, S. A., & Wallis, J. D. (2008). Introduction. In S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.),
Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. xiii-xxiii). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Bunge, S. A., Wallis, J. D., Parker, A., Brass, M., Crone, E. A., Hoshi, E., & Sakai, K. (2005).
Neural circuitry underlying rule use in humans and nonhuman primates. J Neurosci,
25(45), 10347-10350. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2937-05.2005
Bunge, S. A., & Zelazo, P. D. (2006). A brain-based account of the development of rule use in
childhood. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(3), 118-121.
Buttelmann, F., & Karbach, J. (2017). Development and Plasticity of Cognitive Flexibility in
Early and Middle Childhood. Front Psychol, 8, 1040. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01040

148

Camerer, C. F., & Weber, M. (1991). Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty
and ambiguity. Manusckipte aus den Instituten fur Betriebswirtschaftslehre der
Universitat Kiel, 275.
Caparos, S., Ahmed, L., Bremner, A. J., de Fockert, J. W., Linnell, K. J., & Davidoff, J. (2012).
Exposure to an urban environment alters the local bias of a remote culture. Cognition,
122(1), 80-85. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.08.013
Caparos, S., Linnell, K. J., Bremner, A. J., de Fockert, J. W., & Davidoff, J. (2012). Does
local/global perceptual bias tell us anything about local/global selective attention? Visual
Cognition, 20(9), 1016-1020.
Carr, K., Kendal, R. L., & Flynn, E. G. (2016). Eureka!: What Is Innovation, How Does It
Develop, and Who Does It? Child Dev, 87(5), 1505-1519. doi:10.1111/cdev.12549
Chelune, G. J., & Baer, R. A. (1986). Developmental norms for the Wisconsin Cart Sorting test.
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 8(3), 219-228.
Chevalier, N., Blaye, A., Dufau, S., & Lucenet, J. (2010). What visual information do children
and adults consider while switching between tasks? Eye-tracking investigation of
cognitive flexibility development. Dev Psychol, 46(4), 955-972. doi:10.1037/a0019674
Chiu, L. (1972). A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Cognitive Styles in Chinese and American
Children. International Journal of Psychology, 7(4), 235-242.
doi:10.1080/00207597208246604
Christoff, K., & Keramatian, K. (2008). Abstraction of Mental Representations: Theoretical
Considerations and Neuroscientific Evidence. In S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.), The
Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 107-126). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Chrysikou, E. G., Hamilton, R. H., Coslett, H. B., Datta, A., Bikson, M., & Thompson-Schill, S.
L. (2013). Noninvasive transcranial direct current stimulation over the left prefrontal
cortex facilitates cognitive flexibility in tool use. Cogn Neurosci, 4(2), 81-89.
doi:10.1080/17588928.2013.768221
Chrysikou, E. G., & Weisberg, R. W. (2005). Following the wrong footsteps: fixation effects of
pictorial examples in a design problem-solving task. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn,
31(5), 1134-1148. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.31.5.1134
Chua, H. F., Boland, J. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (2005). Cultural variation in eye movements during
scene perception. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 102(35), 12629-12633.
doi:10.1073/pnas.0506162102
Clegg, J. M., & Legare, C. H. (2016). A cross-cultural comparison of children's imitative
flexibility. Dev Psychol, 52(9), 1435-1444. doi:10.1037/dev0000131
Coffey, D. M., Marmol, L., Schock, L., & Adams, W. (2005). The influence of acculturation on
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test by Mexican Americans. Arch Clin Neuropsychol, 20(6),
795-803. doi:10.1016/j.acn.2005.04.009
Cole, P., Duncan, L. G., & Blaye, A. (2014). Cognitive flexibility predicts early reading skills.
Front Psychol, 5, 565. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00565
Conway, C. M., & Christiansen, M. H. (2001). Sequential learning in non-human primates.
Trends Cogn Sci, 5(12), 539-546.
Cools, R. (2008). Dopaminergic Modulation of flexible cognitive control: the role of the
striatum. In S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behaviors
(pp. 313-334). New York: Oxford University Press.

149

Corballis, M. C. (2010). Mirror neurons and the evolution of language. Brain Lang, 112(1), 2535. doi:10.1016/j.bandl.2009.02.002
Crone, E. A., Donohue, S. E., Honomichl, R., Wendelken, C., & Bunge, S. A. (2006). Brain
regions mediating flexible rule use during development. J Neurosci, 26(43), 1123911247. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2165-06.2006
Crooks, N. M., & McNeil, N. M. (2009). Increased practice with 'set' problems hinders
performance on the water jar task. Preceedings of the 31st annual conference of the
Cognitive Science Society, Cognitive Science Society, 643-648.
Cunningham, J. D. (1965). Einstellung rigidity in children. Journal of Experimental Child
Psychology, 2(237-247).
Davidoff, J., Davies, I., & Roberson, D. (1999). Colour categories in a stone-age tribe. Nature,
398, 203-204.
Davidoff, J., & Fagot, J. (2010). Cross-species Assessment of the Linguistic Origins of Color
Categories. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 5, 100-116.
doi:10.3819/ccbr.2010.50005
Davidoff, J., Fonteneau, E., & Fagot, J. (2008). Local and global processing: observations from a
remote culture. Cognition, 108(3), 702-709. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.004
Davis, S. J. (2017). The Context of Behavioural Flexibility in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes):
Implications for the Evolution of Cumulative Culture. (PhD in Psychology), University of
St. Andrews.
Davis, S. J., Vale, G. L., Schapiro, S. J., Lambeth, S. P., & Whiten, A. (2016). Foundations of
cumulative culture in apes: improved foraging efficiency through relinquishing and
combining witnessed behaviours in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Sci Rep, 6, 35953.
doi:10.1038/srep35953
de Fockert, J. W., Caparos, S., Linnell, K. J., & Davidoff, J. (2011). Reduced distractability in a
remote culture. PLoS One, 6(10), e26337. doi:10.1371/
de Fockert, J. W., Davidoff, J., Fagot, J., Parron, C., & Goldstein, J. (2007). More accurate size
contrast judgments in the Ebbinghaus Illusion by a remote culture. J Exp Psychol Hum
Percept Perform, 33(3), 738-742. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.33.3.738
de Waal, F. B., & Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up perspective on animal and human
cognition. Trends Cogn Sci, 14(5), 201-207. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.03.003
Dean, L. G., Kendal, R. L., Schapiro, S. J., Thierry, B., & Laland, K. N. (2012). Identification of
the social and cognitive processes underlying human cumulative culture. Science,
335(6072), 1114-1118. doi:10.1126/science.1213969
Defeyter, M. A., & German, T. P. (2003). Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from
children's insight problem solving. Cognition, 89(2), 133-155. doi:10.1016/s00100277(03)00098-2
Della-Maggiore, V., & McIntosh, A. R. (2005). Time course of changes in brain activity and
functional connectivity associated with long-term adaptation to a rotational
transformation. J Neurophysiol, 93(4), 2254-2262. doi:10.1152/jn.00984.2004
Deruelle, C., & Fagot, J. (1998). Visual search for global/local stimulus features in humans and
baboons. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5(3), 476-481.
Diamond, A., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1989). Comparison of human infants and rhesus
monkeys on Piaget's AB task: evidence for dependence on dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
Exp Brain Res, 74, 24-40.

150

Diamond, A., & Kirkham, N. (2005). Not quite as grown-up as we like to think: parallels
between cognition in childhood and adulthood. Psychol Sci, 16(4), 291-297.
doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01530.x
Dolins, F. L., Schweller, K., & Milne, S. (2017). Technology advancing the study of animal
cognition: using virtual reality to present virtually simulated environments to investigate
nonhuman primate spatial cognition. Current Zoology, 63(1), 97-108.
doi:10.1093/cz/zow121
Doll, B. B., Hutchison, K. E., & Frank, M. J. (2011). Dopaminergic genes predict individual
differences in susceptibility to confirmation bias. J Neurosci, 31(16), 6188-6198.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6486-10.2011
Dukette, D., & Stiles, J. (2001). The effects of stimulus density on children’s analysis of
hierarchical patterns. Developmental Science, 4(2), 233-251.
Duncker, K., & Lees, L. S. (1945). On problem-solving. Psychological Monographs, 58(5), i113. doi:10.1037/h0093599
Ellis, J. J., & Reingold, E. M. (2014). The Einstellung effect in anagram problem solving:
evidence from eye movements. Front Psychol, 5, 679. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00679
Emerson, M. J., & Miyake, A. (2003). The role of inner speech in task switching: A dual-task
investigation. Journal of Memory and Language, 48, 148-168.
Fagot, J., & Bonte, E. (2010). Automated testing of cognitive performance in monkeys: use of a
battery of computerized test systems by a troop of semi-free-ranging baboons (Papio
papio). Behav Res Methods, 42(2), 507-516. doi:10.3758/BRM.42.2.507
Fagot, J., & De Lillo, C. (2011). A comparative study of working memory: immediate serial
spatial recall in baboons (Papio papio) and humans. Neuropsychologia, 49(14), 38703880. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.10.003
Fagot, J., & Deruelle, C. (1997). Processing of global and local visual information and
hemispheric specialization in Humans (Homo sapiens) and Baboons (Papio papio).
Journal of experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 23(2), 429442.
Fagot, J., Goldstein, J., Davidoff, J., & Pickering, A. (2006). Cross-species differences in color
categorization. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13(2), 275-280.
Fagot, J., Kruschke, J. K., Depy, D., & Vauclair, J. (1998). Associative learning in baboons
(Papio papio) and humans (Homo sapiens): species differences in learned attention to
visual features. Animal Cognition, 1, 123-133.
Fagot, J., & Paleressompoulle, D. (2009). Automatic testing of cognitive performance in baboons
maintained in social groups. Behav Res Methods, 41(2), 396-404.
doi:10.3758/BRM.41.2.396
Fagot, J., & Tomonaga, M. (1999). Global and Local Processing in Humans (Homo sapiens) and
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): Use of a Visual Search Task With Compound Stimuli.
Journal of Comparative and Physiological Pyschology, 113(1), 3-12.
Fehr, H. F. (1953). The learning of mathematics: Its theory and practice. National Council of
Teachers of Mathematics, 21.
Fragaszy, D. M., Kennedy, E., Murnane, A., Menzel, C., Brewer, G., Johnson-Pynn, J., &
Hopkins, W. (2009). Navigating two-dimensional mazes: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
and capuchins (Cebus apella sp.) profit from experience differently. Anim Cogn, 12(3),
491-504. doi:10.1007/s10071-008-0210-z

151

Frank, M. C., Everett, D. L., Fedorenko, E., & Gibson, E. (2008). Number as a cognitive
technology: evidence from Piraha language and cognition. Cognition, 108(3), 819-824.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.04.007
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Young, S. E., Defries, J. C., Corley, R. P., & Hewitt, J. K. (2008).
Individual differences in executive functions are almost entirely genetic in origin. J Exp
Psychol Gen, 137(2), 201-225. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.137.2.201
Gallup, G. G., Jr. (1970). Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition. Science, 167(3914), 86-87.
Gallup, G. G., Jr. (1976). Absence of self-recognition in a monkey (Macaca fascicularis)
following prolonged exposure to a mirror. Dev Psychol, 10(3), 281-284.
Genovesio, A., Brasted, P. J., Mitz, A. R., & Wise, S. P. (2005). Prefrontal cortex activity related
to abstract response strategies. Neuron, 47(2), 307-320.
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2005.06.006
Genovesio, A., & Wise, S. P. (2008). The Neurophysiology of Abstract Response Strategies. In
S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.), The Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 81105). New York: Oxford University Press.
German, T. P., & Barrett, H. C. (2005). Functional Fixedness in a Technologically Sparse
Culture. American Psychological Society, 16(1), 1-4.
German, T. P., & Defeyter, M. A. (2000). Immunity to functional fixedness in young children.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7(4), 707-712.
Ghirlanda, S., Lind, J., & Enquist, M. (2017). Memory for stimulus sequences: a divide between
humans and other animals? R Soc Open Sci, 4(6), 161011. doi:10.1098/rsos.161011
Gobet, F., Lane, P. C., Croker, S., Cheng, P. C., Jones, G., Oliver, I., & Pine, J. M. (2001).
Chunking mechanisms in human learning. Trends Cogn Sci, 5(6), 236-243.
Gonen-Yaacovi, G., de Souza, L. C., Levy, R., Urbanski, M., Josse, G., & Volle, E. (2013).
Rostral and caudal prefrontal contribution to creativity: a meta-analysis of functional
imaging data. Front Hum Neurosci, 7, 465. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00465
Gopnik, A., Griffiths, T. L., & Lucas, C. G. (2015). When Younger Learners Can Be Better (or
at Least More Open-Minded) Than Older Ones. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 24(2), 87-92. doi:10.1177/0963721414556653
Griffin, A. S. (2016). Innovativeness as an emergent property: a new alignment of comparative
and experimental research on animal innovation. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci,
371(1690). doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0544
Gruber, T. (2016). Great Apes Do Not Learn Novel Tool Use Easily: Conservatism, Functional
Fixedness, or Cultural Influence? International Journal of Primatology, 37(2), 296-316.
doi:10.1007/s10764-016-9902-4
Gruber, T., Muller, M. N., Reynolds, V., Wrangham, R., & Zuberbuhler, K. (2011). Communityspecific evaluation of tool affordances in wild chimpanzees. Sci Rep, 1, 128.
doi:10.1038/srep00128
Hanus, D., Mendes, N., Tennie, C., & Call, J. (2011). Comparing the performances of apes
(Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus) and human children (Homo sapiens)
in the floating peanut task. PLoS One, 6(6), e19555. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019555
Harlow, H. (1949). The formation of learning sets. Pscyhological Review, 56(1), 51-65.
Haun, D. B., & Call, J. (2008). Imitation recognition in great apes. Curr Biol, 18(7), R288-290.
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2008.02.031

152

Henderson, K. B., & Pingry, R. E. (1953). Problem-Solving in Mathematics. In H. F. Fehr (Ed.),
The Learning of Mathematics: Its Theory and Practice (Vol. 21, pp. 228-270). Reston,
VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics.
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behav
Brain Sci, 33(2-3), 61-83; discussion 83-135. doi:10.1017/S0140525X0999152X
Heyes, C. M. (1993). Imitation, culture and cognition. Anim Behav, 46, 999-1010.
Hobaiter, C., & Byrne, R. W. (2010). Able-bodied wild chimpanzees imitate a motor procedure
used by a disabled individual to overcome handicap. PLoS One, 5(8), e11959.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011959
Hockings, K. J., McLennan, M. R., Carvalho, S., Ancrenaz, M., Bobe, R., Byrne, R. W., &
Dunbar, R. I. (2015). Apes in the Anthropocene: flexibility and survival. Trends in
Ecology & Evolution, 30(4), 215-222.
Holmes, P., & Cohen, J. D. (2014). Optimality and some of its discontents: successes and
shortcomings of existing models for binary decisions. Top Cogn Sci, 6(2), 258-278.
doi:10.1111/tops.12084
Hommel, B., & Colzato, L. S. (2017). The social transmission of metacontrol policies:
Mechanisms underlying the interpersonal transfer of persistence and flexibility. Neurosci
Biobehav Rev. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.01.009
Hopkins, W. D. (1997). Hemispheric specialization for local and global processing of
hierarchical visual stimuli in chimpanzees "Pan troglodytes#. Neuropsychologia, 35(3),
343-348.
Hopkins, W. D., Misiura, M., Pope, S. M., & Latash, E. M. (2015). Behavioral and brain
asymmetries in primates: a preliminary evaluation of two evolutionary hypotheses. Ann N
Y Acad Sci, 1359, 65-83. doi:10.1111/nyas.12936
Hopkins, W. D., & Washburn, D. A. (2002). Matching visual stimuli on the basis of global and
local features by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta).
Animal Cognition, 5(1), 27-31.
Hopper, L. M., Kurtycz, L. M., Ross, S. R., & Bonnie, K. E. (2015). Captive chimpanzee
foraging in a social setting: a test of problem solving, flexibility, and spatial discounting.
PeerJ, 3, e833. doi:10.7717/peerj.833
Horner, V., & Whiten, A. (2005). Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens). Anim Cogn, 8(3), 164-181.
doi:10.1007/s10071-004-0239-6
Hoshi, E. (2008). Differential involvement of the Prefrontal, Premotor, and Primary motor
cortices in rule-based motor behavior Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 159175). New York: Oxford University Press.
Hovers, E. (2012). Invention, Reinvention and Innovation Origins of Human Innovation and
Creativity (pp. 51-68).
Hrubesch, C., Preuschoft, S., & van Schaik, C. (2009). Skill mastery inhibits adoption of
observed alternative solutions among chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Anim Cogn, 12(2),
209-216. doi:10.1007/s10071-008-0183-y
Huber, L., Range, F., Voelkl, B., Szucsich, A., Viranyi, Z., & Miklosi, A. (2009). The evolution
of imitation: what do the capacities of non-human animals tell us about the mechanisms
of imitation? Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 364(1528), 2299-2309.
doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0060

153

Huguet, P., Barbet, I., Belletier, C., Monteil, J. M., & Fagot, J. (2014). Cognitive control under
social influence in baboons. J Exp Psychol Gen, 143(6), 2067-2073.
doi:10.1037/xge0000026
Hyafil, A., Summerfield, C., & Koechlin, E. (2009). Two mechanisms for task switching in the
prefrontal cortex. J Neurosci, 29(16), 5135-5142. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.282808.2009
Inoue, S., & Matsuzawa, T. (2007). Working memory of numerals in chimpanzees. Curr Biol,
17(23), R1004-1005. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.10.027
Ionescu, T. (2012). Exploring the nature of cognitive flexibility. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(2),
190-200. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.11.001
Ionescu, T. (2017). The variability-stability-flexibility pattern: A possible key to understanding
the flexibility of the human mind. Review of General Psychology, 21(2), 123-131.
doi:10.1037/gpr0000110
Jacques, S. (2001). The roles of labelling and abstraction in the development of cognitive
flexibility. (PhD), University of Toronto, National Library of Canada.
Jahoda, G. (2016). Seventy years of social psychology: A cultural and personal critique. Journal
of Social and Political Psychology, 4(1), 364-380. doi:10.5964/jspp.v4i1.621
Janzen, H. L., Maguire, T. O., & Boersma, F. J. (1976). A developmental analysis of set patterns
in children: A normative study. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Educational Research Association, San Fransisco, CA.
Ji, L. J., Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture, control, and perception of relationships in the
environment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 943-955.
Ji, L. J., Zhang, Z., & Nisbett, R. E. (2004). Is it culture or is it language? Examination of
language effects in cross-cultural research on categorization. J Pers Soc Psychol, 87(1),
57-65. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.1.57
Jordan, P. L., & Morton, J. B. (2012). Perseveration and the status of 3-year-olds' knowledge in a
card-sorting task: evidence from studies involving congruent flankers. J Exp Child
Psychol, 111(1), 52-64. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2011.06.011
Kirkham, N. Z., Cruess, L., & Diamond, A. (2003). Helping children apply their knowledge to
their behavior on a dimension-switching task. Developmental Science, 6(5), 449-467.
doi:10.1111/1467-7687.00300
Kitayama, S., Duffy, S., Kawamura, T., & Larsen, J. T. (2003). Perceiving an object and its
context in different cultures: a cultural look at new look. Psychol Sci, 14, 201-206.
Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., & Raney, G. E. (2001). An eye movement study of insight problem
solving. Memory & Cognition, 29(7), 1000-1009.
Koechlin, E., & Hyafil, A. (2007). Anterior prefrontal function and the limits of human decisionmaking. Science, 318(5850), 594-598. doi:10.1126/science.1142995
Kolodny, O., Edelman, S., & Lotem, A. (2015). Evolved to adapt: A computational approach to
animal innovation and creativity. Current Zoology, 61(2), 350-367.
Kuhnen, U., & Oyserman, D. (2002). Thinking about the self influences thinking in general:
cognitive consequences of salient self‐concept. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 38, 492-499.
Laland, K. N. (2004). Social learning strategies. Learning & Behavior, 32(1), 4-14.
Langer, E. J., & Lois, G. I. (1979). When practice makes imperfect: debilitating effects of
overlearning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11), 2014.

154

Legare, C. H., & Nielsen, M. (2015). Imitation and Innovation: The Dual Engines of Cultural
Learning. Trends Cogn Sci, 19(11), 688-699. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.005
Lehner, S. R., Burkart, J. M., & Schaik, C. P. (2011). Can captive orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus
abelii) be coaxed into cumulative build-up of techniques? J Comp Psychol, 125(4), 446455. doi:10.1037/a0024413
Lemaire, P., & Leclere, M. (2014). Strategy repetition in young and older adults: a study in
arithmetic. Dev Psychol, 50(2), 460-468. doi:10.1037/a0033527
Lemaire, P., Luwel, K., & Brun, F. (2017). Does the Number of Available Strategies Change
How Children Perform Cognitive Tasks? Insights from Arithmetic. Journal of
Educational and Developmental Psychology, 7(2). doi:10.5539/jedp.v7n2p43
Linnell, K. J., Caparos, S., de Fockert, J. W., & Davidoff, J. (2013). Urbanization decreases
attentional engagement. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform, 39(5), 1232-1247.
doi:10.1037/a0031139
Lipton, P. A., & Eichenbaum, H. (2008). Binding and organization in the medial temporal lobe.
In S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 337363). New York: Oxford Universtiy Press.
Lucas, C. G., Bridgers, S., Griffiths, T. L., & Gopnik, A. (2014). When children are better (or at
least more open-minded) learners than adults: developmental differences in learning the
forms of causal relationships. Cognition, 131(2), 284-299.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.010
Luchins, A. S. (1942). Mechanization of problem solving: The effect of Einstellung.
Psychological Monographs, 54(6), 1-95.
Luchins, A. S., & Luchins, E. H. (1950). New experimental attempts at preventing
mechanization in problem solving. The Journal of General Psychology, 42, 279-297.
Luwel, K., Schillemans, V., Onghena, P., & Verschaffel, L. (2009). Does switching between
strategies within the same task involve a cost? Br J Psychol, 100(Pt 4), 753-771.
doi:10.1348/000712609X402801
MacLean, E. L., Hare, B., Nunn, C. L., Addessi, E., Amici, F., Anderson, R. C., . . . Zhao, Y.
(2014). The evolution of self-control. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 111(20), E2140-2148.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1323533111
Manrique, H. M., & Call, J. (2015). Age-dependent cognitive inflexibility in great apes. Animal
Behaviour, 102, 1-6.
Manrique, H. M., Völter, C. J., & Call, J. (2013). Repeated innovation in great apes. Animal
Behaviour, 85(1), 195-202. doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.10.026
Marshall-Pescini, S., & Whiten, A. (2008). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and the question of
cumulative culture: an experimental approach. Anim Cogn, 11(3), 449-456.
doi:10.1007/s10071-007-0135-y
Masley, S., Roetzheim, R., & Gualtieri, T. (2009). Aerobic exercise enhances cognitive
flexibility. J Clin Psychol Med Settings, 16(2), 186-193. doi:10.1007/s10880-009-9159-6
Masuda, T., & Nisbett, R. E. (2001). Attending Holistically Versus Analytically: Comparing the
Context Sensitivity of Japanese and Americans. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81(5), 922-934. doi:10.1037//0022-35I4.81.5.922
Masuda, T., & Nisbett, R. E. (2006). Culture and change blindness. Cognitive Science, 30, 381399.

155

Mathot, S., Schreij, D., & Theeuwes, J. (2012). OpenSesame: an open-source, graphical
experiment builder for the social sciences. Behav Res Methods, 44(2), 314-324.
doi:10.3758/s13428-011-0168-7
McGuigan, N., Makinson, J., & Whiten, A. (2011). From over-imitation to super-copying: adults
imitate causally irrelevant aspects of tool use with higher fidelity than young children. Br
J Psychol, 102(1), 1-18. doi:10.1348/000712610X493115
McGuigan, N., Whiten, A., Flynn, E., & Horner, V. (2007). Imitation of causally opaque versus
causally transparent tool use by 3- and 5-year-old children. Cognitive Development,
22(3), 353-364. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.01.001
McKelvie, S. J. (1984). Einstellung: Still alive and well. The Journal of General Psychology,
112(3), 313-315.
Meiran, N. (1996). Reconfiguration of processing mode prior to task performance. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, memory, and cognition, 22(6), 1423.
Menzel, E. W., Jr., & Menzel, C. R. (2007). Do Primates Plan Routes? Simple Detour Problems
Reconsidered. In D. A. Washburn (Ed.), Primate Perspectives on Behavior and
Cognition (pp. 175-206). Washington (DC): American Psychological Association.
Michimata, C., Okubo, M., & Mugishima, Y. (1999). Effects of Background Color on the Global
and Local Processing of Hierarchically Organized Stimuli. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 11(1), 1-8. doi:10.1162/089892999563201
Miles, C., Morgan, M. J., Milne, A. B., & Morris, E. D. M. (1996). Developmental and
individual differences in visual memory span. Current Psychology: Developmental,
Learning, Personality, and Social, 15(1), 53-67.
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York: Harper and Row.
Miller, E. K., & Buschman, T. J. (2008). Rules through recursion how interactions between the
frontal cortex and basal ganglie may build abstract, complex rules from concrete, simple
ones. In S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp.
419-455). New York: Oxford University Press.
Miyake, A., & Friedman, N. P. (2012). The Nature and Organization of Individual Differences in
Executive Functions: Four General Conclusions. Curr Dir Psychol Sci, 21(1), 8-14.
doi:10.1177/0963721411429458
Miyamoto, Y., Nisbett, R. E., & Masuda, T. (2006). Culture and the physical environment.
Holistic versus analytic perceptual affordances. Psychol Sci, 17(2), 113-119.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01673.x
Moore, R. (2016). Meaning and ostension in great ape gestural communication. Anim Cogn,
19(1), 223-231. doi:10.1007/s10071-015-0905-x
Moriguchi, Y., Tanaka, M., & Itakura, S. (2011). Executive function in young children and
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): evidence from a nonverbal Dimensional Change Card
Sort task. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 172(3), 252-265.
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: The precedence of global features in visual perception.
Cognitive Psychology, 9, 353-383.
Nielsen, M., Mushin, I., Tomaselli, K., & Whiten, A. (2014). Where culture takes hold:
"overimitation" and its flexible deployment in Western, Aboriginal, and Bushmen
children. Child Dev, 85(6), 2169-2184. doi:10.1111/cdev.12265
Nielsen, M., & Tomaselli, K. (2010). Overimitation in Kalahari Bushman children and the
origins of human cultural cognition. Psychol Sci, 21(5), 729-736.
doi:10.1177/0956797610368808

156

Nisbett, R. E., Choi, I., Peng, K., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought:
Holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108(2), 291-310.
Nisbett, R. E., & Miyamoto, Y. (2005). The influence of culture: holistic versus analytic
perception. Trends Cogn Sci, 9(10), 467-473. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.004
Nissen, H. W., Blum, J. S., & Blum, R. A. (1948). Analysis of matching behavior in chimpanzee.
Journal of comparative and physiological psychology, 41(1), 62-74.
Norenzayan, A., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture and Causal Cognition. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 9(4), 132-135.
Norenzayan, A., Smith, E. E., Kim, B. J., & Nisbett, R. E. (2002). Cultural preferences for
formal versus intuitive reasoning. Cognitive Science, 26, 653-684.
Oden, D. L., Thompson, R. K., & Premack, D. (1988). Spontaneous transfer of matching by
infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of experimental Psychology: Animal
Behavior Processes, 14(2), 140.
Ohshiba, N. (1997). Memorization of serial items by japanese monkeys, a chimpanzee, and
humans. Japanese Psychological Research, 39(3), 236-252.
Oishi, S., Jaswal, V. K., Lillard, A. S., Mizokawa, A., Hitokoto, H., & Tsutsui, Y. (2014).
Cultural variations in global versus local processing: A developmental perspective.
Developmental Psychology, 50(12), 2654-2665. doi:10.1037/a0038272
10.1037/a0038272.supp (Supplemental)
Perelman, P., Johnson, W. E., Roos, C., Seuanez, H. N., Horvath, J. E., Moreira, M. A., . . .
Pecon-Slattery, J. (2011). A molecular phylogeny of living primates. PLoS Genet, 7(3),
e1001342. doi:10.1371/journal.pgen.1001342
Peterson, E. R., & Deary, I. J. (2006). Examining wholistic–analytic style using preferences in
early information processing. Personality and Individual Differences, 41(1), 3-14.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2005.12.010
Petrides, M. (2008). Selection between Competing Responses Based on Conditional Rules. In S.
A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.), The Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 3-22).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Piaget, J. (1954). The Construction of Reality in the Child. New York: Basic Books.
Pope, S. M., Fagot, J., Meguerditchian, A., Washburn, D. A., & Hopkins, W. (Submitted).
Enhanced cognitive flexibility in the semi-nomadic Himba. Cognition.
Pope, S. M., Meguerditchian, A., Fagot, J., & Hopkins, W. (In Prep). The evolution of cognitive
flexibility in primates: Chimpanzees’ intermediate susceptibility to cognitive set.
Pope, S. M., Meguerditchian, A., Hopkins, W. D., & Fagot, J. (2015). Baboons (Papio papio),
but not humans, break cognitive set in a visuomotor task. Anim Cogn, 18(6), 1339-1346.
doi:10.1007/s10071-015-0904-y
Potts, R. (2012). Environmental and Behavioral Evidence Pertaining to the Evolution of
EarlyHomo. Current Anthropology, 53(S6), S299-S317. doi:10.1086/667704
Price, E. E., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J., & Whiten, A. (2009). A potent effect of
observational learning on chimpanzee tool construction. Proc Biol Sci, 276(1671), 33773383. doi:10.1098/rspb.2009.0640
Qiu, J., Li, H., Jou, J., Liu, J., Luo, Y., Feng, T., . . . Zhang, Q. (2010). Neural correlates of the
"Aha" experiences: evidence from an fMRI study of insight problem solving. Cortex,
46(3), 397-403. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2009.06.006
Reader, S. M. (2003). Innovation and social learning: individual variation and brain evolution.
Animal Biology, 53(2), 147-158.

157

Reader, S. M. (2016). Animal social learning: associations and adaptations. F1000Res, 5.
doi:10.12688/f1000research.7922.1
Reader, S. M., Morand-Ferron, J., & Flynn, E. (2016). Animal and human innovation: novel
problems and novel solutions. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 371(1690).
doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0182
Rilling, J. K., & Insel, T. R. (1999). The primate neocortex in comparative perspective using
magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of Human Evolution, 37(2), 191-223.
Ringo, J. L., Doty, R. W., Demeter, S., & Simard, P. Y. (1994). Time is of the essence: a
conjecture that hemispheric specialization arises from interhemispheric conduction delay.
Cerebral Cortex, 4(4), 331-343.
Ritchie, S. J., & Tucker-Drob, E. M. (2017). How much does education improve intelligence? A
meta-analysis. Retrieved from https://psyarxiv.com/kymhp
Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., Davies, I., & Shapiro, L. (2005). Color categories: Evidence for the
cultural relativity hypothesis. Cognitive Psychology, 50(4), 378-411.
Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., & Shapiro, L. (2002). Squaring the circle: The cultural relativity of
‘good shape’. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2(1), 29-51.
Roberts, A. C. (2008). Dopaminergic and Serotinergic modulation of two distinct forms of
flexible cognitive control: Attentional set-shifting and Reversal learning. In S. A. Bunge
& J. D. Wallis (Eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 283-312). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictable switch between cognitive tasks.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124(2), 207.
Rohrer, D., & Taylor, K. (2006). The effects of overlearning and distributed practice on the
retention of mathematics knowledge. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 1209-1224.
Rosati, A. G. (2017). The Evolution of Primate Executive Function: From Response Control
to Strategic Decision-Making Evolution of Nervous Systems (pp. 423-437).
Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. (2009). Artifact in behavioral research. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Rumbaugh, D. M. (1971). Evidence of qualitative differences in learning processes among
primates. Journal of comparative and physiological psychology, 76(2), 250-255.
Ruscio, A. M., & Amabile, T. M. (1999). Effects of instructional style on problem-solving
creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 12(4), 251-266.
Rushworth, M. F. S., Croxson, P. L., Buckley, M. J., & Walton, M. E. (2008). Ventrolateral and
Medial Frontal Contributions to Decision-Maing and Action Selection. In S. A. Bunge &
J. D. Wallis (Eds.), The Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 129-157). New
York: Oxford Univeristy Press.
Rygula, R., Walker, S. C., Clarke, H. F., Robbins, T. W., & Roberts, A. C. (2010). Differential
contributions of the primate ventrolateral prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex to serial
reversal learning. J Neurosci, 30(43), 14552-14559. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.263110.2010
Sakai, K. (2008). Task set and prefrontal cortex. Annu Rev Neurosci, 31, 219-245.
doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.31.060407.125642
Sakai, K., & Passingham, R. E. (2003). Prefrontal interactions reflect future task operations. Nat
Neurosci, 6(1), 75-81. doi:10.1038/nn987
Schenker, N. M., Hopkins, W. D., Spocter, M. A., Garrison, A. R., Stimpson, C. D., Erwin, J.
M., . . . Sherwood, C. C. (2010). Broca's area homologue in chimpanzees (Pan

158

troglodytes): probabilistic mapping, asymmetry, and comparison to humans. Cereb
Cortex, 20(3), 730-742. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhp138
Schoenemann, P. T., Sheehan, M. J., & Glotzer, L. D. (2005). Prefrontal white matter volume is
disproportionately larger in humans than in other primates. Nat Neurosci, 8(2), 242-252.
doi:10.1038/nn1394
Schwartz, D. L., Bransford, J. D., & Sears, D. (2005). Efficiency and innovation in transfer.
Transfer of learning from a modern multidisciplincary perspective, 1-51.
Semendeferi, K., Lu, A., Schenker, N., & Damasio, H. (2002). Humans and great apes share a
large frontal cortex. Nat Neurosci, 5(3), 272-276. doi:10.1038/nn814
Shan, I. K., Chen, Y. S., Lee, Y. C., & Su, T. P. (2008). Adult normative data of the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task in Taiwan. Journal of the Chinese Medical Association, 71(10), 517522.
Smaers, J. B., Gomez-Robles, A., Parks, A. N., & Sherwood, C. C. (2017). Exceptional
Evolutionary Expansion of Prefrontal Cortex in Great Apes and Humans. Curr Biol,
27(5), 714-720.
Smith, K. S., & Graybiel, A. M. (2016). Habit Formation. Dialogues in clinical neuroscience,
18(1), 33.
Star, J. R., & Seifert, C. (2006). The development of flexibility in equation solving.
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 31(3), 280-300.
doi:10.1016/j.cedpsych.2005.08.001
Stevens, N. J., Seiffert, E. R., O’Connor, P. M., Roberts, E. M., Schmidtz, M. D., Krause, C., . . .
Temu, J. (2013). Palaeontological evidence for an Oligocene divergence between Old
World monkeys and apes. Nature, 497, 611-614.
Stoet, G., & Snyder, J. (2007). Extensive Practice does not Eliminate Human Switch Costs.
Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 7(3), 192-197.
Stoet, G., & Snyder, J. (2008). Task-Switching in Human and Nonhuman Primates:
Understanding rule encoding and control from behavior to single neurons. In S. A. Bunge
& J. D. Wallis (Eds.), The Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 227-253). New
York, New York: Oxford University Press.
Stoet, G., & Snyder, L. H. (2003). Executive control and task-switching in monkeys.
Neuropsychologia, 41(10), 1357-1364. doi:10.1016/s0028-3932(03)00048-4
Stoet, G., & Snyder, L. H. (2004). Single neurons in posterior parietal cortex of monkeys encode
cognitive set. Neuron, 42(6), 1003-1012. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.06.003
Sullivan, E. V., Mathalon, D. H., Zipursky, R. B., Kersteen-Tucker, Z., Knight, R. T., &
Pfefferbaum, A. (1993). Factors of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test as measures of
frontal-lobe function in schizophrenia and in chronic alcoholosim. Psychiatry Research,
46(2), 175-199.
Sweller, J. (1980). Hypothesis salience, task difficulty, and sequential effects on problem
solving. The American Journal of Psychology, 93(1), 135-145.
Sweller, J. (1983). Control mechanisms in problem solving. Memory & Cognition, 11(1), 32-40.
Sweller, J., & Gee, W. (1978). Einstellung, the sequence effect, and hypothesis theory. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4(5), 513-526.
Sweller, J., & Levine, M. (1982). Effects of goal specificty on means-ends analysis and learning.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, memory, and cognition, 8(5), 463.
Sweller, J., Mawer, R. F., & Howe, W. (1982). Consequences of history-cued and means-end
strategies in problem solving. The American Journal of Psychology, 95(3), 455-483.

159

Tebbich, S., Griffin, A. S., Peschl, M. F., & Sterelny, K. (2016). From mechanisms to function:
an integrated framework of animal innovation. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci,
371(1690). doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0195
Tennie, C., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the evolution of
cumulative culture. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 364(1528), 2405-2415.
doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0052
Thomason, M. E., Race, E., Burrows, B., Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., Glover, G. H., & Gabrieli, J. D.
(2009). Development of spatial and verbal working memory capacity in the human brain.
J Cogn Neurosci, 21(2), 316-332. doi:10.1162/jocn.2008.21028
Thompson, R. K., Oden, D. L., & Boysen, S. T. (1997). Language-Naive Chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) Judge Relations Between Relations in a Conceptual Matching-to-Sample
Task.
Thompson-Schill, S. L., Ramscar, M., & Chrysikou, E. G. (2009). Cognition without control:
When a little frontal lobe goes a long way. Curr Dir Psychol Sci, 18(5), 259-263.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01648.x
Titz, C., & Karbach, J. (2014). Working memory and executive functions: effects of training on
academic achievement. Psychological Research, 78(6), 852-868.
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A. C., & Ratner, H. H. (1993). Cultural learning. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 16, 495-552.
Toni, I., Rowe, J., Klass, S. E., & Passingham, R. E. (2002). Changes of Cortico-striatal
Effective Connectivity during Visuomotor Learning. Cerebral Cortex, 12, 1040-1047.
Trick, L., Kempton, M. J., Williams, S. C., & Duka, T. (2014). Impaired fear recognition and
attentional set-shifting is associated with brain structural changes in alcoholic patients.
Addict Biol, 19(6), 1041-1054. doi:10.1111/adb.12175
Van Leeuwen, E. J., Cronin, K. A., Schutte, S., Call, J., & Haun, D. B. (2013). Chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) flexibly adjust their behaviour in order to maximize payoffs, not to
conform to majorities. PLoS One, 8(11), e80945. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080945
van Schaik, C. P., Burkart, J., Damerius, L., Forss, S. I., Koops, K., van Noordwijk, M. A., &
Schuppli, C. (2016). The reluctant innovator: orangutans and the phylogeny of creativity.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 371(1690). doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0183
Visalberghi, E., & Fragaszy, D. (2002). “Do Monkeys Ape?” - Ten Years After. In K.
Daughternhahn & C. L. Nehavniv (Eds.), Imitation in Animals and Artifacts. (pp. 471499). Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Vlamings, P. H., Hare, B., & Call, J. (2010). Reaching around barriers: the performance of the
great apes and 3-5-year-old children. Anim Cogn, 13(2), 273-285. doi:10.1007/s10071009-0265-5
Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive Thinking. New York: Harper.
Yamamoto, S., Humle, T., & Tanaka, M. (2013). Basis for cumulative cultural evolution in
chimpanzees: social learning of a more efficient tool-use technique. PLoS One, 8(1),
e55768. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055768
Yeung, M. K., Han, Y. M., Sze, S. L., & Chan, A. S. (2015). Abnormal Frontal Theta
Oscillations Underlie the Cognitive Flexibility Deficits in Children With HighFunctioning Autism Spectrum Disorders. Neuropsychology, 30(3), 281-295.
Zelazo, P. D. (2008). The Development of Rule Use in Children. In S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis
(Eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior (pp. 441-455). New York: Oxford
University Press.

160

Zelazo, P. D., Frye, D., & Rapus, T. (1996). An age-related dissociation between knowing rules
and using them. Cognitive Development, 11(1), 37-63. doi:10.1016/s08852014(96)90027-1
Zelazo, P. D., Muller, U., Frye, D., Marcovitch, S., Argitis, G., Boseovski, J., . . . Carlson, S.
(2003). The development of executive function in early childhood. Monographs of the
society for research in child development, i-151.

161

APPENDICES
Appendix A

Supplemental Fig 2.1. Pilot data was collected on 32 humans (ages 6-51), including 5
children (mean age = 6.4, SD=.55), 8 adolescents (mean age = 14.13, SD=.35), and 14 adults
(mean age 36.36, SD= 10.02). Methods were highly similar to those previously described;
however, children were given 500ms demonstration slides during testing. Additionally, the first
10 adults were only given 48 testing trials. After a subject noted that she “figured it out at the
very end,” the trial numbers were doubled. Once participants had completed all trials, they
were asked if they had thought about touching the Triangle directly and their responses were
recorded. Our results showed that 1 out of 14 (7.14%) adults, 1 out of 8 (12.5%) adolescents
and 2 out of 5 (40%) children would be classified as DSers. This is consistent with our later
findings.
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Appendix B - Chapter 5 Supplementary Data

Group differences in accuracy and response times
Western subjects’ overall accuracy in experimental trials was significantly higher than
Urban, and Traditional Himba subjects,’ as revealed by a Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis of
variance (H(2) = 54.74, p < .001; Ms: Western = 91.5%, Urban = 77.9%, Traditional = 79.2%).
Additionally, a loglinear analysis revealed no effect of sex on DS-use in any group for either
PRE [χ2(1, N= 183 = 0.87, p = .351; Female DSers = 23.6%; Male DSers = 35.6%] or POST
[χ2(1, N = 183 = 1.49, p = .223; Female DSers = 35.5%; Male DSers = 41.1%] trials.
We assessed general differences in response times between groups by isolating the time
between the end of the Square1→Square2 demonstration and subjects’ first response (RT1),
between first and second response (RT2) and between second and third response (RT3) for
BASE trials in which they used the LS. Data were normalized using a natural logarithmic
transform and outliers were excluded (N = 6 Westerners, 1 Urban, 8 Traditional). A mixed
design ANOVA indicated a significant interaction (F(4,330) = 19.78, p < .000) between
response (RT1, RT2, RT3) and group (Western, Urban, Traditional). RT1 was slower than RT3,
which was slower than RT2, for all groups. Further, Westerners’ were significantly faster than
Urban Himba, who in turn were significantly faster than traditional Himba for RT1 (Westerners:
M = 722.6 ms; SD = 176.9; Urban: M = 1259.6 ms; SD = 438.6; Traditional: M = 1463.9 ms; SD
= 482.3) and RT2 (Westerners: M = 218.1 ms; SD = 107.2; Urban: M = 405.7 ms; SD = 266.1;
Traditional: M = 520.9 ms; SD = 225.5). For RT3, Westerners were significantly faster than
Urban and Traditional Himba, who did not differ from each other (Westerners: M = 653.9 ms;
SD = 115.5; Urban: M = 929.1 ms; SD = 193.9; Traditional: M = 980.5 ms; SD = 320.4).
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An intermediate strategy
During analysis, we discovered that some subjects used an intermediate strategy, in
which they selected Square1 and then the Triangle, skipping Square2 (Figure 1.6-1c). That is to
say, they began to use the LS but then switched to the DS, invoking a ‘switch strategy’ (SS).
Using the same greater than 5% classification criteria to identify SSers, we found a significantly
higher proportion of SSers within the Traditional Himba (20.0%) than the Urban Himba (3.7%)
however, the proportion of Westerners (5.6%) did not differ from either group, in PRE trials
[χ2(1, N = 183) = 10.837, p = .004]. Yet, in POST trials SSer proportions of Traditional (16%),
Urban (7.4%), and Westerners (9.3%) were not statistically distinct.

